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one's sense ofjustice that the judgment meted out.., should depend in large part
on a purely fortuitous circumstance; namely the personality of the particular
judge before whom the case happens to come for disposition. " Yet in asylum
cases, which can spell the difference between life and death, the outcome
apparently depends in large measure on which government official decides the
claim. In many cases, the most important moment in an asylum case is the instant
in which a clerk randomly assigns an application to a particular asylum officer
or immigration judge.
This study analyzes databases of decisions from all four levels of the asylum
adjudication process: 133,000 decisions involving nationals from eleven key
countries rendered by 884 asylum officers over a seven-year period, 140,000
decisions of 225 immigration judges over afour-and-a-half-year period; 126, 000
decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals over a six-year period; and 4215
decisions of the U.S. courts of appeals during 2004 and 2005. The analysis
reveals amazing disparities in grant rates, even when different adjudicators in the
same office each considered large numbers of applications from nationals of the
same country. For example, in one regional asylum office, 60% of the officers
decided in favor of Chinese applicants at rates that deviated by more than 50%
from that region 's mean grant rate for Chinese applicants, with some officers
granting asylum to no Chinese nationals, while other officers granted asylum in
as many as 68% of their cases. Similarly, Colombian asylum applicants whose
cases were adjudicated in the federal immigration court in Miami had a 5%
chance of prevailing with one of that court's judges and an 88% chance of
prevailing before another judge in the same building. Half of the Miami judges
deviated by more than 50% from the court's mean grant rate for Colombian
cases.
Using cross-tabulations based on public biographies, the paper also
explores correlations between sociological characteristics of individual
immigration judges and their grant rates. The cross-tabulations show that the
chance of winning asylum was strongly affected not only by the random
assignment of a case to a particular immigration judge, but also in very large
measure by the quality of an applicant's legal representation, by the gender of the
immigration judge, and by the immigration judge's work experience prior to
appointment.
In their conclusion, the authors do not recommend enforced quota systems
for asylum adjudicators, but they do make recommendations for more
comprehensive training, more effective and independent appellate review, and
other reforms that wouldfurther professionalize the adjudication system.
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INTRODUCTION
We Americans love the idea of "equal justice under law," the words
inscribed above the main entrance to the Supreme Court building. We want like
cases to come out alike. We publish tens of thousands of judicial decisions and
have enshrined the concept of stare decisis in order to reduce the likelihood that
Jane's case, adjudicated in December 2006, will come out very differently from
Joe's very similar case adjudicated in January 2007. We have adopted
sentencing guidelines in the hope that the punishment meted out to offenders
depends on their offenses and prior records rather than on the whims,
personalities, or ideologies of the sentencing judges. We use pattern jury
instructions in both civil and criminal cases to guide lay adjudicators to apply
the same law to similar disputes. When civil juries depart significantly from
established norms, judges use remittitur to reduce awards, enter judgments that
are at odds with the jury's verdict, or grant new trials.
Americans don't love consistent decision making merely because we think
that fairness to the parties requires that similar cases should have similar
outcomes. We also like the predictability that stare decisis offers. Most disputes
can be settled without all-out litigation when the results of formal adjudication
can be predicted in advance with reasonable certainty. In addition, and perhaps
most pertinent, we don't like the idea that litigants' lives, liberty, or property
could be determined by the predilections or personal preferences of the
individual men and women who happen to judge their cases. The very essence
of the rule of law, embodied in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, is that individual cases should be disposed of by reference to
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standardized norms rather than by arbitrary factors, particularly the personal
biases, attitudes, policies, or ideologies of government adjudicators.
In recent years, however, the public and the press have become skeptical
about the extent to which American judging reflects only the law and not the
predilections of the adjudicators. Judges (and entire courts) are commonly
referred to in the press as liberal or conservative, and many lawyers believe that
although they cannot predict the outcome of a trial-level case on the day before
it is filed, or the outcome of an appeal on the day before it is docketed, they can
do so once they know what judge or judges have been assigned to decide it. In
response to this public skepticism, Chief Judge Harry Edwards of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit wrote a noteworthy law review article
defending the notion that "it is the law-and not the personal politics of
individual judges-that controls judicial decision making."' His article
spawned a series of rebuttals and counter-rebuttals. Professor Richard Revesz
conducted a careful empirical study of decisions by the judges of Edwards'
court in challenges to rules of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). He
concluded that the political composition of three-judge panels often mattered a
great deal.2
Judge Edwards wrote a surprisingly harsh critique of the Revesz "so-called
'empirical stud[y],"' claiming that its interpretations were "bogus." 3 Revesz
then rebutted this critique,4 and Edwards published a further article rejecting
the "neo-realist arguments of scholars who claim that the personal ideologies
[rather than law and collegiality] ... are crucial determinants" of outcomes.
1. Harry T. Edwards, Public Misperceptions Concerning the "Politics" of Judging:
Dispelling Some Myths About the D.C. Circuit, 56 U. COLO. L. REv. 619, 620 (1985).
2. Looking only at individual votes, Revesz found:
(1) for industry challenges [to EPA rules on procedural grounds], Republicans had a higher
reversal rate [that is rate of reversing the EPA] than Democrats in all the periods [of time
studied]; and (2) for environmental [group] challenges, Democrats had a higher reversal rate
than Republicans in all the periods .... These relationships are consistent with the selective
deference hypotheses (that judges' votes are determined by their preferences concerning the
substance of environmental policy) ....
Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L.
REv. 1717, 1738-39 (1997). Turning to the composition of three-judge panels, Revesz found
that judges were significantly more likely to vote to invalidate an EPA rule when at least two
of the three members of the panel had been appointed by a President whose party could be
expected to disagree with the rule (i.e., when at least two Republicans considered an industry
challenge or when at least two Democrats considered an environmentalist challenge). In
other words, "[T]he effects of panel composition are far greater than the effects of individual
ideology." Id. at 1764. The effects were presumably greater because, on a three-judge
appellate panel, when members who had been appointed by a party that was more likely to
disagree with an EPA decision constituted a majority of the panel, they had the power to
change it or at least to force the EPA to reconsider its decision.
3. Harry T. Edwards, Collegiality and Decision Making on the D.C. Circuit, 84 VA. L.
REv. 1335, 1335, 1368 (1998).
4. Richard L. Revesz, Ideology, Collegiality, and the D.C. Circuit: A Reply to Chief
Judge Harry T. Edwards, 85 VA. L. REv. 805 (1999).
5. Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making, 151 U.
[Vol. 60:295
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Much of the Edward-Revesz debate concerned relatively small differences
in the voting patterns of the various judges. For example, in two of six periods
of time reported, Democratic judges voted 44% of the time to sustain
environmentalists' challenges to EPA rules, while Republican judges did so
only 42% of the time (a 5% disparity). In another period, the Democratic to
Republican ratio was 47% to 33%. In the other periods, Republican judges
were more prone to sustain such challenges than Democratic judges. In some
periods, a Democratic judge was perhaps 50% more likely to vote for an
environmentalist challenge than a Republican judge, a difference that should
perhaps be disturbing if we expect judges to leave their political leanings
behind when they take the bench. The differences were somewhat more
dramatic in the case of industry challenges to the EPA. Republican judges
voted nearly twice as often as Democratic judges to sustain those challenges. 6
In other words, a judge might be nearly 100% more likely to vote for an
industry-requested remand if the judge were Republican rather than
Democratic, statistics that may again suggest cause for concern. Those
percentages are far larger than the approximate 17% disparity (about 5 months)
in the lengths of sentences meted out by federal judges in 1986-1987 before
federal sentencing guidelines took effect, a disparity thought so great as to
warrant a federal statute imposing those guidelines.
7
But how about a situation in which one judge is 1820% more likely to
grant an application for important relief than another judge in the same
courthouse? 8 Or where one U.S. Court of Appeals is 1148% more likely to rule
in favor of a petitioner than another U.S. Court of Appeals considering similar
cases? 9
Welcome to the world of asylum law.
Collectively, asylum officers, immigration judges, members of the Board
of Immigration Appeals, and judges of U.S. courts of appeals render about
79,000 asylum decisions annually.' 0 Almost all of them involve claims that an
PA. L. REv. 1639, 1640 (2003).
6. Revesz, supra note 2, at 1750 tbl.8.
7. James M. Anderson, Jeffrey R. Kling & Kate Stith, Measuring Interjudge
Sentencing Disparity: Before and After the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON.
271, 303 (1999).
8. See infra text after note 70 (discussing the difference in grant rates of two New York
immigration judges for Albanian applicants).
9. See infra Figure 48 and accompanying text (discussing the difference in remand
rates of the Fourth and Seventh Circuits when considering asylum claims from the same
group of fifteen countries from which asylum is frequently granted).
10. In FY 2005, asylum officers rendered 28,305 merits decisions (grants, denials,
referrals after interviews, and rejections after interviews based on failure to meet the
statutory deadline, for applicants from all countries other than Mexico). E-mail from Ted
Kim, Operations Branch Chief, Asylum Div., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., to
Philip Schrag (Aug. 23, 2006) (attaching "Refugees, Asylum and Parole System: Grant
Rates by Asylum Officer-FY99 through FY05 National Table (All Officers)," which
contains the data) (on file with authors). In the same year, immigration judges made 30,903
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applicant for asylum reasonably fears imprisonment, torture, or death if forced
to return to her home country. Given our national desire for equal treatment in
adjudication, one would expect to find in this system for the mass production of
justice many indicators demonstrating a strong degree of uniformity of decision
making over place and time. Yet in the very large volume of adjudications
involving foreign nationals' applications for protection from persecution and
torture in their home countries, we see a great deal of statistical variation in the
outcomes pronounced by decision makers. The statistics that we have collected
and analyzed in this Article suggest that in the world of asylum adjudication,
there is remarkable variation in decision making from one official to the next,
from one office to the next, from one region to the next, from one Court of
Appeals to the next, and from one year to the next, even during periods when
there has been no intervening change in the law. The variation is particularly
striking when one controls for both the nationality and current area of residence
of applicants and examines the asylum grant rates of the different asylum
officers who work in the same regional building, or immigration judges who sit
in adjacent courtrooms of the same immigration court. When an asylum seeker
stands before an official or court who will decide whether she will be deported
or may remain in the United States, the result may be determined as much or
more by who that official is, or where the court is located, as it is by the facts
and law of the case. The fact that the outcome of a case appears to be strongly
influenced by the identity or attitude of the officer or judge to whom it is
assigned is particularly discomfiting in asylum cases, because when a bona fide
application is erroneously denied, the applicant is almost always ordered
deported to a nation in which she will be in grave danger. 
1 I
decisions on the merits in asylum cases. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION COURTS, FY
2005 ASYLUM STATISTICS (2006), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/efoia/FY05AsyStats.pdf. During that year, the Board decided
16,762 asylum cases (this number excludes about 2000 cases that the Board is not able to
characterize as favoring either party). Computer disk from Brett Endres, Executive Office of
Immigration Review, to Andrew I. Schoenholtz (May 31, 2006) (on file with authors)
(attaching Board of Immigration Appeals, "Crosstabulation for Decision Type by Attorney
and Nationality per Year of Appeal"). Finally, during calendar year 2005, the U.S. courts of
appeals decided 2163 asylum cases, as described in Part V of this Article.
11. This Article explores statistical disparities in asylum adjudication but does not
attempt to convey the human suffering attendant on the denial of an application for asylum.
One of us has recently co-authored, with an unsuccessful asylum applicant who had been
tortured and nearly executed, a full account of the applicant's persecution and flight to the
United States, and of the adjudication of his case. His application went through all of the
stages of hearing and appeals that are described in this Article. After his request for asylum
was turned down by an asylum officer and denied by the immigration judge who had the
lowest grant rate in her immigration court, his appeal was rejected by a single member of the
Board of Immigration Appeals and then by the U.S. Court of Appeals in the circuit that had
the lowest rate of remanding cases to the Board. Forced to return to Africa, he was nearly
murdered once again. DAVID NGARURI KENNEY & PHILIP G. SCHRAG, ASYLUM DENIED: A
REFUGEE'S STRUGGLE FOR SAFETY IN AMERICA (forthcoming 2008).
[Vol. 60:295
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We cannot prove that the variations in outcomes based on the locations or
personalities of the adjudicators are greater in asylum cases than in criminal,
civil, or other administrative adjudications. Only a few scholars, such as
Revesz, have attempted to analyze similarities or differences in adjudication in
a large database of cases that involve particular subject matters and were
governed by a single body of law. 12 In this Article, however, we report and
analyze new statistical data that suggest to us that very significant differences
from one decision maker to the next in the adjudication of asylum cases should
be a matter of serious concern to federal policymakers. 13 The new statistics
show disconcerting variability among individual adjudicators in the institutions
for which adequate data are available for analysis.
In Part I of this Article, we describe the systems through which asylum
cases are adjudicated and the four institutions that decide them: the asylum
offices, the immigration courts, the Board of Immigration Appeals, and the
United States courts of appeals. Readers familiar with the institutions that
process asylum applications and with the procedures they follow may choose to
skip Part I of this Article and begin with Part II.
In Part II of the Article, we look at the first stage of decision making:
adjudications by asylum officers. The Department of Homeland Security
provided us with grant rate data for each of the 928 asylum officers who served
12. See, e.g., John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, How Federal Circuit Judges Vote in
Patent Validity Cases, 10 FED. CIR. B.J. 435, 436 (2001) (finding that "[j]udges do not fit
easily into pro-patent or anti-patent categories, or into affirmers and reversers"); Robert G.
Dixon, Jr., The Welfare State and Mass Justice: A Warning from the Social Security
Disability Program, 1972 DuKE L.J. 681, 717 (showing that 153 of 252 Social Security
disability hearing examiners reversed denials of benefits between 36% and 55% of the time,
but 19 examiners reversed 66% to 80% of the time, and 26 reversed 21% to 30% of the time,
a "striking and disturbing" disparity); James Edward Maule, Instant Replay, Weak Teams,
and Disputed Calls: An Empirical Study of Alleged Tax Court Judge Bias, 66 TENN. L. REV.
351, 400 (1999) ("[W]eighted taxpayer prevalence scores demolish the assertions that Tax
Court judges make decisions in congruity with their backgrounds."); Cass R. Sunstein,
David Schkade & Lisa Michelle Ellman, Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals: A
Preliminary Investigation, 90 VA. L. REV. 301, 306, 353 (2004) (finding that although the
political affiliation of the appointing President is not correlated with judicial votes on
criminal appeals, takings, or federalism, in cases involving abortion and capital punishment,
"judges vote their convictions").
13. A recent law journal article reviews some of the data relating to disparities in
immigration courts (looking only at rates within the New York City immigration court and
ranking disparity levels for twenty-eight immigration courts) and briefly examines reversal
rates in the courts of appeals (looking only at the Seventh Circuit and the combined reversal
data for all federal circuits). Sydenham B. Alexander III, A Political Response to Crisis in
the Immigration Courts, 21 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1 (2006). That article does not analyze the
Asylum Office and Board of Immigration Appeals data that we obtained, and does not
engage as comprehensively with the data on the immigration courts and courts of appeals. It
instead focuses on the evidence it examines to advocate compellingly for a political solution
to the immigration court crisis. The article notes that legal scholars "concerned about IJ
inconsistency ... have been slow to incorporate statistical analysis into their work." Id. at 21
n.125.
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during fiscal years 1999-2005. 4 For decisions on cases of applicants from
eleven key countries that generate many valid asylum claims, the Department
also provided individual grant rates by nationality of the applicant. From these
data, we measured changes in the rate at which asylum was granted by the
Department from region to region (holding constant the group of countries of
greatest interest and, in some cases, limiting our study to a particular country),
and variations from officer to officer within each of the Department's eight
regional asylum offices (again controlling for countries of the applicants). The
results of this analysis are reported in Part II.
Part III examines statistics in asylum cases decided by 247 immigration
judges from fiscal years 2000-2004. We investigated disparities in grant rates
between different immigration courts, but more important, we examined
disparities in the grant rates of different judges within the largest courts. We
were also able to correlate the grant rates of individual judges with biographical
information about those judges and with additional information about the cases.
Certain correlations surprised us and raise serious questions about whether the
results of cases are excessively influenced by personal characteristics of the
judges, such as their prior government service. The results of our examinations
are reported in Part III.
We would have liked to include an analysis of how individual members of
the Board of Immigration Appeals resolve cases assigned to them, but the
Department of Justice does not keep statistics on the dispositions of appeals by
individual members of the Board, 15 and it does not make public the vast
majority of its asylum decisions. 16 We were able to examine variations from
year to year in the Board's treatment of asylum appeals. Our study included the
period just before, during, and after FY 2002, when the Board was in great
turmoil due to substantial personnel and procedural changes.' 7 Although we
14. "The fiscal year is the accounting period for the federal government which begins
on October 1 and ends on September 30. The fiscal year is designated by the calendar year in
which it ends; for example, fiscal year 2006 begins on October 1, 2005 and ends on
September 30, 2006." United States Senate, Glossary, http://www.senate.gov/reference/
glossaryterm/fiscalyear.htm.
15. The Board claims that it does not track decisions by outcome, but there is some
evidence to the contrary. See John R.B. Palmer, Stephen W. Yale-Loehr & Elizabeth Cronin,
Why Are So Many People Challenging Board of Immigration Appeals Decisions in Federal
Court? An Empirical Analysis of the Recent Surge in Petitions for Review, 20 GEO. IMMIGR.
L.J. 1, 56 n.248 (2005). Even if the Board does track decisions by outcome, it apparently
does not track them by member.
16. Confidentiality concerns could justify the Board's refusal to publish decisions that
include identifying information about asylum applicants, as they or their relatives could
suffer retaliation for reporting on their countries' human rights violations. However, the
Board does not publish or otherwise make available even redacted copies of most of its
asylum decisions.
17. See DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP, BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS: PROCEDURAL




could not compare individual Board members' grant rates because the Board
lacks the relevant data, we were able to measure the effect of these changes on
its overall rate of decisions favorable to asylum applicants. Part IV of the
Article describes and analyzes the data that the Board was able to provide to us.
Part V investigates variations in the treatment of asylum cases in the U.S.
courts of appeals from one circuit to another. We examined the rate at which
asylum denials by the Board of Immigration Appeals were remanded by courts
in all of the circuits. We were able to compare these rates both for all cases and
for cases from a group of fifteen countries that generate a particularly large
number and high percentage of successful asylum cases. We were also able to
compare the rates at which individual judges in two circuits voted to remand
cases.
In Parts VI and VII, we summarize and comment on our findings and
suggest several steps that might be taken to advance the degree to which the
outcomes in asylum cases could become somewhat more uniform. We also
recommend other reforms to improve the asylum adjudication process.
Human judgment can never be eliminated from any system of justice. But
we believe that the outcome of a refugee's quest for safety in America should
be influenced more by law and less by a spin of the wheel of fate that assigns
her case to a particular government official. 
18
I. THE ASYLUM PROCESS
As part of its commitment to human rights, the United States offers asylum
to foreign nationals who flee to its shores and can prove that they are
"refugees"--that is, that they have a well-founded fear of persecution in their
own countries, and that their race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or
membership in a particular social group is at least one central reason for the
threatened persecution.1 9 A foreign national who seeks asylum in the United
States may do so either affirmatively or defensively. An affirmative applicant
seeks asylum on her own initiative, and voluntarily identifies herself to the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) through her application. An
affirmative applicant may be either an individual who maintains a valid non-
immigrant visa (e.g., a tourist or student) or a person who either overstayed her
visa or entered the United States without being formally processed by an
immigration official. A defensive applicant applies for asylum after having
been apprehended by DHS and placed in removal proceedings in immigration
18. We agree with Stephen Legomsky that accuracy, consistency, and public
acceptance are among the most important goals of any adjudicative system, and particularly
one in which human life and liberty are at stake. See Stephen H. Legomsky, An Asylum
Seeker's Bill of Rights in a Non-Utopian World, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 619, 622 (2000).
19. 8 U.S.C. §§ I 101(a)(42), 1158(b)(1) (2000).
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court, a part of the Department of Justice (DOJ). 20 A successful applicant is
granted asylum and is not ordered removed.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is the executive agency
primarily responsible for overseeing immigration processes, including
affirmative asylum applications. The Department's Office of Citizenship and
Immigration Services (USCIS) houses the asylum corps, comprised of asylum
officers who evaluate asylum applications and interview the applicants. The
Department's Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement includes the
trial attorneys who oppose asylum claims before the immigration courts.
Asylum decisions, whether by asylum officers or immigration judges,
involve both a judgment about whether the applicant's story, if true, would
render the applicant eligible for asylum under American law and an assessment
as to whether the applicant is telling the truth about his or her personal
experiences of actual or threatened persecution. Among similar cases, we
would expect some, but relatively little, variation from one experienced
adjudicator to another in relationship to the legal assessment of a truthful
applicant's legal eligibility. Assessments of credibility are more difficult and
subjective, so we might expect somewhat greater variability from one
adjudicator to another with respect to this component of the decision.
Nevertheless, a system that endeavors to prevent arbitrary adjudication should
attempt to keep even this aspect of variability within a relatively narrow range.
It is a difficult task indeed that the adjudicators face, as it is not only
important to grant genuine claims but also to deny false claims. Successful
false asylum claims undermine the integrity of the asylum system and reduce
public support for the admission of genuine refugees.
A. The Regional Asylum Offices
Several weeks after filing a written application for asylum, an affirmative
asylum seeker is interviewed by a trained asylum officer in one of the eight
regional USCIS asylum offices. Within each regional office, cases are assigned
randomly to particular asylum officers.21 The interview is nonadversarial, with
the asylum officer in an inquisitorial role. There is no separate representative
for the government, and asylum seekers may be represented by counsel at their
own expense. The asylum officer can grant asylum, refer the asylum claim to
immigration court, or, if the asylum seeker has valid immigration status in the
20. DHS may have apprehended the individual in the interior of the country or at an
airport, seaport, or land port of entry at which he arrived without a valid passport or visa.
Individuals without proper documentation who voluntarily identify themselves to
immigration officials at a port of entry as applicants for asylum are apprehended and
detained just as if they were discovered by officials to have lacked such documentation.




United States, deny the asylum claim. 22 About 35% of adjudicated cases in
most recent years are grants of asylum. Most asylum officer decisions,
however, result in referrals to immigration court.
Figure 1. The Affirmative Asylum Process
The Asylum Office keeps separate statistics on three different types of
referrals, though all three result in removal hearings in immigration court. First,
referrals without interviews occur when an asylum applicant does not appear
for a scheduled interview. Because there is no interview or adjudication on the
merits in these cases, we have excluded them entirely from our study. Second,
regular referrals occur when the asylum officer either (1) does not believe that
the applicant has carried her burden of proving facts showing that she meets the
statutory definition of a refugee, or (2) accepts the proffered facts as true but
does not believe that those facts qualify the applicant for asylum as a matter of
22. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.1(b), 1208.9, 1208.14(b)-(c) (2006). Denials comprise only a
small fraction of asylum officer decisions, as only 7% of asylum seekers apply while they
still have a lawful immigration status. See U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2004 YEARBOOK
OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 55-64 tbls. 18 & 19 (2006).
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law. The third type of referral, called a "rejection" for purposes of statistical
record-keeping, occurs when the asylum officer does not believe that the
applicant applied for asylum within one year after last entering the United
States, a deadline imposed by Congress in 1996, effective April 1, 1998.23 An
applicant who filed more than a-year after entering the United States may be
granted asylum if she can prove the existence of "changed circumstances" or
"extraordinary circumstances" justifying late filing. 24 If she is not able to prove
entry less than a year before application, or if she is not able to show the
existence of a qualifying excuse, she is "rejected" and referred to an
immigration court hearing.
Decisions by asylum officers are reviewed by a supervisory asylum officer
within the regional office before being released to the asylum applicant
approximately two weeks after the interview takes place. In rare cases (e.g., if
the case presents a novel issue of law as to which neither the Department of
Homeland Security nor the Attorney General has made a policy decision), the
case may be referred to DHS national headquarters before a decision is
rendered.
B. The Immigration Courts
When an asylum officer refers a case to immigration court, the Asylum
Office serves the asylum applicant with a "Notice to Appear" in that court on a
specific date. 25 The notice to appear is the equivalent of a summons in a civil
case, and with service of this notice, the asylum applicant becomes a
"respondent."
In most cases, the respondent has no basis for denying the government's
charge of being present in the United States without authorization, so the bulk
of the court proceeding, which can last for several hours, is devoted to a de
novo hearing on her evidence of eligibility for asylum. If for some reason the
respondent does not qualify for asylum (e.g., she missed the application
deadline), she may be eligible for withholding of removal26 or protection under
23. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B).
24. 8 U.S.C. § 1 158(a)(2)(D); 8 CFR § 208.4(a)(4)-(5) (2007) (interpreting the statute);
see PHILIP G. SCHRAG, A WELL-FOUNDED FEAR: THE CONGRESSIONAL BATTLE TO SAVE
POLITICAL ASYLUM IN AMERICA (2000) (describing the history of the enactment of the
deadline); Michele R. Pistone & Philip G. Schrag, The New Asylum Rule: Improved but Still
Unfair, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1 (2001) (detailing the exceptions to the deadline and their
limitations).
25. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.18(b), 1208.2(c)(3)(ii) (2007).
26. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) (2000). An important distinction between asylum and
withholding is that to win asylum, an applicant must demonstrate only well-founded fear,
perhaps only a ten percent chance, of persecution. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,
431 (1987). By contrast, to obtain withholding of removal, an applicant must prove that




the Convention Against Torture.2 7 The benefits awarded with those types of
relief are far more limited. For example, an asylee may obtain asylum for her
dependent spouse and minor children in the United States, or, if they are
abroad, she may later bring those dependents to the United States as derivative
beneficiaries of her asylum claim. After a year, asylees may apply to become
permanent residents, and, after five years, to become American citizens.
However, grants of withholding of removal or protection under the Convention
Against Torture do not lead to permanent residence or citizenship, and do not
provide derivative protection for dependents.
2 8
The immigration court also hears defensive asylum cases. A defensive case
is one that is presented by an applicant without valid immigration status who
was apprehended by DHS before the individual filed an asylum application.
Such an individual does not have an opportunity to present their claim to an
asylum officer, and may file their asylum application only in immigration
court. Defensive applicants are usually detained (jailed) by DHS after
apprehension. A small number are released on bond (or on their own
recognizance) before their immigration court hearings, while most remain
detained through their hearings and any subsequent appeal.
In both affirmative cases that were referred by an asylum officer and in
defensive cases, immigration court hearings are adversarial proceedings. A
DHS attorney is assigned to cross-examine the asylum applicant and usually
argues before the immigration judge that asylum is not warranted. Asylum
seekers may be represented at their own expense, but indigent applicants are
not provided with legal counsel even though nearly all unsuccessful applicants
are ordered deported.
C. The Board of Immigration Appeals
An applicant who is denied asylum by an immigration judge may appeal to
the Board of Immigration Appeals, another institutional component of the
Department of Justice. Today the Board consists of eleven to fifteen members
appointed by the Attorney General of the United States. The Board was created
by a directive of the Attorney General, rather than by statute, and its members
serve at the pleasure of the Attorney General, exercising his delegated
authority.
2 9
27. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16-.18 (2007).
28. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.21, 1209.2 (2007).
29. CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 3.05[2] (2007).
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D. The United States Courts of Appeals
An asylum applicant (and anyone else whose order of removal is sustained)
may seek review of an adverse Board decision in a U.S. Court of Appeals.
30
The circuit courts may remand a case in which the Board rendered a decision
contrary to the law or abused its discretion, but the courts grant a great deal of
deference to the Board.3 1 Except in rare instances, the courts of appeals can
only remand a decision to the Board; they cannot grant asylum.
32
E. The Supreme Court
In principle, a foreign national who has been ordered removed and whose
removal has been sustained by a Court of Appeals could seek certiorari in the
U.S. Supreme Court. However, as a practical matter, the Court of Appeals is
the last stop; the Supreme Court has accepted review in only a handful of
asylum cases since the Refugee Act authorized asylum in 1980.
II. THE REGIONAL ASYLUM OFFICES
The Asylum Office, part of the Department of Homeland Security, makes
decisions in the first instance when asylum seekers come forward on their own
to assert claims. Asylum seekers file such claims knowing that they will be
placed into removal proceedings if they are not successful and have no lawful
immigration status in the United States. These "affirmative" claims, assessed at
eight regional asylum offices, constitute the vast majority of first-instance
asylum cases.
33
30. The Board acts for the Attorney General and the Attorney General's decisions bind
the Department of Homeland Security, so the Department does not appeal adverse decisions
of the Board. Palmer et al., supra note 15, at 38 n.203.
31. The standard of deference that courts should grant to the Board varied among
circuits for several years before Congress codified the standard in 1996. See Stephen M.
Knight, Shielded from Review: The Questionable Birth and Development of the Asylum
Standard of Review Under Elias-Zacarias, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 133 (2005). The current
uniform standard requires that the circuits uphold findings of fact unless "any reasonable
adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary." 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)
(2000). Credibility determinations must be sustained unless they are not supported by
specific, cogent, and relevant reasoning. See, e.g., Gjerazi v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 800 (7th
Cir. 2006); Camara v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 361 (4th Cir. 2004). In actual practice, however,
the federal circuits appear to vary dramatically in how they apply those standards. See infra
Part V.
32. INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12 (2002).
33. See OFFICE OF PLANNING, ANALYSIS, AND TECH., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FY 2005
STAT. Y.B. I1 (showing 35,049 affirmative cases and 15,551 defensive ones), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/statspub/fy05syb.pdf. On the different stages of the asylum
process, see generally U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Servs., Obtaining Asylum in the
United States: Two Paths to Asylum, http://uscis.gov/graphics/services/asylum/paths.htm.
The eight regional Asylum Offices are located in Arlington (VA), Chicago, Houston, Los
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With respect to training and quality control, every new asylum officer
completes an intensive five-week basic training course with testing.3 4 Each
week, every regional office conducts four hours of training on new legal issues,
country conditions, procedures, and other relevant matters. A supervisory
asylum officer reviews every decision proposed by an asylum officer.
Supervisory asylum officers must complete an intensive two-week training
course on substantive law with testing. At least one quality assurance or
training officer in each regional office regularly reviews supervisory sign-offs
on cases in order to report to the Regional Office Director on possible
inconsistencies in the application of the law and to identify training needs.
To support these regional officers, the Asylum Office headquarters
maintains staff dedicated to quality assurance, training, and country-conditions
research to provide support to the field. Every month, quality assurance/training
officers in each regional office hold a conference call with headquarters office
quality-assurance staff and country condition researchers to address common
issues or concerns, new cases, emerging patterns of claims, and training ideas.
The quality assurance team reviews cases involving novel or complex legal
issues. This team also closely monitors the implementation of new laws. For
example, in implementing the one-year filing deadline, this staff reviewed all
referrals based on the deadline to ensure consistent application of the new law.
In addition to asylum quality-assurance staff, each regional office has fraud
prevention coordinators and immigration officers with the Fraud Detection and
National Security Division of USCIS, whose responsibilities include
identification of fraud indicators, provision of training, and assistance to
asylum officers and supervisory asylum officers.
3 5
Nationals from well over one hundred countries applied for asylum in
recent years.36 Asylum officers have different nationality caseloads in the eight
regions since applicants from various countries are concentrated to different
degrees in certain regions. In order to account for nationality differences in
Angeles, Miami, Newark (NJ), New York City, and San Francisco. Previous research
suggested a significantly lower rate of granting asylum both nationally, and particularly at
two offices, following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. Andrew I. Schoenholtz,
Refugee Protection in the United States Post-September 11, 36 COLUM. HuM. RTS. L. REv.
323, 340-44 (2005) (showing the significant decline in grant rates at the Houston and Los
Angeles offices). To understand what factors might account for such variation, we asked the
Asylum Office for raw data on nationality, representation, the eight Regional Offices, and
individual decision makers over time. The Asylum Office provided us with very useful data
on each of these factors associated with grant rates for fiscal years 1999-2005. The
Methodological Appendix to this Article includes a complete explanation of these
measurements.
34. E-mail from Joanna Ruppel, Deputy Dir., Asylum Div., U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Servs., U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., to Andrew 1. Schoenholtz (Dec. 18, 2006)
(on file with authors).
35. Id.
36. U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2006 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS tbl.
17 (2007), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2006/Table 1 7D.xls.
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caseloads, we based comparisons of grant rates only on cases of nationals from
countries that we call Asylee Producing Countries (APCs). The countries on
this list had at least five hundred asylum claims before the asylum offices or
immigration courts in FY 2004, and a national grant rate of at least 30% before
either the asylum office or the immigration court. The minimum claim criterion
ensures that the database includes a significant number of applicants and
grantees. The minimum grant rate requirement ensures that asylum officers or
immigration judges have reached a reasonable degree of consensus in
concluding that many applicants from these countries are bona fide refugees.
Fifteen countries met these criteria: Albania, Armenia, Cameroon, China,
Colombia, Ethiopia, Guinea, Haiti, India, Liberia, Mauritania, Pakistan, Russia,
Togo, and Venezuela. Countries with low grant rates, such as El Salvador and
Guatemala, are not on our APC list. We also excluded Mexicans from our
database since the vast majority entered the affirmative asylum system for
purposes other than to obtain asylum. 37 We first examined the data from eleven
countries 38 where there were enough data on individual asylum officers to
compare certain nationalities fairly.
The Asylum Office provided us with data on decision making by 928
asylum officers from all eight regional offices over a period of seven years,
from 1999-2005. 39 For security and privacy reasons, the Asylum Office
provided these data without identifying either the individual officers or the
regional office by name. Rather, each officer was assigned a number, and each
regional office a letter (Regions A through H). We studied the grant rates only
of the 884 officers who decided at least fifty APC cases.
We also established a standard to measure disparities among individual
adjudicators in the same office. For this Article, we created a very tolerant
standard of consistency, regarding an adjudicator as deviating significantly only
if her grant rate for the population in question was higher or lower by more
than 50% than the overall grant rate for the same population in the decision
maker's own regional asylum office. 40 Some might argue that this measure
37. According to the Asylum Office, Mexicans voluntarily entered the affirmative
asylum system in large numbers during this period principally in order to be placed into
immigration court proceedings where they could seek relief other than asylum. Since they
are generally not seeking asylum, they are not included in our analysis. See Schoenholtz,
supra note 33, at 338 n.62 (explaining this behavior).
38. There was not sufficient data on asylum officer decisions to compare four APC
nationalities fairly, so the individual decision-making analysis that follows does not include
data on Guinea, Mauritania, Togo, and Venezuela. See infra Methodological Appendix Part
II.
39. The Methodological Appendix includes the terms and definitions established by
the Asylum Office for this data set, along with other relevant materials. This data is available
at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/humanrightsinstitute/refugeeroulette.htm.
40. Our rationale for adopting this measure of consistency is explained in more detail
in the Methodological Appendix. See infra Methodological Appendix.
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tolerates too much deviation within an office, but even using this benchmark,
there is a great deal of disparity in asylum adjudication.
A. Grant Rate Disparities for Asylee Producing Countries Among Individual
Asylum Officers
Figure 2. Individual Asylum Officer Grant Rates for
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Note: Data are shown for all officers deciding at least 50 APC cases; the mean









Note: As above, data are shown for all officers deciding at least 50 APC cases;
the mean grant rate for APC cases in Region H was 26%.
Figure 2, like many of the bar graphs in this Article, shows the spread of
grant rates among adjudicators in a particular office. Each bar represents a
different adjudicator's grant rate. Bar graphs like these are a way of viewing the
November 2007]
STANFORD LAWREVIEW
degree of consistency within an office: the flatter the slope of a line connecting
the tops of the bars, the more consistent the decision making within the office.
Figure 2 shows the grant rates of individual officers in APC cases in two
asylum office regions.
In principle, since clerks in the asylum offices assign cases to asylum
officers randomly,4 1 the graphs of grant rates for asylum officers deciding
similar cases within a particular regional office should be quite flat. Indeed the
graph for Region A is relatively flat. Most of the officers grant asylum to
nationals of APC countries at a rate of between 25% and 50%. But Region H
shows a much steeper slope and therefore much less consistency among its
asylum officers.
We thought it would be useful to compare these individual officers' APC
grant rates either to the mean regional office or national APC grant rate. Since
there are significant differences in the mix of countries of origin of those
making APC claims in the various regional offices, we concluded that
comparing individual grant rates to the mean national APC grant rate would not
take that variation in composition into account. We therefore used regional
mean grant rates for comparison purposes.
Figure 3. Individual Officers' Deviations from the Regional Office Mean











-50% . . .. .. ..
-60%
Note: Data are shown for all Region D officers who decided at least 50 APC
cases (64 officers). The mean grant rate for APC cases decided by these
officers was 62%. One officer, shown in black, deviated by more than 50%.
41. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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Figure 3 and the other deviation graphs in this Article display the degree to
which each officer deviated from the mean APC grant rate for the region in
question. Figure 3 shows exceptional consistency in Region D as measured by
this standard. Only one of sixty-four officers deviated from the Region D mean
by more than 50%.
Similarly, in Region A shown in Figure 4, only two of thirty-one officers
deviated by more than 50% from the regional office mean APC grant rate.
Figure 4. Individual Officers' Deviations from the Regional Office Mean
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Note: Data are shown for all Region A officers who decided at least 50 APC
cases (31 officers). The mean grant rate for APC cases decided by these
officers was 35%. See supra Fig.2. Two officers, shown in black, deviated by
more than 50%.
But not all regional offices show that extraordinary degree of consistency.
In Region H, more than half of the officers deviated by more than 50% (Figure
5). In fact, five officers deviated as much as 130-190%.
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Figure 5. Individual Officers' Deviations from the Regional Office Mean
Grant Rate in APC Cases-Region H






Note: Data are shown for all Region H officers who decided at least 50 APC
cases (53 officers); the mean grant rate for APC cases decided by these officers
was 26%. See supra fig.2. Twenty-seven officers, shown in black, deviated by
more than 50%.
Table 1. Grant and Deviation Rates for All Regional Offices
Percentage of Officers Deviating from









Note: This table is based on 126,504 cases decided by the 527 asylum officers
who had decided at least fifty APC cases.
When we compare the grant and deviation rates for all of the asylum
offices, we see significant variation. As Table 1 shows, the regional deviation
rates vary tremendously-from 2% to 51%. Interestingly, these disparities do
not depend exclusively on the grant rate. For example, Regions A and G have
similar APC grant rates-35% and 38%, respectively. Yet the percentage of
officers who deviate from their respective asylum office is six times greater in
Region G (35% deviation rate) than in Region A (6% deviation rate).
[Vol. 60:295
REFUGEE ROULETTE
B. Grant Rate Disparities for Single Countries Among Individual Asylum
Officers
By definition, all APC countries have a high rate of successful asylum
applicants. Nevertheless, the particular mix of countries of origin in the pool of
cases adjudicated in a particular region may affect that region's grant rate,
which could explain at least some of the dis parity between offices with respect
to APC grant rates that we see in Table 1. We therefore decided to look at
whether regional office grant rates continued to vary when we narrowed our
focus to applicants from a single country.
Our first analysis examines cases from China. Figure 6 shows the grant
rates of 290 asylum officers nationwide who decided at least 100 Chinese cases
from FY 1999-2005. This graph shows that asylum officers nationally have not
reached any consensus regarding Chinese cases. The disparities are striking,
from a low grant rate of 0% to a high of more than 90% and almost every
possibility in between.











We also examined asylum officers' grant rates in Chinese cases by region.
To ensure sufficient data within each region, however, we had to reduce to 25
the minimum number of cases decided by an officer before that officer would
be included in our study. Some regions show high consistency among asylum
officers deciding Chinese cases. In Region C, for example, grant rates were
pretty consistent (Figure 7).
42. Differences in the mix would not, however, explain the differences in rates of
consistency.
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Note: Data are shown for all Region C officers with at least 25 Chinese cases
(42 officers); the mean grant rate for Chinese cases decided by these officers
was 72%.


















Note: Data are the same as in Figure 7. Two asylum officers had grant rates at
exactly the mean; their data points have been jittered so as to appear visible on
the graph. Three officers, shown in black, deviated by more than 50%.
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As Figure 8 shows, only three of forty-two officers deviated from the
Region C China mean by more than 50%.
However, in Region E, there is considerably less consistency (Figure 9). As
Figure 10 shows, seventeen of fifty-seven asylum officers, or about 30%,
deviated from the regional China mean by more than 50%. This graph also
shows extreme rates of deviation from the mean, with several officers deviating
100% or more and one officer over 250% deviant.
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Note: Data are shown for all Region E officers who decided at least 25 Chinese
cases (57 officers); the mean grant rate for Chinese cases decided by these
officers was 24%. One officer granted no cases; that data point is jittered so as
to appear visible on the graph.
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Note: Data are same as in Figure 9. Seventeen officers, shown in black,
deviated by more than 50%.
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Note: Data are shown for all Region H officers who decided at least 25 Chinese
cases (52 officers); the mean grant rate for Chinese cases decided by these
officers was 15%. Two officers granted 0% of their cases; their data points
have been jittered so as to appear visible on the graph.











Note: Data are the same as in Figure 11. Thirty-one officers, shown in black,




Some regions are even less consistent than this, despite the fact that the
officers are deciding essentially the same pool of cases. In Region H, the grant
rates vary between 0% and 68% (Figure 11). In this region, thirty-one of fifty-
two officers, or 60%, who decided more than twenty-five China cases deviated
from the regional China mean by more than 50% (see Figure 12). Two officers
granted asylum in none of their cases. One of them (Officer 343) decided 273
Chinese cases, but did not grant a single asylum claim.










A B C D E F G H
Note: Data show the mean grant rate for all officers in Chinese cases (total of
38,748 cases in all regions).
Figure 13 provides the same information broken down into mean grant
rates by regional office. The range is very significant: while Region H grants at
a 15% rate, Region C grants asylum to people from the same country at a 72%
rate. What could account for this? It is possible that migrants from certain
regions within China (or traffickers who assist them) choose to go to particular
regions of the United States before applying for asylum, and that fraud is more
prevalent among migrants from some of those regions than among migrants
from other regions. Perhaps, therefore, migration patterns cause Region H to
receive a much higher proportion than Region C of Chinese applicants who
have false claims for asylum. While in principle these migration patterns could
explain some degree of disparity among the U.S. regional asylum offices, we
doubt that it could account for a five-fold difference in grant rates from one
office to another. Furthermore, there are significant differences in mean grant
rates from region to region even when we examine the rates for applicants from
countries much smaller than China. For example, the regional mean grant rates
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for Armenian claims in Regions C, F, and G were, respectively, 57%, 37%, and
23%. 43 In addition, it could not possibly explain the differences in grant rates
from officer to officer within regional asylum offices.
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Note: Officers are considered outliers if their grant rates deviated by more than
50% from the regional office mean grant rate. Data are shown for officers
deciding at least 25 Chinese cases. There were no such officers in Region B
and only two such officers in Region D, so they are omitted from this chart.
Figure 14 compares the degree of deviation from the regional mean China
grant rate in the six regional offices that had many asylum officers who decided
twenty-five or more China cases. The deviation rate is extraordinary, varying
from about 7% in Region C to about 60% in Region H.
The last graphs in this Part examine the degree of consistency within a
regional office with respect to single countries other than China. Region D
decides many Ethiopian cases, and Figures 15 and 16 show that it does so with
a good deal of consistency.
Figure 15 shows that many asylum officers in this region seem to grant at
similar rates in these cases.
43. The data for Armenia are derived from the country-by-country statistics for
individual asylum officers supplied to the authors by the Department of Homeland Security.
E-mail from Ted Kim, Operations Branch Chief, Asylum Div., U.S. Citizenship &
Immigration Servs., U.S. Dep't. of Homeland Sec., to Andrew Schoenholtz (Oct. 24, 2006),
amended by E-mail from Trina Zwicker, Program Manager, Operations Branch, Asylum
Div. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., U.S. Dept. of Homeland Sec., to Philip Schrag
(Jan. 23, 2007) (stating that the headings for Armenia and Cameroon in the October 23,
2006, dataset should be reversed).
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Note: Data are shown for
Ethiopian cases; the mean
officers was 72%.
all Region D officers who decided at least 50
grant rate for Ethiopian cases decided by these









-40% .. . .
-50%
Note: Shows percentage deviation from the mean grant rate in Region D for
Ethiopian cases, which was 72%.
In fact, no officer deviates from the mean by more than 50% (Figure 16).
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Note: Data are shown for all Region C officers who decided at least 50 Indian
cases; the mean grant rate for Indian cases decided by these officers was 39%.










-100% . . . . . .. . . . . .
-125%
Note: Deviations are from the mean grant rate of 39%. The darker shaded bars
show deviations of greater than 50%.
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By contrast, in Region C, the grant rates for Indian cases range
considerably, from 3% to 88% (Figure 17). In Region C, fifteen of thirty-nine
officers deviate from the mean Indian grant rate by more than 50% (Figure 18).
We find this of particular interest because only one in eleven asylum officers in
Region C deviated more than 50% from the mean regional APC grant rate.
Given Region C's high degree of consistency in its adjudications of APC cases
generally, perhaps the significant degree of inconsistency in Indian cases
reflects particular disagreements among officers about the extent of persecution
within India, or about the extent of fraud committed by Indian applicants.
But what explains the tremendous range from very little to quite significant
degrees of inconsistency at the eight Asylum Offices? Training, supervisory
review, and the quality assurance mechanisms discussed above could well
account for the high degree of consistency that exists in several offices. 4 4 But
the existing mechanisms have not created a just system in all regional offices
for those whom America wants to protect. New approaches need to be
developed to achieve such a result.
III. THE IMMIGRATION COURTS
As explained in Part I, immigration courts are the "trial-level"
administrative bodies responsible for conducting removal hearings-hearings
to determine whether non-citizens may remain in the United States.45 For
represented asylum seekers, these hearings are generally conducted like other
court hearings, with direct and cross-examination of the asylum seeker,
testimony from other supporting witnesses where available, and opening or
closing statements by both sides. Approximately one-third of asylum seekers in
immigration court are unrepresented; 46 in these cases, the immigration judge
must play a more active role in questioning the applicant and building the
factual record.47 Neither the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure nor the Federal
Rules of Evidence apply in immigration court.
Until 1983, immigration courts were part of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS), which was also responsible for enforcement of
immigration laws and housed the INS trial attorneys who opposed asylum
claims in court.4 8 In January of that year, the Executive Office for Immigration
44. See discussion supra Part I.B.
45. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.1 (a)(1)(i) (2007). For further information on removal hearings, see'
supra Part 1.
46. Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Jonathan Jacobs, The State of Asylum Representation:
Ideas for Change, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 739, 742 (2002).
47. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(1) (2000) ("The immigration judge shall . . . interrogate,
examine, and cross-examine the alien and any witnesses.").
48. Indeed, before 1956, "special inquiry officers," who were the predecessors to
immigration judges, held hearings as only part of a range of responsibilities that included
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Review (EOIR) was created, placing the immigration courts in a separate
agency within the Department of Justice.49 In 2003, when the Department of
Homeland Security was created, the trial attorneys became part of that Agency
but the courts remained in the Department of Justice.
There are fifty-three immigration courts located in twenty-four states, and
more than two hundred immigration judges sit on these courts. 50 Asylum cases
are assigned to immigration courts according to the asylum seeker's geographic
residence. 51 The administrators in each immigration court assign cases to
immigration judges to distribute the workload evenly among them, and without
regard to the merits of the cases or the strength of defenses to removal that may
be asserted by the respondents.
52
For the approximately 65% of asylum seekers whose cases are referred by
asylum officers to immigration court, the removal hearing allows them to
present their claim de novo. 53 The immigration court presents the last good
opportunity for these asylum seekers to prevail. The immigration court also
hears claims from individuals who raise an asylum claim after being placed in
removal proceedings. For such individuals, the immigration court hearing is the
only opportunity they will have to present evidence in support of their case. It
is therefore of the utmost importance that immigration court proceedings be
enforcing immigration laws. These officials were retitled "immigration judges" in 1973. T.
ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF & DAVID A. MARTIN, IMMIGRATION: PROCESS AND POLICY 107-09
(2d ed. 1991).
49. See Board of Immigration Appeals, 48 Fed. Reg. 8038 (Feb. 25, 1983) (to be
codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 1, 3, 100).
50. Office of the Chief Immigration Judge, Executive Office of Immigration Review,
U.S. Dep't of Justice, http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/ocijinfo.htm.
51. Asylum cases are assigned to the court with jurisdiction over the asylum seeker's
residence when the Notice to Appear is issued. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.14(a), 1003.20(a) (2007).
See supra Part I for discussion of the Notice to Appear. An asylum seeker may move to
change venue "for good cause." 8 C.F.R. § 1003.20(b) (2007).
52. The only exception is that in some courts, a particular judge may be designated to
hear cases initiated against unaccompanied minors, which are referred from the Office of
Special Investigations, and attorney discipline cases. The percentage of such cases is very
small, in the low single digits. E-mail from the Executive Office for Immigration Review to
Andrew Schoenholtz (Feb. 1, 2007) (on file with authors); see also U.S. GOV'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW: CASELOAD
PERFORMANCE REPORTING NEEDS IMPROVEMENT 17 (2006) ("Within each immigration court,
newly filed cases are generally assigned to immigration judges through an automated
process; however, some flexibility exists. . . . [T]he court administrator may manually
schedule some cases to correct inequities that occurred in the number and type of cases that
were assigned to a judge by the automated system. Also, cases that are re-entering the
immigration court system are generally manually assigned to the immigration judge who had
initially adjudicated the case. Further, if a judge already has a heavy caseload, . . . the
[delegate of the] Chief Immigration Judge . . . may decide to exclude a judge from
assignment of newly filed cases through the automated system." (footnote omitted)).
53. The DHS trial attorney may present the asylum application filed with the Asylum
Office to impeach the asylum seeker on inconsistencies between that application and any
documents filed in Immigration Court. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.6, 1240.2, 1240.7 (2007).
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predictable and fair, as a loss in immigration court will likely result in
removal-a possible death sentence for some asylum seekers whose cases are
wrongly denied.
We were fortunate to have access to vast amounts of data relating to
asylum decision making in immigration court from January 2000 through
August 2004. Our analysis of disparities in decision making in the asylum
process follows three reports: Frederick Tulsky's article in the San Jose
Mercury News detailing the results of his Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
request to the Immigration and Naturalization Service; 54 the asylumlaw.org
website, which provides data received in response to their FOIA request to the
Department of Homeland Security;5 5 and the Transactional Records Access
Clearinghouse (TRAC) website, 56 which analyzes the data from the first two
requests and provides extensive biographical information for many of the
immigration judges. We are indebted to Tulsky, asylumlaw.org, and TRAC for
obtaining and sharing these data.
57
Our analysis takes this prior work as a jumping-off point, analyzing the
available data in two new ways. First, we examined the grant rates across and
within courts, looking at 78,459 decisions in the aggregate for APCs as well as
cases involving asylum seekers from individual countries. 58 Second, we used
immigration judges' biographical information and a database of 66,443 cases to
run a descriptive cross-tabulation analysis that showed us how characteristics
such as age, gender, and prior employment experience correlated with their
decisions in asylum cases.59 This analysis also looked at individual
54. Fredric N. Tulsky, Asylum Seekers Face Capricious Legal System, SAN JOSE
MERCURY NEWS, Oct. 18, 2000, at IA.
55. Asylumlaw.org, U.S. Immigration Judge Decisions in Asylum Cases, Jan. 2000 to
Aug. 2004, http://www.asylumlaw.org/legal-tools/index.cfm?fuseaction=showJudges2004.
56. TRAC, Immigration Judge Reports-Asylum, http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/
reports/judgereports.
57. Moreover, the United States Committee on International Religious Freedom
conducted a statistical analysis of immigration judge rulings on claims of asylum seekers in
expedited removal from FY 2000 to FY 2003. Patrick Baier, Selected Statistical Analyses of
Immigration Judge Rulings on Asylum Applications, FY 2000-2003, in 11 REPORT ON
ASYLUM SEEKERS IN EXPEDITED REMOVAL 674 (2005), available at
http://www.uscirf.gov/countries/global/asylum-refugees/2005/february/index.htmi.
58. For the criteria by which these "Asylee Producing Countries" were selected, see
supra text accompanying note 37. As further explained in the Methodological Appendix, this
data includes defensive asylum claims, but eliminates detained asylum cases as thoroughly
as possible. Approximately 30% of the asylum claims in the database were defensive, and
approximately 7% were detained. See E-mail from Executive Office of Immigration Review
to Andrew Schoenholtz (Jan. 25, 2007) (on file with authors); infra Methodological
Appendix Part I11.
59. We eliminated defensive asylum seekers from this database, thus minimizing the
number of detained cases. According to information provided by the Executive Office for
Immigration Review, only 996 detained cases remain in the data after eliminating defensive
cases. See E-mail from Executive Office of Immigration Review to Andrew Schoenholtz
(Feb. 6, 2007) (on file with authors); see also Methodological Appendix Part III.
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characteristics of asylum seekers, such as number of dependents and legal
representation, revealing interesting insights into how these factors play into
immigration judges' decisions. We also ran three regression analyses to
confirm the results of the bivariate cross-tabulations. 60 The methodological
challenges we faced and choices we made are described in Part III of the
Methodological Appendix.
A. Disparities Between Courts
Figure 19 shows, for each APC, the grant rate in the high-volume
immigration courts with the highest and lowest grant rate for nationals of that
country, as well as the average grant rate for all high-volume immigration
courts. The graph reveals that even for asylum seekers from countries that
produce a relatively high percentage of successful asylees, there are serious
disparities among immigration courts in the rates at which they grant asylum to
nationals of five of these countries. As explained further in the Methodological
Appendix, we are primarily concerned with court-wide grant rates that deviate
by more than 50% from the national average grant rate for any of these
countries.61
We found serious disparities in decision making with respect to applicants
from six of the fifteen APCs. Asylum seekers from three of these countries
faced a grant rate in at least one court that was more than 50% below the
national average, and applicants from four of these countries enjoyed a grant
rate in at least one court that was more than 50% above the national average.
For one of these countries, China, the high grant rate and the low grant rate
deviated by more than 50% from the national average.
60. The regression analyses included several independent variables for which we did
not report cross-tabulations. These additional variables are discussed further in Part III of the
Methodological Appendix.
61. As further explained in Part III of the Methodological Appendix, the "national
average" is limited to cases from APCs decided in "high-volume immigration courts," terms
defined in the Methodological Appendix. See infra Methodological Appendix Part IIl.
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Figure 19. High, Low, and Average Grant Rates for Nationals of APCs in
High-Volume Immigration Courts





















Note: The "High" and "Low" bars represent the highest and lowest grant rates
from high-volume immigration courts deciding at least 100 cases involving
nationals from a particular country). The "Average" bar denotes the average
grant rate across all immigration courts for such cases. Togo and Venezuela
have only "Low" and "Average" bars because only one immigration court
heard more than 100 cases from those countries. The numbers in parentheses
denote the number of asylum cases from that country decided by high-volume
immigration courts during the time frame studied. See also infra note 62.
This means that a Chinese asylum seeker unlucky enough to have her case
heard before the Atlanta Immigration Court had a 7% chance of success on her
asylum claim, as compared to 47% nationwide. 62 Moreover, if this same
62. The following chart provides the cities in which high and low grant rates were
awarded by country of asylum seeker. We examined only courts that decided 100 or more
cases from the country in question. Only one immigration court (Baltimore) decided 100 or
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asylum seeker had presented her claim 400 miles to the south, before the
Orlando Immigration Court, she would have had a 76% chance of winning
asylum, over ten times the Atlanta grant rate. Colombian asylum seekers also
faced major disparities: those who appeared before the Orlando Immigration
Court had a 63% grant rate, while those heard by the Atlanta Immigration
Court faced a grant rate of 19%. The average national grant rate for Colombian
asylum seekers is 36%. Why is an individual fleeing persecution in China
986% more likely to win her asylum claim in one venue than in another? Why
is the average national grant rate for Chinese asylum claims 571% higher than
the Atlanta court's grant rate? And why are Colombian asylum seekers 232%
more likely to win their claims in Orlando than they are in Atlanta?
One answer is that some immigration courts grant asylum cases from the
aggregate of all APCs at a rate much lower (e.g., Atlanta, Detroit, Miami, and
San Diego) or much higher (e.g., New York, Orlando, and San Francisco) than
the national average. For example, grant rates at least 50% below the national
average rate were awarded in Atlanta for Chinese cases and in Detroit for
Albanian and Mauritanian cases. As Figure 20 shows, the average grant rate in
high-volume immigration courts for APCs was 40%, but the average grant rates
in Atlanta and Detroit for all APCs, at 12% and 19% respectively, were over
50% lower than the national average. The Miami court's average grant rate for
APCs was 42% below the national average, at 23%.
There were also upward disparities in the high-granting courts, although
these were not as extreme. The San Francisco Immigration Court, which
granted asylum to Ethiopians at a rate more than 50% greater than the national
average rate, had an average grant rate for all APCs that was 35% greater than
the national average. In addition, the New York Immigration Court, which had
from Venezuela; as a result, the chart below includes a low grant rate but not a high grant
rate for both countries.
Country High Grant Rate (%) Low Grant Rate (%)
Albania New York (65%) Detroit (17%)
Armenia San Francisco (54%) Los Angeles (39%)
Cameroon Houston (51%) Baltimore (39%)
China Orlando (76%) Atlanta (7%)
Colombia Orlando (63%) Atlanta (19%)
Ethiopia San Francisco (79%) Arlington (35%)
Guinea New York (60%) Baltimore (24%)
Haiti New York (27%) Miami (15%)
India Los Angeles (52%) Newark (25%)
Liberia Newark & New York (72%) Philadelphia (58%)
Mauritania New York (49%) Detroit (12%)
Pakistan Philadelphia (57%) Houston (28%)
Russia San Francisco (7 1%) Newark (53%)
Togo N/A Baltimore (37%)
Venezuela N/A Miami (16%)
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the high grant rate for Haiti, had an average grant rate for APCs that was 30%
greater than the national average, and the Orlando Immigration Court, which
had the high grant rate for both China and Colombia, had an average APC grant
rate that was 23% higher than the nationwide mean. One explanation for the
differences between the courts could be simply cultural, for lack of a better
term-some courts are more likely to grant asylum claims while other courts,
despite being components of a single national Executive Office for Immigration
Review, are especially tough on all asylum seekers.










Los Angeles (6819) kL 41
Memphis (1049) 140%
Miami (19,402) 23%
New York (27,942) -- 52%
Newark (2392) .. 42%
Orlando (2974) 49%
Philadelphia (1512) sAM ,,- 39%
San Diego (449) 30%
San Francisco (5659) 54%
TOTAL (78,459) 40%
Note: The numbers in parentheses after the court name indicate the number of
cases from all APCs decided by the court in question.
It seems possible that, to some extent, the differences across courts (and
from one region of the asylum office to another) may be due to differences in
the populations of asylum seekers in different geographic locations, though we
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know of no reason why Orlando should attract a much higher proportion of
bona fide asylum applicants from APCs than Atlanta. Within a court, however,
no such geographic variable should exist, as nearly all cases are assigned
randomly to the judges. 63 As explained below, our research found tremendous
differences in the asylum grant rates of immigration judges on the same court,
even holding nationality constant. To further investigate discrepancies between
decision makers within the high volume immigration courts, we examined the
grant rates of individual immigration judges, holding nationality constant.
B. Disparities Within Immigration Courts














Baltimore Chicago Orlando Los San Newark New York Miami
(2299/4) (1461/6) (2809/4) Angeles Francisco (2299/7) (25976/31) (19402/24)
(5365/22) (5043/18)
Note: The x-axis shows: city (number of cases decided/number of judges). As
noted infra note 64, the number of cases decided includes only cases heard by
judges hearing 100 or more APC cases on each court and the number of judges
includes only judges who decided 100 or more APC cases on each court.
We began our investigation of grant rate disparities within immigration
courts by looking at the eight largest courts by volume: Baltimore, Chicago,
Los Angeles, Miami, Newark, New York, Orlando, and San Francisco. Taking
only judges who had decided 100 or more cases, we analyzed discrepancies in
grant rates for asylum seekers from APCs. 64 With the national APC mean of
63. See supra text accompanying note 52.
64. The number of cases decided by judges hearing 100 or more APC cases on each
court as well as the number of judges hearing 100 or more APC cases are indicated in
parentheses after the name of the court on each graph in this Subpart.
[Vol. 60:295
REFUGEE ROULETTE
40% as a starting point, we determined for each court how many judges' APC
grant rates were more than 50% deviant from that mean. Figure 21 provides the
results of this investigation.
C. Disparities from the Court Mean
The statistics tell us that the five largest courts have consistent outliers;
65
that is, from one-third to three-quarters of the judges on these courts grant
asylum in Asylee Producing Countries cases at rates more than 50% greater or
more than 50% less than the national average. Why would it be that there are
such discrepancies in grant rates between judges on the same court? One
obvious response to this finding is that there may be different geographic
populations of asylum seekers in different regions; for example, it may be that
in Chicago, the Chinese asylum seekers all come from a certain region or ethnic
group and have similarly viable asylum claims, while in Miami, the Chinese
asylum seeker population is more diverse, resulting in greater disparities in
claim viability. As a result, individual judges in Miami might produce grant
rates more discrepant from the Miami court mean for Chinese cases than those
in Chicago are from the Chicago mean for Chinese cases.
We tested this concern by limiting geographic variability, looking only at
individual judges' discrepancies from their own court's average grant rate for
asylum seekers from APCs. 66 We focused on the four largest courts6 7: San
Francisco, Miami, New York, and Los Angeles, with eighteen, twenty-one,
twenty-six, and twenty-seven judges, respectively. 68 We discovered that in the
65. It is important at this juncture to clarify that these judges' decisions are not
necessarily inaccurate simply because their grant rates are discrepant with the national
average or their court's average. It could be, for example, that a judge with an unusually high
grant rate is deciding cases as fairly as possible, and that the average grant rate is inaccurate
because of a plethora of low-granting judges who are not deciding cases as fairly as the high-
granting "outlier" judge. We note only that these discrepant grant rates indicate the need for
further investigation to determine whether any inappropriate personal biases are coming into
play. To be clear, we are not advocating that these judges be disciplined or otherwise
sanctioned based solely on discrepant grant rates, but instead that the data may be a jumping-
off point for a more thorough examination of performance and professionalism in the
courtroom.
66. We looked only at judges hearing one hundred or more APC cases to determine
disparities. The number of APC cases decided by each judge is noted in parentheses along
the x-axis of each chart. We looked at all APC cases decided by each court (in other words,
we did not limit this calculation to cases decided by judges hearing one hundred or more
APC cases) to determine the court APC mean. The number of APC cases decided by all
judges on each court is noted in parentheses next to the "Court Mean" label.
67. In the four other courts examined in Figure 21, the percentages of judges deviating
from their own court's APC mean by 50% or more were Baltimore: 0% (0 of 4 judges; 41%
mean); Chicago: 17% (1 of 6 judges; 38% mean); Newark: 29% (2 of 7 judges; 42% mean);
and Orlando: 0% (0 of 4 judges; 49% mean).
68. The numbers of judges per court are current as of July 2004. As further explained
in Part III of the Methodological Appendix, the Miami court numbers exclude judges at
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three largest courts, more than a quarter of the judges were markedly out of
step with the other judges in their own courthouse. 69
As Figure 22 shows, in New York, one judge granted only 6% of the APC
asylum cases before him, and another pulled in just behind him, having granted
7% of asylum cases he heard. A New York judge who was transferred to the
Miami court in September 2003 granted asylum in 11% of the APC cases he
heard in New York (as compared to 6% in Miami). Three more judges granted
fewer than a quarter of the cases that came before them, at rates of 17%, 19%,
and 23%. The New York Immigration Court also had three judges who
awarded asylum to most of the asylum seekers before them, at rates of 80%,
89%, and 91%. This means that 29% of New York judges decided APC cases
at rates more than 50% discrepant from the court's mean of 52%.
Figure 22. Grant Rates for Judges Who Are Outliers in APC Cases-New
York (9 of 31 judges)
100%
80%
J1(544) J2 (959) 3(777) 4(342) J5(319) J6(1076) Mean 7(405) J8 (1159) J9(1197)
(25,976)
Judge (No. of Cases)
Note: This graph and the two graphs that follow show grant rates for judges
deciding at least 100 APC cases who deviated by more than 50% from their court's
mean in APC cases.
As illustrated in Figure 23, in Los Angeles, one judge granted asylum to
only 10% of the applicants from APCs who came before him; another judge
approved only 16% of the APC asylum cases she heard; and three judges
Krome Detention Center, and the New York court numbers exclude judges at the Varick
Street court, as these judges hear predominantly detainee cases.
69. Only three of eighteen, or 17%, of San Francisco judges deviated by more than
50% from that court's mean APC grant rate of 54%.
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granted only 17% of the APC asylum claims in their courts. Against these five,
the highest-granting judge approved 83% of the asylum cases from APCs in his
court, and another judge granted 64% of the cases from APCs before him. In
the end, 32% of the Los Angeles judges deviated more than 50% from the
court's APC mean of 41%.
Figure 23. Grant Rates for Judges Who Are Outliers in APC Cases-
Los Angeles (7 of 22 judges)
41%
16% 17% 171 1711
10%
J1 (210) J2 (183) 3 (144) J4 (242) J5 (259)
Judge (No. of Cases)
Mean J6 (347)
(5365)
Figure 24. Grant Rates for Judges Who Are Outliers in APC Cases-
Miami (8 of 24 judges)
J1(958) J2(115) J3(323) J4(1111) J5(740) Mean J6(741) J7(1084) J8(769)
(19,402)
Judge (No. of Cases)
Figure 24 shows that the numbers are similar in Miami: one judge granted





judges eked in just ahead of him, with average asylum grant rates for APCs of
5% and 6%. The next judge in line granted 8% of the asylum cases he saw and
another granted 9%. In contrast, three judges granted asylum at rates more than
50% above the Miami average, 75%, 61%, and 38%. In sum, 33% of the Miami
judges decided APC asylum cases at rates more than 50% deviant from the
court's mean of 23%.
In total, in the Los Angeles, Miami, and New York immigration courts, we
found eight judges whose average grant rates for all asylum seekers from APCs
during the period studied were more than 50% above their court's mean and
sixteen judges whose rates were more than 50% below their court's mean.
From a pool of approximately seventy-four judges, 32% decided asylum cases
from APCs at rates significantly discrepant from their court's average grant
rate. Why are there such great disparities among judges in these courts?
D. Disparities from the Court Mean, Holding Nationality Constant
Even when examining disparities from each court's mean, thus correcting
for any geographical differences in populations of asylum seekers, there are
serious discrepancies in the grant rates of individual immigration judges on the
same court. To delve more deeply into the causes of these disparities, we again
limited the variables and examined individual grant rates for asylum seekers of
only one nationality for immigration judges in each of the four largest courts. 70
Figures 25 through 28 show, for each of the four largest courts, the grant
rate for each judge when deciding cases involving nationals of one of the two
countries from which the largest number of asylum cases were filed in that
court. In each chart, the black bar marked "Mean" shows the mean grant rate
for that country's applicants in that court. In New York, for example, three
judges decided Albanian cases at a rate more than 50% below the court
70. We excluded judges who had decided fewer than fifty asylum cases from the
country in question as well as immigration judges detailed to the court in question from
depiction in the chart. See infra note 186 for further explanation of the concept of "detailing"
immigration judges. The data by court includes judges who retired or were hired during the
January 2000 to August 2004 time frame. We included the following numbers in
parentheses: after each judge's number, the number of cases that judge heard from the
country in question; and after the word "Mean," the total number of cases from the country
in question heard by judges on that court, including judges who heard fewer than fifty
asylum cases from that country (but still excluding judges detailed to the court in question).
For each court, we have provided a chart showing grant rates for one of the top two
nationalities by volume heard in that court. For both Los Angeles and New York, China was
the top nationality by volume. To avoid repetition of nationality, we provided grant rates in
New York for Albania, which was the second nationality by volume in New York.
Moreover, Haiti was the top nationality by volume in Miami; because the grant rate for
Haitians in Immigration Court was substantially lower than that for all other APCs, we
provided grant rates for Colombia, which was the second nationality by volume in Miami.
India was the top nationality by volume in San Francisco.
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average-meaning that 14% of the judges ruled at a rate considerably at odds
with the court's mean of 67%.
Figure 25. Judges' Grant Rates in Albanian Cases-New York
100/6 96%1oo% 9I% 92% 92% 93%
90% 82% 83%
80% 
71% 71% 71% 73%
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Figure 26. Judges' Grant Rates in Indian Cases-San Francisco
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And in San Francisco, four judges decided Indian cases at rates more than
50% below and one judge at a rate more than 50% above that court's mean;
28% of the judges deviated by more than 50% from the court's average of 52%.
The situation was even worse in Los Angeles for Chinese cases, where five
judges granted at a rate more than 50% lower than and five judges granted at a
rate more than 50% higher than the court mean, so that 45% of the judges were
out of step with the court's average of 36% in these cases.
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Similarly, in Miami six judges decided Colombian cases at rates 50%
below the mean and five judges decided these cases at rates 50% above the
mean; 50% of these judges decided asylum cases at a rate that varied by more
than 50% from the court's average of 30%.
The differences in grant rates among the judges in the larger courts are
large. In Los Angeles, one judge granted asylum to 9% of the 117 Chinese
applicants who appeared before him, whereas another granted asylum to 81%
of 118 Chinese applicants-nine times the rate of his colleague. In Miami,
Colombians before one judge were granted asylum at a rate of 5%, while those
who appeared before another judge, with an 88% grant rate, were almost
eighteen times more likely to win asylum. The same story is repeated in New
York, with one judge granting asylum to 5% of the Albanians whose cases he
heard, and another granting asylum to 96% of the Albanians in her court. The
second judge worked in the same suite of offices as the first judge but was
nineteen times more likely to grant asylum. And the case in San Francisco is
even more dramatic; one judge granted 84% of Indian asylum cases, a rate
twenty-eight times that of another judge in the same courthouse who granted
3% of these cases.
E. Variables Impacting Judges 'Decisions
We also performed a descriptive analysis, using cross-tabulation, of the
decisions of the judges during the time frame discussed above. We examined
the following variables to determine their impact on the judges' grant rates:
whether the asylum seeker was represented, the number of dependents the
asylum seeker had, the gender of the judge, and the prior work experience of
the judge.7 1 The last category was broken out into experience working in the
following fields: for the Immigration and Naturalization Service or the
Department of Homeland Security, for the government (except the INS or
DHS), in the military, for a non-governmental organization, in private practice,
and in academia. Although each variable was statistically significant to a 99%
71. We ran cross-tabulation analyses for several other independent variables, which we
do not report here. We did include these variables in the regression analyses to increase the
accuracy of our models. The cross-tabulation and regression results for these variables can
be found at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/humanrightsinstitute/refugeeroulette.htm. First,
we did not report here the age of the judge, the size of the judge's caseload, the size of the
court's caseload, or the weekly earnings in the state in which the judge's court sits because
both the cross-tabulation analysis and the regression analyses found that these variables did
not have much impact on grant rates. Second, we did not report years that a judge served on
the bench because the cross-tabulation analysis did not reveal a clear pattern relating to grant
rates. Third, we did not report the national freedom index of the asylum seeker's country of
origin because this variable, as expected, related inversely to grant rate (less freedom, higher
grant rate), and was largely included to increase the accuracy of the regression models.
Finally, we did not report results for political party of the President whose Attorney General
appointed the judge because important results were not statistically significant to a 95%
probability.
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probability (i.e., the relationship did not occur by chance), the magnitudes of
some relationships were quite weak. We confirmed the statistical significance
of the cross-tabulation analysis with chi-square and performed two logistic
regression analyses and one hierarchical linear regression to ensure that the
results of the cross-tabulation analysis would remain consistent with all other
variables held constant.
72
The results of the cross-tabulation analysis confirm earlier studies showing
that whether an asylum seeker is represented in court is the single most
important factor affecting the outcome of her case.73 Represented asylum
seekers were granted asylum at a rate of 45.6%, almost three times as high as
the 16.3% grant rate for those without legal counsel. The regression analyses
confirmed that, with all other variables in the study held constant, represented
asylum seekers were substantially more likely to win their case than those
without representation.
74
Given the complexity of the asylum process and increasingly stringent
corroboration requirements in immigration court, it is not surprising that legal
assistance plays an enormous role in determining whether an asylum seeker
wins her case. While there could be a selection effect in play-that is, legal
representatives might take on only viable asylum cases, thus weeding out weak
claims-the power of the representation variable makes it unlikely that this is
the only causal factor. Moreover, the data do not take into account the quality
of representation. Asylum seekers represented by Georgetown University's
clinical program from January 2000 through August 2004 were granted asylum
at a rate of 89% in immigration court.
75
72. The full results of the cross-tabulation analysis as well as the regression analyses
confirming these results can be found at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/
humanrightsinstitute/refugeeroulette.htm. An explanation of the methods we used can be
found in Part III of the Methodological Appendix.
73. See Donald Kerwin, Revisiting the Need for Appointed Counsel, in INSIGHT, at 1
(Migration Policy Inst., No. 4, 2005), available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/insight/
InsightKerwin.pdf; Charles H. Kuck, Legal Assistance for Asylum Seekers in Expedited
Removal: A Survey ofAlternative Practices, in II REPORT ON ASYLUM SEEKERS IN EXPEDITED
REMOVAL, supra note 57, at 232, 239; Schoenholtz & Jacobs, supra note 46, at 739-40.
74. The bivariate cross-tabulation analysis does not control for other variables, while
the multivariate regression analyses do control for other variables. These analyses exclude
all Mexican cases and defensive cases; see Part III of the Methodological Appendix for our
method and reasoning.
75. Because two of the authors of the Article have selected cases for the Georgetown
asylum clinic, they can verify that these cases are not selected solely based on the likelihood
of success-that is, the clinic does not select only those cases most likely to win. There is, of
course, some selection bias, as the clinic's standard for acceptance of asylum clients is that
they present a genuine, non-frivolous claim, but this is a low bar. Indeed, the clinic often
chooses particularly complex and difficult cases so that students will have challenging
educational experiences. The main selection principle is that the case has to be one that will
have a hearing in April or November, when the students, who arrive in August and January,
will be fully trained.
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Unrepresented Represented Represented by
Georgetown Clinic
Similarly, asylum applicants represented pro bono by large law firms
cooperating with Human Rights First (formerly the Lawyers Committee for
Human Rights) had a success rate of about 96% in the 479 cases they handled
to conclusion in that same period.76  Asylum seekers whose legal
representatives track down corroborating evidence and obtain experts to testify
about country conditions as well as about the asylum seeker's mental and
physical health are more likely to win their cases. Moreover, such claims are
easier for adjudicators to decide than those that rely only on the asylum
seeker's testimony.
The number of dependents that an asylum seeker brought with her to the
United States played a surprisingly large role in increasing the chance of an
asylum grant. According to the cross-tabulation analysis, while asylum seekers
with no dependents have a 42.3% grant rate, having one dependent increases
the grant rate to 48.2%. This could be because asylum seekers who bring
children in addition to a spouse appear more credible, or because immigration
judges are more sympathetic to asylum seekers who have a family to protect. In
any case, the regression analyses confirm that this factor affected judges'
determination whether to grant an asylum claim.
76. Human Rights First (HRF) refers cases to large law firms in New York and
Washington, DC. The HRF data refers to cases accepted from January 2000 through
December 2004 and adjudicated during that period. The 96% success rate (94% grants of
asylum, 2% grants of withholding of removal) refers not only to adjudications in
immigration court but also to cases that HRF cooperating lawyers handled in the asylum
office, the Board of Immigration Appeals, and in federal court, because HRF is unable to
separate its final adjudication data by forum. However, only final outcomes are reported, so
no case was counted twice. E-mail from Anwen Hughes, Human Rights First, to Philip
Schrag (April 27, 2007) (on file with authors).
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Figure 31. Relationship Between Judge's Gender and Grant Rates
53.8%
37.3%
Fenale Judges Male Judges
We also looked at characteristics of the judges that impacted the asylum
decision. Perhaps the most interesting result of our cross-tabulation study was
that the gender of the judge had a significant impact on the likelihood that
asylum would be granted. Female immigration judges granted asylum at a rate
of 53.8%, while male judges granted asylum at a rate of 37.3%.77 An asylum
applicant assigned by chance to a female judge therefore had a 44% better
chance of prevailing than an applicant assigned to a male judge. 78 In contrast,
no appreciable difference existed in the grant rates of male and female asylum
77. Our regression analyses confirm that with all other variables held equal, female
gender of the judge is correlated with higher grant rates. See
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/humanrightsinstitute/refugeeroulette.htm.











officers. Our study of the grant rates of 264 male and 257 female officers who
decided fifty or more APC cases from FY 1999 through FY 2005 shows only a
7% difference, with male officers granting asylum at a rate of 44% and female
officers granting at a rate of 41%.
Several political scientists have studied the effect of gender on judicial
decision making in federal and state courts. Our cross-tabulation analysis,
which analyzes over 60,000 decisions by 78 female immigration judges and
169 male immigration judges, includes significantly greater numbers of both
female judges and decisions than any of the prior studies.79 The literature in
this area offers several possible reasons for gender differentials in judicial
decision making.80 One survey of federal judges found that while 81% of
79. Most of these studies have found that a gender differential exists, but there has
been great variation in findings about the types of cases that are impacted by the gender of
the decision maker. See, e.g., David W. Allen & Diane E. Wall, Role Orientations and
Women State Supreme Court Justices, 77 JUDICATURE 156, 159, 165 (1993) (finding that
twenty-four female state supreme court justices in the 1970s and 1980s voted differently
from male justices in cases involving women's issues, but not in those involving criminal
rights and economic liberties, with some variation due to political party); Sue Davis, Susan
Haire & Donald R. Songer, Voting Behavior and Gender on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 77
JUDICATURE 129, 131-32 tbls.2-4 (1993) (finding that female judges on the federal courts of
appeals from 1981 to 1990 voted differently from male judges in employment discrimination
and search and seizure cases, women being 36.9% more likely to vote in favor of the
plaintiff in the former and 62.4% more likely to cast a liberal vote in the latter, but finding no
significant gender differential in obscenity cases; examining votes of 15 female and 237
male judges in search and seizure cases and 16 female and 188 male judges in discrimination
cases); Elaine Martin & Barry Pyle, Gender, Race, and Partisanship on the Michigan
Supreme Court, 63 ALB. L. REV. 1205, 1224-25, 1227 tbl.1 (2000) (finding differences in the
voting patterns of twelve male and female justices on the Michigan Supreme Court from
1985 through 1998 in thirty-six divorce cases, in which women were 32.9% more likely to
cast a liberal vote, and in forty discrimination cases, in which men were 36.5% more likely
to vote liberally, but finding no statistically significant gender disparity in twenty-one
feminist issues cases); Jennifer A. Segal, The Decision Making of Clinton's Nontraditional
Judicial Appointees, 80 JUDICATURE 279, 279 (1997) (finding differences in the voting
patterns of male and female judges appointed by President Clinton to the federal district
courts through July 1996 in sixty-two cases involving race issues decided by twenty judges,
in which women were 74.8% more likely to vote in favor of the minority position, but
finding no gender disparity in twenty-four cases involving women's issues decided by
sixteen judges). But see Orley Ashenfelter, Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J. Schwab,
Politics and the Judiciary: The Influences of Judicial Background on Case Outcomes, 24 J.
LEGAL STUD. 257, 265, 275 (1995) (finding that gender and other variables did not affect
outcomes in 2258 federal civil rights and prisoner cases filed in three federal districts and
decided by forty-seven district judges in FY 1981; the number of female judges in this study
was so small that the authors caution that these results cannot be a basis for inferential
statistics beyond the sample); Jon Gottschall, Carter's Judicial Appointments: The Influence
of Affirmative Action and Merit Selection on Voting on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 67
JUDICATURE 165, 167-68, 172 (1984) (finding no statistically significant differences between
the 121 female and male judges sitting on four federal courts of appeals from July 1979 to
June 1981 in 765 cases involving criminal procedure, race discrimination, and sex
discrimination).
80. See, e.g., Martin & Pyle, supra note 79, at 1214-20 (discussing three groups of
studies of gender differences, namely tokenist, feminist jurisprudence, and "different voice"
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female judges had experienced sex discrimination, only 18.5% of men on the
bench had experienced race or class discrimination. 8' This experience may
have an impact in the courtroom: it might make female judges more
sympathetic to stories of persecution, as well as more conscious in eliminating
their own biases from the decision making process. Carrie Menkel-Meadow
notes that some women lawyers would prefer that trials take the form of
"conversations with fact-finders-rather than persuasive intimidation." 82 It is
possible that female immigration judges are inclined to a non-adversarial
proceeding in their courtroom, an approach more likely to solicit a coherent and
complete story from a traumatized asylum seeker. 83 Finally, Judith Resnik
argues that feminist approaches to judging focus on caretaking and an
understanding of connections to those before them.8 4 This may lead feminist
immigration judges to empathize more with the plight of asylum seekers, and to
decide asylum cases from a perspective of connection with, rather than distance
from, the applicant. In the end, we cannot be sure of the cause of this
difference, or whether women or men are more likely to decide asylum cases
"correctly," but this statistical outcome points to issues ripe for future study.
We wondered whether some of the "gender effect" on asylum decision
making was related to the different prior work experience of male and female
judges. We found that the two groups-male judges and female judges-had
distinctly different work experience prior to appointment to the bench.8 5 Of 78
female judges studied, 29% had previously worked for non-governmental
organizations, defending the rights of immigrants or indigent populations. But
judicial studies); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Feminization of the Legal Profession: The
Comparative Sociology of Women Lawyers, in LAWYERS IN SOCIETY: AN OVERVIEW 221,222
(Richard L. Abel & Philip S.C. Lewis eds., 1995) (arguing that female lawyers will bring a
different perspective to the profession); Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine
Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543, 543 (1986) (finding a different,
feminine jurisprudence in Justice O'Connor's constitutional opinions); see also Judith
Resnik, On the Bias: Feminist Reconsiderations of the Aspirations for Our Judges, 61 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1877, 1906-28 (1988) (discussing implications of feminist theories for the
judiciary). These studies all reference CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982),
which, though not a legal study, remains perhaps the most influential book in prompting
academics to examine the question whether men and women reason differently.
81. Elaine Martin, Men and Women on the Bench: Vive la Difference?, 73 JUDICATURE
204, 207 (1990).
82. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Comparative Sociology of Women Lawyers: The
"Feminization " of the Legal Profession, 24 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 897,915 (1986).
83. See PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, EXAMINING ASYLUM SEEKERS: A HEALTH
PROFESSIONAL'S GUIDE TO MEDICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS OF TORTURE 23-25
(2001), available at http://physiciansforhumanrights.org/library/documents/reports/
examining-asylum-seekers-a.pdf (describing these results in physical and psychological
examinations).
84. Resnik, supra note 80, at 1921, 1927.
85. Of course, the regression analyses demonstrate that gender has a significant impact




of 169 male judges studied, only 9% had worked for NGOs. In contrast, 56% of
male judges had previously worked for the INS or DHS, and 83% of male
judges had worked for the government in some capacity (excluding work for
INS or DHS) before their appointment to the bench. Only 51% of female
judges had prior work experience with INS or DHS, although 72% of women
had previous government experience. As Figure 32 illustrates, this differential
in previous INS or DHS experience becomes even more striking with time;
while 32% of female judges and 44% of male judges had over five years of
INS/DHS experience, 10% of females and 17% of males had worked for
INS/DHS for more than ten years, 1% of females and 8% of males had over
fifteen years INS/DHS experience, and 1% of females but 4% of the males had
over twenty years INS/DHS experience. While women had more prior
experience in occupations likely to make them sympathetic to asylum seekers,
men had substantially more and longer experience in positions adversarial to
asylum seekers.
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We also found that prior work experience of all types had a significant
impact on a judge's grant rate. Judges with prior government experience
(excluding work for INS or DHS) granted asylum at a rate of 39.6%, contrasted
with a grant rate of 47.1% for those with no prior government experience, a
difference of 19%. Judges with prior INS or DHS experience granted 38.9% of
86. Unlike the other figures in this section, this figure demonstrates the relationship
between two independent variables (gender and INS/DHS experience) but does not include
the effect of either on the dependent variable (grant rate).
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the asylum claims before them, in contrast to judges without DHS/INS
experience, who granted at a rate of 48.2%, a difference of 24%. Judges with
military experience granted asylum at a rate of 37.4%, compared with a rate of
44.2% for those without military experience, a difference of 18%. On the other
end of the spectrum, judges who had worked for non-profit organizations
granted asylum at a rate of 55.4%, compared with a rate of 41.1% for those
without such experience, a difference of 35%. And judges with prior
experience in academia granted asylum at a rate of 52.3%, in contrast to a rate
of 43.2% for those without experience as an academic, a disparity of 21%.
Finally, judges who had worked in private practice granted asylum at a rate of
46.3%, compared to 39.5% for judges without experience in a private firm, a
difference of 17%.
Figure 33. Grant Rates by Different Types of Prior Work Experience
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Despite our initial hypothesis that male judges had lower grant rates
because they had more prior work experience of the type that leads judges to be
skeptical of applicants' claims, we found that gender had an impact on grant
rates independent of prior work experience. When we considered only the grant
rates of judges with no prior work experience in government, or no such
experience in INS or DHS, or no such experience in non-profit organizations,
the increased chance of winning with a female judge was in each instance at
least 30% greater than the chance of winning with a male judge. 87
87. See infra Figure 35 and preceding text.
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Setting the gender findings aside for a moment, we explored further the
finding that work experience in an enforcement capacity with the former
Immigration and Naturalization Service or the current Department of
Homeland Security made judges less likely to grant asylum. This effect became
more pronounced with years of service. The cross-tabulation analysis tells us
that judges who had not worked for the INS or DHS had a grant rate of 48.2%,
while judges who had worked there for one to five years granted asylum at a
rate of 42.9% (Figure 34). Moreover, judges with six to ten years of INS or
DHS experience granted asylum at a rate of 40.2% and those with eleven or
more years in the INS or DHS granted asylum to only 31.3% of the asylum
seekers before them. Perhaps people who spend many years enforcing the
immigration law carry some of the culture or ideology of their agencies with
them when they are appointed to the bench.












No experience I to 5 years 6 to 10 years 11 or more years
We next explored a combination of independent variables-namely gender
and work experience-and learned that gender has an effect on grant rate even
among judges with similar prior work experience or even without a certain type
of work experience. 89 As Figure 35 shows, female judges still grant asylum at
consistently higher rates than male judges regardless of the type of prior work
experience. For example, when we look only at judges with no work experience
88. We did not confirm this relationship in the regression analyses, as we ran
INS/DHS experience by number of years of experience, but not broken down by the ranges
laid out in this graph. The regression analyses did confirm that years of INS/DHS experience
correlated negatively with grant rates.
89. Of course, it was not possible to use regression analyses to confirm the results of
these cross-tabulations that combined independent variables.
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for the INS or DHS, we find that women grant at a rate of 59.4%, which is 50%
higher than the male judges' rate of 39.6%. In the group of judges with no prior
government work experience (excluding INS or DHS), female judges granted
5 6.8% of the asylum cases they heard, a rate 40% higher than male judges, who
granted 40.5% of the asylum cases before them. And when we look at judges
without experience working for NGOs, the grant rate for female judges is
49.9%, a rate 37% higher than the 36.5% grant rate awarded by male judges.90
Figure 35. Grant Rates by Gender and Work Experience
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When we examine gender and contrasting prior work experience, the
disparities in grant rates increase. Female judges with no prior government
work experience granted asylum at a rate of 56.8%, a rate 68% higher than that
of male judges with prior government work experience, who granted at a rate of
33.9%. Similarly, female judges without prior work experience with the NS or
DHS granted 59.4% of the asylum cases they saw, a rate 68% higher than male
judges with prior 1NS/DHS work experience, who granted only 35.3% of the
cases before them. Finally, female judges with prior work experience at a non-
profit organization granted 64% of the asylum claims before them, a rate 75%
90. Similarly, when we examine grant rates of judges with INS or DHS experience,
female judges grant 46.1% of the asylum cases before them, a rate 31% higher than male
judges, who grant only 35.3% of asylum cases they hear. Looking at judges with government
experience, female judges grant at a rate of 49.8%, 47% higher than the male grant rate of
33.9%. And women with NGO experience had a grant rate of 64%, 48% higher than men,
who had a grant rate of 43.2%.
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higher than male judges with no prior non-profit work experience, who granted
only 36.5% of the cases they heard.
When we added the representation factor into the mix, the disparities were
even more striking. Our cross-tabulation analysis determined that female judges
grant asylum to represented asylum seekers at a rate of 55.6%, a rate 289%
higher than the rate at which male judges granted asylum to unrepresented
asylum seekers, or 14.3%. Moreover, as Figure 36 illustrates, female judges
with no DHS/INS experience grant asylum to represented asylum seekers at a
rate of 60.6%, which is 324% higher than the 14.3% grant rate of male judges
with DHS/1NS experience hearing the cases of unrepresented asylum seekers.
Figure 36. Grant Rates by Gender, Representation, and
DHS/INS Work Experience
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IV. THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS
A. Background
Any party may appeal an adverse immigration court decision to the Board
of Immigration Appeals (BIA). As one of us has argued elsewhere, the BIA has
been the single most important decision maker in the asylum adjudication
system. 91 It reviews cases nationwide and sets precedents that immigration
judges and asylum officers must follow. Given that the Supreme Court issues
very few asylum law decisions, the BIA essentially interprets immigration law
for the country. While a U.S. Court of Appeals may disagree with a Board
91. Schoenholtz, supra note 33, at 352-53.
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interpretation, the BIA must follow that court's jurisprudence only for appeals
from immigration courts in the court's own jurisdiction. Moreover, the federal
courts must show extreme deference to the BIA.92
The Attorney General established the BIA by regulation and has the power
to overrule its decisions, change its adjudicatory procedures, and appoint and
remove Board members who disagree with his political ideology. 93 During the
1990s, Attorney General Janet Reno increased the size of the BIA to address a
growing caseload. She added members who had served as INS trial attorneys or
Office of Immigration Litigation attorneys at the Department of Justice, a
senior congressional staffer who had served the Republican Chairman of the
House Immigration Subcommittee, and several lawyers from private practice,
advocacy, and academia.94 The latter appointments balanced somewhat the
predominant government experience of existing members and of her appointees
who had prior law enforcement experience. The caseload, however, continued
to increase, resulting in a large backlog. To address this, the Attorney General
authorized major changes in the adjudicatory process.
Throughout the first half century of operations, the Board issued its
decisions in two ways. Most decisions resulted from three-member reviews of a
case. In a limited number of cases, the Board issued en banc decisions. In
October 1999, the Attorney General authorized a new procedure to enable the
Board to address the large backlog of cases. She gave individual BIA members
the authority in certain circumstances to issue summary affirmances--decisions
without any written analysis.95 Instead of having all appeals decided by three-
member or en banc panels, the BIA began to issue individual member summary
92. See supra text accompanying note 31. An unusually extreme degree of deference is
required by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (2000), specifying that "the administrative findings of
fact [of the BIA or of an immigration judge whose findings are not rejected by the BIA] are
conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the
contrary."
93. The Board was created by the Attorney General in 1940, after a transfer of
functions from the Department of Labor. See Reorganization Plan No. V, 3 C.F.R. 1940
Supp. 336 (1941). The Board is not a statutory body; it was created wholly by the Attorney
General from the transferred functions. Delegation of Powers and Definition of Duties, 5
Fed. Reg. 2454 (July 1, 1940); see In re L-, 1 1 & N Dec. 1, 2 n.1 (B.I.A. 1940).
94. See Executive Office for Immigration Review, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Fact Sheet
(Dec. 2006), http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/fs/biabios.htm (describing the biographical
information of Board members Juan P. Osuna, Gerald S. Hurwitz, Patricia A. Cole, Lauri S.
Filppu, Edward R. Grant, Frederick D. Hess, David B. Holmes, Neil P. Miller, and Roger
Pauley); Executive Office for Immigration Review, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Fact Sheet (June
2005), http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/fs/ogcbio.htm (describing the biographical information of
former-Board members Gustavo D. Villageliu and Cecelia M. Espenoza); see also Peter J.
Levinson, The Facade of Quasi-Judicial Independence in Immigration Appellate
Adjudications, 9 BENDER'S IMMIGR. BULL. 1154, 1159 (2004) (describing Paul W. Schmidt,
Noel A. Brennan, and John W. Guendelsberger).




affirmances in certain limited categories of cases.96 The Board issued its first
summary affirmances in September 2000.97 The BIA Chairman did not
authorize affirmances without opinion at this time in any asylum, withholding,
or CAT cases.
In December 2001, an independent audit determined that this streamlining
was an unqualified success. First, the Board completed 53% more cases using
summary affirmances in a circumscribed manner during its implementation
period from September 2000 to August 2001, as compared to the previous
twelve-month period. Second, for the first time in a number of years, the Board
completed more cases than it received. 98
Despite this demonstration that a more efficient Board could address its
caseload over time, as well as agreement "with the fundamental assessment that
the Board's [initial] use of the streamlining process has been successful," 99
Attorney General John Ashcroft authorized new policies in the name of
streamlining that fundamentally changed the nature of the BIA's review
function. In addition, he radically changed the composition of the Board.
The February 2002 proposed rule, which became final in August 2002,
made single member decision making the "dominant method of adjudication
for the large majority of cases," and single member summary affirmances
commonplace.' 00 In March 2002, Acting Chairman Lori Scialabba authorized
96. Under the 1999 streamlining regulation, the BIA Chairman could designate certain
categories of cases eligible for single member summary affirmance if:
the result reached in the decision under review was correct; ... any errors in the decision
under review were harmless or nonmaterial; and ... (A) the issue on appeal is squarely
controlled by existing Board or federal court precedent and does not involve the application
of precedent to a novel fact situation; or (B) the factual and legal questions raised on appeal
are so insubstantial that three-member review is not warranted.
8 C.F.R. § 3.1(a)(7)(i)-(ii) (2000). Even this relatively modest regulatory change allowing
some cases to be decided without opinions drew criticism from the Bar. Most of the twenty-
three commenters on the proposed rule objected that allowing a single Board member to
decide appeals on the merits "would compromise consistency and thereby devalue the
guidance that the Board provides," but the Department of Justice rejected those comments
because three-member review "is extremely time and labor intensive and is of significantly
less value in routine cases." Board of Immigration Appeals: Streamlining, 64 Fed. Reg. at
56,139; see also Philip G. Schrag, The Summary Affirmance Proposal of the Board of
Immigration Appeals, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 531 (1998).
97. See Memorandum from Paul Schmidt, Chairman, Bd. of Immigration Appeals, to
Board Members, Streamlining Implementation - Phase III (Aug. 28, 2000), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/vll/genifo/streamimplem.pdf.
98. To be precise, the Board completed 4000 more cases than it received. See ARTHUR
ANDERSEN & CO., BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS (BIA): STREAMLINING PILOT PROJECT
ASSESSMENT REPORT 5, 6 (2001), reprinted in DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP, supra note 17, app.
21; EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STATISTICAL YEAR
BOOK: 2002, at S2 (2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/statspub/fy02syb.pdf.
99. Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case
Management, 67 Fed. Reg. 54,878, 54,879 (Aug. 26, 2002).
100. Id. Under the new regulation, all cases are adjudicated by a single Board member
unless they fall into one of six specified categories, which are handled by a panel of three
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the expansion of affirmances without opinion to several new types of cases,
including asylum, withholding of deportation, and Convention Against Torture
claims.' 0 1 The final rule also authorized single members to issue short orders
affirming immigration judge decisions or dismissing appeals on procedural
grounds.' 0 2 The regulatory language appeared to establish a streamlining
hierarchy, stating that, "[i]f the Board member to whom an appeal is assigned
determines, upon consideration of the merits, that the decision is not
appropriate for affirmance without opinion, the Board member shall issue a
brief order affirming, modifying, or remanding the decision under review,
unless the Board member designates the case for decision by a three-member
panel." 103 As the second major streamlining tool, these single-member short
orders are closer in kind to affirmances without opinion than to the more fully
reasoned panel decisions that the Board regularly issued until 2002.104
The new rule also reduced the membership of the Board from twenty-three
to eleven authorized positions. By downsizing, Attorney General Ashcroft
removed from the Board five members who had been appointed during the
Clinton Administration, and a sixth resigned when she saw that she would not
be retained. The members he removed were not those with the least seniority.
The Attorney General observed in the final streamlining rule that "the ability of
individuals to reach consensus on legal issues" was a justification for the
reduction in size, 10 5 but those removed from the Board were the members who
Board members. Those six categories are where there is a need to (1) settle inconsistencies
between the rulings of different immigration judges; (2) establish precedent construing the
meaning of ambiguous laws, regulations, and procedures; (3) review a decision by an
immigration judge or DHS that is not in conformity with the law or applicable precedents;
(4) resolve a case or controversy of major national import; (5) review a clearly erroneous
factual determination by an immigration judge; or (6) reverse the decision of an immigration
judge or DHS, other than reversal under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(5). 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(6)
(2007). The new rule also largely stripped the Board of its de novo review authority. See
Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case Management, 67 Fed.
Reg. at 54,888-91.
101. Memorandum from Lori Scialabba, Acting Chairman, Bd. of Immigration
Appeals, to Board Members, Use of Summary Affirmance Orders in Asylum and
Cancellation Cases (Mar. 15, 2002), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/vll/genifo/sl031502.pdf. In May, Scialabba authorized summary
affirmances in all cases. Memorandum from Lori Scialabba, Acting Chairman, Bd. of
Immigration Appeals, to Board Members, Expanded Use of Summary Affirmance for
Immigration Judge and Immigration and Naturalization Service Decisions (May 3, 2002),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/vll/genifo/stO50302.pdf.
102. Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case
Management, 67 Fed. Reg. at 54,880.
103. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(5).
104. For examples of more fully reasoned panel decisions, see DEBORAH E. ANKER,
THE LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES: A GUIDE TO ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND
CASE LAW app. VI (2d ed. 1991).
105. Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case
Management, 67 Fed. Reg. at 54,893. The Attorney General observed in full:
The Department has determined that I I Board members is the appropriate size for the Board
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most disagreed with him ideologically. He did retain some members who had
been appointed by his Democratic predecessor, but the members he removed
were those who had come from the practice of immigration law, advocacy, and
law teaching, while those who were retained had experience primarily in
federal government service. 
106
Finally, during the downsizing transition, the Attorney General required
BIA members to clear their current backlog of 55,000 cases within 180 days.1
0 7
Human Rights First pointed out that to do so, each Board member "would have
to decide 32 cases every work day, or one every 15 minutes."
' 10 8
The 2002 streamlining changes were controversial. An independent study
concluded that the Board's remand rate declined significantly,10 9 and the
Board's Chairwoman responded that the data on which the study was based
was outdated and "unsubstantiated."' 10
Various studies focused as well on the significant, increased caseload at the
federal courts of appeals reportedly resulting from the 2002 streamlining
changes. The leading scholars of this development, Professor Steven Yale-
Loehr, Second Circuit Director of Legal Affairs Elizabeth Cronin, and Second
Circuit staff member John Palmer concluded as follows:
[O]ur data support the hypothesis that [the] appeal rate has increased as a
result of a surge in BIA decisions that leave non-detained aliens with final
expulsion orders and a fundamental shift in behavior among lawyers and their
clients, causing them to focus their litigation in the courts of appeals for the
first time. We think this fundamental shift was triggered by the high volume of
final expulsion orders that began to be issued starting in March 2002 and a
general dissatisfaction with the BIA's review. I I I
based on judgments made about the historic capacity of appellate courts and administrative
appellate bodies to adjudicate the law in a cohesive manner, the ability of individuals to reach
consensus on legal issues, and the requirements of the existing and projected caseload. The
Board is expected to function with two three-member panels and five Board members acting
individually in deciding cases. The Department believes that this is a realistic evaluation of
the resource needs, capacities and resources of the Board in adjudicating immigration issues.
The Attorney General may reevaluate the staffing requirements of the Board in light of
changing caseloads and legal requirements following implementation of the final rule.
Id.
106. See Levinson, supra note 94, at 1155-56.
107. Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case
Management, 67 Fed. Reg. at 54,903.
108. Press Release, Human Rights First, New Regulations Threaten to Turn Board of
Immigration Appeals into Rubber Stamp: Justice Department Rules Place Speed Above
Justice for Refugees Seeking Asylum in the United States (Aug. 28, 2002), available at
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/media/2002_alerts/0828.htm.
109. DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP, supra note 17, at 39-40.
110. Letter from Lori Scialabba, Chairman, Bd. of Immigration Appeals, to the ABA
Comm'n on Immigration Policy, Practice, and Pro Bono (Dec. 22, 2003), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/press/03/ABA.pdf.
111. Palmer et al., supra note 15, at 94.
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B. Data Request and the Limitations of Board Recordkeeping
To measure the effects of streamlining on appeals involving asylum, we
requested data from the Board regarding asylum determinations for fiscal years
1998 to 2005. We specifically asked for statistics that would enable us to
examine individual member decision making on the merits of asylum claims.
We also requested data regarding the mode of decision making (i.e., panel,
single member short opinions, or affirmances without opinion). Finally, we
asked for information on the nationality of non-citizens whose cases were
appealed and whether they were represented in the appellate process.
112
The Board provided us with data on nationality and representation, as well
as on mode of decision making. Two important problems surfaced with regard
to the data that the Board collects and how it does so. First, the Board knows
the period of service of every Board member, and it knows the outcome of each
Board decision, but it does not keep statistical records from which it can
ascertain which members made or participated in which decisions, or from
which it could calculate the rate at which individual members rendered
decisions (grants or remands) that benefited asylum applicants. Therefore, we
were not able to determine the existence or extent of disparities in the decisions
from one member to the next, as we were able to do for asylum officers and
immigration judges. Nor could we explore the possible effect of the genders or
prior experiences of the adjudicators. Second, for fiscal years 2001 and 2002,
the precise period during which the Attomey General radically altered its
procedures, the Board did not have reliable data on the mode of decision
making-whether particular decisions were rendered by a single member or by
a three-member panel. The coding of the decision modes changed during that
period. Unfortunately, the very helpful EOIR staff currently responsible for
statistical reports did not have the information needed to decipher the meaning
of the codes used in 2001 and 2002.
Accordingly, the analysis that we present below is limited by these factors.
Unlike our analyses of Asylum Office and immigration court decision making,
our study of the Board cannot address the degree to which disparities exist
among individual decision makers. That in itself is an important finding. In
order to ensure consistency in the application of the law and for its own quality
control purposes, the Board should reform its data system so that it can collect
and analyze individual member decision making.1 1
3
112. See Letter from Andrew Schoenholtz to Lori Scialabba, Chairman, Bd. of
Immigration Appeals (Jan. 30, 2006) (on file with authors).
113. With appropriate resources, EOIR has proven that it is capable of improving its
data systems with regards to the immigration court. Improved reporting based on these data
systems, such as EOIR's Statistical Year Books, has made it possible for government and
independent researchers to examine trends and help policymakers understand just how well,




In examining the BIA data, 114 we looked to see what we could learn about
the impact of the major 2002 streamlining changes ordered by Attorney
General Ashcroft. The first impact has been widely reported by the Palmer,
Yale-Loehr, and Cronin study described above: significantly increased
caseloads at the federal courts of appeals. 115
In February 2002, the month before Attorney General Ashcroft changed
the procedures, 116 200 cases were appealed to the courts each month. One year
later, 900 cases a month were appealed, and by April 2004, more than 1000
cases per month were being appealed.'i 7 The second impact that Figure 37
shows concerns the important issue of outcome-the grant and remand rates
declined significantly as the number of panel decisions dramatically dropped.













-- =Percent of Cases Remanded by BIA
- Percent of Cases with Panel Opinions
- -A- - Cases per Month Appealed to the Courts of Appeals
114. Part IV of the Methodological Appendix, infra, more fully describes the data set
and the decisions on the merits at the Board.
115. Palmer et al., supra note 15, at 3.
116. The pertinent procedures were actually changed several months before the
regulation requiring those changes became effective in August 2002. See sources cited supra
note 100.
117. Palmer et al., supra note 15, at 3; DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP, supra note 17, at 40.
These monthly caseload numbers include both asylum and other immigration law appeals.
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The decline in remand rates of all Board decisions was mirrored in its
asylum decisions.1 18 To understand the factors that might account for the drop,
we examined the different types of Board decisions. We began by looking only
at panel decisions (for the six years with reliable data). As Figure 38
demonstrates, following the 2002 streamlining, these three-member decisions
increasingly favored asylum applicants. During fiscal years 1998-2000, that is,
when asylum decisions were made only by three-member panels or en banc,
119
panel decisions regarding all applicants from APCs favored the government
about two-thirds of the time. During fiscal years 2003-2005, that is, after the
implementation of the Ashcroft changes, almost the exact opposite occurred in
panel decisions: 64% of the panel adjudications favored asylum applicants.











FY 98 FY99 FY00 FY 03 FY 04 FY05
But as Figure 39 shows, the number of panel decisions decreased
significantly, from about 9000 in FY 1998 to 1100 in FY 2005. The number of
affirmances without opinions rose to over 10,000 in FY 2003, as did the
number of single member short opinions in FY 2005. Initially following the
Ashcroft changes, the affirmances without opinion dominated Board decision
making. That changed in FY 2005, when single member short opinions began
to dominate.
118. See infra Figure 41.
119. Affirmances without opinion were first issued in September 2000, right at the end




Figure 39. Number of Decisions by Year and Type (FYs 1998-2000, 2003-2005)
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Figure 40. Number of Decisions Issued by Panels and Single Members
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As Figure 40 illustrates, by FY 2005, single member decisions
(affirmances without opinions and short opinions combined) totaled some
16,000 compared to the 1100 panel decisions. With this major change in the
mode of decision making, what happened to the outcomes in these cases?
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Figure 41 shows a steep drop in remand rates favorable to asylum
applicants. From fiscal years 1998-2000, asylum applicants received favorable
decisions in over 30% of the cases. For fiscal years 2003-2005, the rate
dropped by more than half. Affirmances without opinion favored asylum
applicants in about 3% of cases. The single member short opinions favored
asylum seekers 25% of the time in FY 2003, but as they increased in
dominance, asylum applicants found favor through short opinions less than
10% of the time.
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Note: In order to present an understandable graph, we did not include a separate
line for panel decisions. Because those decisions are included in the line for
"All asylum decisions," the line ends in FY 2005 at a point higher than the end
point for the other lines. This reflects the higher grant and remand rate in panel
decisions as set forth in Figure 38.
Viewed as a simple bar graph, we see in Figure 42 that the success rate for




Figure 42. Asylum Grant and Remand Rates
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Note: Based on 84,191 appeals.
We also wanted to understand the degree to which representation affected
outcomes as the Board changed its mode of decision making. Figure 43 shows
that the change in outcomes following the Ashcroft changes-the sudden and
lasting decline in the rate of success by asylum applicants-occurred whether
or not the applicant was represented by counsel. As Figure 43 shows, the
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in FY 2005, a decrease of 70%. Unrepresented applicants were hit even harder:
during the same time frame, the success rate of unrepresented applicants fell
from 26% to 6%, a decrease of 77%.




40% 3%0 All APC cases (15 countries)








FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2005
Even when only cases from APCs are considered, an extraordinary decline
occurred. 120 As Figure 44 demonstrates, the success of all APC asylum
applicants declined from 35% in FY 2001 to 14% in FY 2005. The decline for
represented APC asylum applicants was even greater: from 44% in FY 2001 to
15% in FY 2005, a 66% drop. The greatest decline occurred with regards to pro
se asylum applicants from non-APC countries, from a 31% success rate in FY
2001 to a 5% success rate in FY 2005, or a decline of 84%.
Finally, as Figure 45 shows, the success rates of asylum seekers from each
of the fifteen APC countries declined significantly and immediately once the
Ashcroft changes occurred. The drops from FY 2001 to 2002 ranged from 25%
(Ethiopia) to 82% (Venezuela). Asylum seekers from eleven of the fifteen APC
countries faced a decline in grant rates of more than 50%.
120. See supra text accompanying note 37 (listing "Asylee Producing Countries" and
the criteria by which we selected them).
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Figure 45. Asylum Grant and Remand Rates by APC (FYs 2001-2002)









V. THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS
As a practical matter, the last chance for an unsuccessful asylum applicant
is to appeal an adverse Board decision to a U.S. Court of Appeals. 121 Appeals
can be taken only to the circuit in which the immigration judge decided the
underlying asylum case. 122 Since the location of the immigration court that
decides a case is determined by the state of residence of the foreign national
when removal proceedings are initiated a year or two before the appeal, the
venue for the appeal depends on where the asylum applicant lived at that time.
A Court of Appeals may sustain a Board decision, or it may remand the
case for further consideration by the Board. 123 We do not think that the
likelihood of success (that is, of obtaining a remand) should depend on the state
in which the applicant happened to have settled, and one might think that
federal courts would be sensitive to any significant disparity in remand rates
121. See supra text following note 30.
122. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2) (2000).
123. The Supreme Court has instructed courts of appeals that they should ordinarily
remand an erroneous Board decision and not grant asylum themselves, because even if an
individual is legally eligible for asylum, the Attorney General has discretionary authority to
grant or refuse to grant asylum. INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16 (2002). Since withholding
of removal is not a discretionary form of relief, courts of appeals may in principle grant that
form of relief. But since the standard of proof for obtaining withholding of removal is much
higher than the standard of proof for asylum, the courts almost always either sustain the
Board or remand the case.
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Table 2 and Figure 46 show the results of our data compilation. They
demonstrate a surprising degree of variation among circuits.
Figure 46. Remand Rates in Asylum and Related Cases, 2004-05, by Circuit
40% -___
3 5 % 0 2 0 0 4 E 2 0 0 5 13 C o m b in e d -- --. . . .... . .
30%




1st 2d 3d 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th I Ith Total
2004 10.3% 10.0% 7.7% 1.4% 4.3% 8.7% 33.9% 14.1% 18.3% 8.8% 4.4% 14.4%
2005 14.5% 17.6% 15.5% 2.4% 3.8% 16.5% 37.7% 7.0% 20.9% 9.4% 2.6% 16.4%
Combined 12.8% 17.1% 11.8% 1.9% 4.1% 12.7% 36.1% 11.3% 19.5% 9.1% 3.2% 15.4%
The table and graph show that an asylum applicant who lives in the Fourth
Circuit, known generally among lawyers as the most conservative circuit,
125
has only a 1.9% chance of winning a remand, whereas in the Seventh Circuit,
about 36.1% of asylum cases are remanded to the Board. We know of no
rational reason why a person living in Illinois, Indiana, or Wisconsin should
have an 1800% greater chance of winning her asylum appeal than a person
living in Virginia, Maryland, West Virginia, and the Carolinas. We
hypothesized that that the federal judges' remand rate might be much higher in
the Seventh Circuit than in the Fourth Circuit if the immigration judges in the
Seventh Circuit had been inappropriately reluctant to grant asylum, compared
to the immigration judges in the Fourth Circuit. However, the only immigration
court in the Seventh Circuit (Chicago) does not seem to be less inclined to grant
asylum than its counterparts in the Fourth Circuit. It grants asylum to applicants
from all countries at a rate of 34% and to applicants from APCs at a rate of
38%. This is about the same rate as the two immigration courts in the Fourth
Circuit (Arlington, where the corresponding rates are 31% and 37%, and
Baltimore, where the rates are 38% and 41%). We believe that to a large extent,
125. The Fourth Circuit often writes opinions that "lead the way [to the right], issuing
groundbreaking rulings in the hope that the Supreme Court will ratify them as the law of the
land." Brooke A. Masters, 4th Circuit Pushing to Right; Federal Court Tests Supreme
Intentions, WASH. POST, Dec. 19, 1999, at C1; see also Tony Mauro, 4th Circuit Seen to Be
the "'Right" Place, as a Rule, USA TODAY, Mar. 9, 1999, at 1 A; Laura Sullivan, 4th
Circuit's Reputation Is Polite, Conservative; Bush Administration Steers Sensitive Cases to
Friendly Panel of Judges, BALT. SUN, Nov. 18, 2003, at IA.
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the statistics shown in the table reflect not the relative merits of the cases or the
differential grant rates of the immigration judges, but rather the differing
attitudes that the judges in these circuits have, in the aggregate, with respect to
asylum seekers' claims, or at least the differing degrees of their skepticism
about the adequacy of Board and immigration judge decision making. 126 The
fact that the three circuits with the lowest grant rates are the three Southern
circuits reinforces our surmise that the variation is somehow linked to regional
culture, which apparently affects federal appellate judges as well as other
citizens, more than any differing characteristics of these asylum cases.
We note, incidentally, that variations among circuits in their remand rates
in asylum cases are much greater than variations in their rates of remanding or
reversing civil cases. Figure 47, making this comparison, shows that in FY
2005, ten of the eleven circuits in our study had a rate of overturning district
courts in civil cases that was between 10% and 20%. In asylum cases the
spread from circuit to circuit was much greater. 1
27
126. The Seventh Circuit's skepticism is plain from the first paragraph of Benslimane
v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828 (7th Cir. 2005). Judge Posner wrote:
Our criticisms of the Board and of the immigration judges have frequently been severe. E.g.,
Dawoud v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 608, 610 (7th Cir. 2005) ("the [immigration judge's] opinion
is riddled with inappropriate and extraneous comments"); Ssali v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 556,
563 (7th Cir. 2005) ("this very significant mistake suggests that the Board was not aware of
the most basic facts of [the petitioner's] case"); Sosnovskaia v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 589, 594
(7th Cir. 2005) ("the procedure that the [immigration judge] employed in this case is an
affront to [petitioner's] right to be heard"); Soumahoro v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 732, 738 (7th
Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (the immigration judge's factual conclusion is "totally unsupported
by the record"); Grupee v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 1026, 1028 (7th Cir. 2005) (the immigration
judge's unexplained conclusion is "hard to take seriously"); Kourski v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d
1038, 1039 (7th Cir. 2004) ("there is a gaping hole in the reasoning of the board and the
immigration judge"); Niam v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 652, 654 (7th Cir. 2003) ("the elementary
principles of administrative law, the rules of logic, and common sense seem to have eluded
the Board in this as in other cases"). Other circuits have been as critical. Wang v. Attorney
General, 423 F.3d 260, 269 (3d Cir. 2005) ("the tone, the tenor, the disparagement, and the
sarcasm of the [immigration judge] seem more appropriate to a court television show than a
federal court proceeding"); Chen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 426 F.3d 104, 115 (2d Cir. 2005)
(the immigration judge's finding is "grounded solely on speculation and conjecture");
Fiadjoe v. Attorney General, 411 F.3d 135, 154-55 (3d Cir. 2005) (the immigration judge's
"hostile" and "extraordinarily abusive" conduct toward petitioner "by itself would require a
rejection of his credibility finding"); Lopez-Umanzor v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 1049, 1054 (9th
Cir. 2005) ("the [immigration judge's] assessment of Petitioner's credibility was skewed by
prejudgment, personal speculation, bias, and conjecture"); Korytnyuk v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d
272, 292 (3d Cir. 2005) ("it is the [immigration judge's] conclusion, not [the petitioner's]
testimony, that 'strains credulity').
Id. at 829.
127. The civil case rate was determined by dividing the number of remands and
reversals in all non-prisoner civil cases (those civil cases that included the United States as a
party and those that were entirely private cases) by the number of all such cases terminated
on the merits. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. CouRTs, 2005 ANN. REP. DIR. app. tbl.B-5,
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2005/appendices/b5.pdf. Although the spreads
are very different, the means for the two sets of rates were comparable: 16.4% for asylum
cases and 15.2% for civil cases.
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Note: The data are displayed in order of increasing grant rate in asylum cases.
Civil cases exclude prisoner cases; reversals and remands are both counted as
reversals, because both are decisions favorable to the appellant.
It may be objected that the comparison across circuits shown in Figure 47
is not very meaningful because the Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits, which
have the lowest remand rates, may receive many more appeals from Mexicans
or Central Americans with relatively weak asylum claims, whereas the Seventh
Circuit may receive most of its appeals from asylum seekers from countries
such as Cameroon that have had worse human rights records in recent years. To
control the sample to the extent possible, we also calculated the remand rate for
decisions rendered during calendar years 2004 and 2005 in appeals from the
Board by nationals of the fifteen nations that we denominated as APCs. Neither
Mexico nor any Central American countries are among the fifteen APC
countries.
Figure 48 shows the remand rates for cases filed by APC nationals and
decided during calendar years 2004 and 2005:
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Circuit (No. of Cases)
Nationals of the fifteen APC countries account for almost half of all
asylum appeals to the U.S. courts of appeals. We expected that because all of
these cases come from countries with poor human rights records (as measured
by a high grant rate at lower levels of the system), we would find a significantly
lower level of disparity among circuits than that revealed by Table 2. However,
the level of disparity in remand rate from one circuit to another is reduced only
very slightly. There are still significant differences among circuits, with the
three Southern circuits granting remands in a negligible fraction of cases, five
circuits (the First, Third, Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth) granting remands in a range
between about 8% and about 12% of their cases, and another three circuits (the
Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits) remanding in a range between 17% and
31% of their cases. The Seventh Circuit continues to top the list, so that an
asylum applicant from an APC who appeals to that circuit has a 721% greater
chance of obtaining a remand than one who must appeal from the removal
order of an immigration judge in Miami to the Eleventh Circuit, and an 1148%
greater chance than one whose order of deportation was rendered by an
immigration judge in Arlington or Baltimore in the Fourth Circuit.
Although the number of cases is much smaller, we can also compare the
results obtained by applicants from China, the single APC with the largest
number of asylum cases. In order to increase the number of cases considered,
we have included in Table 3 all asylum cases decided in three years (2003,
2004, and 2005), rather than only two years, as in the previous analysis. 128
128. We did not have the resources to conduct this type of examination for cases from
all countries for a three year period. See Part V of the Methodological Appendix for further
discussion of our search method. Although the number of cases in the table is relatively
small, we did not need to compute whether sampling error might account for the disparities
[Vol. 60:295
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Table 3. Remand Rates for Asylum and Related Cases by Nationals of China
(2003-2005)
Number of Merits Number of cases Percentage of cases
Circuit decisions remanded remanded
1 13 1 7.7%
2 307 47 15.3%
3 114 16 14.0%
4 28 0 0%
5 22 5 22.7%
6 10 2 20%
7 27 8 29.6%
8 9 2 22.2%
9 211 78 37.0%
10 4 1 25.0%
11 26 1 3.8%
Total 771 161 20.9%
This table suggests that even for a set of cases that are likely to be the most
similar, because they all involve claims of persecution by the same country,
there is wide variation in the remand rate from circuit to circuit.129 In three
circuits, the remand rate was in single digits or lower (the Fourth Circuit
remanded none of its twenty-eight Chinese cases), while in six circuits, the
remand rate was 20% or more.
We could not compare the individual rates of votes to remand in some
circuits (such as the Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits) because there were
not enough votes to remand to make such a study statistically meaningful; few
of these judges cast any votes to remand. At the other extreme, the Ninth
Circuit decided so many cases that we lacked the resources to count individual
votes.130 However, we did examine the individual votes to remand in two
circuits, in each of which the judges collectively cast more than 600 votes on
asylum cases during 2004 and 2005.3 In the Third Circuit, sixteen judges
between circuits, because we did not sample; we looked at every case from China for the
three-year period reported by the table.
129. The difference between the 0% rate in the Fourth Circuit and the 30% rate in the
Seventh Circuit cannot be explained by the possibility that immigration judges in the Fourth
Circuit were overly generous to Chinese applicants, compared to their counterparts in the
Seventh Circuit. The grant rates in Chinese cases in the Fourth Circuit's immigration courts
(Arlington and Baltimore) during this period were 30% and 38% respectively, while the
grant rate for such cases in Chicago was 31%.
130. Although we were unable to study the more than 6000 asylum votes cast by Ninth
Circuit judges during 2004 to 2005, a period after Attorney General Ashcroft's changes in
BIA procedure sharply escalated appeals to that circuit, a study by Prof. David Law did
code, by judge, the nearly 6000 Ninth Circuit asylum votes that were cast between 1992 and
2001. We apply our methodology to his data in the Ninth Circuit Appendix.
131. See infra Methodological Appendix Part V (explaining further our methodology
in choosing to examine the Third and Sixth Circuits).
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voted in twenty-five or more asylum cases. Figure 49 and Figure 50 show their
grant rates and their rates of deviation from the 12.1% circuit mean. 132







Note: Includes judges with at least 25 cases; judges' names are omitted.




Note: Only one judge (shaded black) deviated more than 50% from the mean.
132. There is usually a small difference between the mean rate at which a court,
through its panels, votes to remand, and the mean rate at which individual judges vote to
remand. Figures 50 and 53 show deviations from the mean in vote-to-remand rate of judges
who have heard at least twenty-five cases (Third Circuit) or twenty-three cases (Sixth
Circuit). In the Third Circuit, this rate was 12. 1%, and in the Sixth Circuit it was 11.4%. The
mean vote-to-remand rate was computed by dividing the total number of votes in favor of
remanding asylum cases that were cast by the judges who voted at least twenty-five or
twenty-three times by the total number of votes in such cases cast by these judges.
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These figures show considerable consistency. Only one judge deviated
from the circuit mean by more than 50%.
We also investigated whether there was any relationship between the
voting pattern of the Third Circuit judges and the political parties of the
Presidents who appointed them. We found no relationship: as a group,
appointees of Presidents of each party voted to remand at the same 12% rate. In
this diagram, each point represents the vote-to-remand rate of a judge who
voted on at least twenty-five asylum or asylum-related cases in 2004 and 2005.
Black lines represent Republican appointees and gray lines represent
Democratic appointees.
133






Democratic Appointees (Gray); Republican Appointees (Black)
The remand rate in the Sixth Circuit was nearly identical to that of the
Third Circuit (12.7% vs. 11.8%),134 but a close investigation of voting shows a
much more scattered pattern. Figure 52 and Figure 53 show the grant rates, and
the rates of deviation from the circuit mean, respectively, of the thirteen judges
who voted in twenty-three or more asylum and related cases.
135
133. The 12% vote-to-remand rate for each party's appointees is the mean rate for all
twenty-two judges of the party in question, not only the sixteen judges who met the threshold
number of votes for display in the diagram.
134. The political composition of the circuits was also similar during the time period
of this study. The Third Circuit had nine Republican and seven Democratic appointees who
voted in at least twenty-three asylum and asylum-related cases (in fact the minimum number
of votes cast by any of these sixteen judges was twenty-eight), while the Sixth Circuit had
eight Republican and five Democratic appointees who cast at least twenty-three votes.
135. We lowered our usual minimum threshold slightly to capture more data. Eleven
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Note: Two judges, whose bars are jittered so as to be visible in the graph, voted
to remand in 0% of their cases.
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Note: Seven of thirteen judges, shaded in black, deviated by more than 50%
from the mean.
of these thirteen judges voted in at least twenty-five asylum cases. The two others voted in






Votes on the Sixth Circuit showed much greater disparity than in the Third
Circuit. Seven of the thirteen judges who voted in at least twenty-three cases
deviated from the circuit mean by more than 50%.
Furthermore, in the Sixth Circuit, unlike the Third Circuit, there appears to
be a significant difference in the voting patterns of judges appointed by
Presidents of different parties. The judges appointed by Republican Presidents
had a weighted mean grant rate of 9.3%, while those appointed by Democratic
Presidents had a weighted mean rate of 14.6%. In other words, the Democratic
Presidents' appointees voted to remand at a rate 57% higher than that of the
appointees of Republican Presidents. Figure 54 compares individual vote-to-
remand rates on the Sixth Circuit.










Democratic Appointees (Gray); Republican Appointees (Black)
Note: Two judges, whose bars are jittered so as to be visible in the graph, voted
to remand in 0% of their cases.
The samples are smaller than those in most of our other investigations, but
the results suggest that at least in some courts, political ideology may play a
role in decision making in these asylum cases. We hope that in the future we
will be able to conduct a more exhaustive study, with a larger database, of the
influence of political party affiliation on the appellate courts' adjudication of
asylum cases. 
136
136. In the Ninth Circuit, there appears to be a strong relationship between the rate at
which a judge votes in favor of asylum applicants and the political party of the appointing
President. See infra Ninth Circuit Appendix (describing an empirical study by Professor
m
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VI. KEY FINDINGS
In 1940, Attorney General Robert H. Jackson wrote to Congress that "[i]t is
obviously repugnant to one's sense of justice that the judgment meted out...
should depend in large part on a purely fortuitous circumstance; namely the
personality of the particular judge before whom the case happens to come for
disposition."' 137 We assume that Attorney General Jackson recognized that the
personal histories and personalities of judges would inevitably have some effect
on their judgments in cases and that what he meant was that the effect of these
individual characteristics should not be very large. With that understanding, we
agree with his view. We are therefore quite troubled by the degree to which the
grant rates of asylum adjudicators in certain regional asylum offices, large
immigration courts, and courts of appeals diverge to a very great extent from
those of other adjudicators in the same offices and from courts deciding cases
from nationals of the same country or group of countries in the same time
frame.
A. Disparities Within Particular Asylum Offices, Immigration Courts, and
Federal Appeals Courts
We adopted what we considered a very forgiving standard for assessing the
degree to which adjudicators vary from the norm. We accepted the possibility
that even within the subset of refugees who come from the small group of
APCs that produce the highest rates of successful asylum-seekers, variations in
the refugee populations who migrate to particular regions might justifiably
account for at least some region-to-region variation. Therefore, except in a few
instances in which we explicitly compared one region with another, we
measured adjudicators' deviations from the mean by comparing individual
grant or remand rates not with national norms but with the norms for those
adjudicators' own local offices. We also decided, for purposes of this Article,
to count an adjudicator as an "outlier" from the norm only if the adjudicator's
grant or remand rate was more than 50% higher or lower than the local mean.
Even by this standard, officers who adjudicate asylum applications in some
of the eight regional offices of the Department of Homeland Security's Asylum
Office appear to have grant rates that reflect personal outlooks rather than an
office consensus. Over the course of a seven-year period, more than 20% of the
asylum officers in three of these regional offices had grant rates for applicants
from APCs that deviated from the regional norm by more than 50%. In only
three offices did fewer than 10% of the asylum officers have grant rates that
deviated from the regional norm by more than 50%. In one office, there was so
Law).
137. 1940 AT'VY GEN. ANN. REP. 5-6, quoted in Anderson et al., supra note 7, at 275.
The Attorney General was referring to criminal sentencing.
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little consensus that most of the officers deviated from the office norm by more
than 50%.
Even confining our analysis to applications by nationals of a single
country, asylum officers in some regions appear to issue grants at very different
rates from each other. Six of the eight regional asylum offices adjudicate large
numbers of applications from China. One of those offices ("Region C") shows
great consistency among officers in their rates of granting asylum to these
applicants. In that region, only 7% of the officers deviate from the regional
office's mean grant rate for Chinese cases by more than 50%. In four other
regions, the percentage of officers who deviate by more than 50% ranges
between 25% and 35%. And in one office, thirty-one of the fifty-two officers
deviated by more than 50% from the mean. In that office, two officers did not
grant asylum to any Chinese applicants (one of those officers turned down 273
applications), while two other officers granted asylum in 68% of their cases
(one of them had 150 such cases). 138 Some individual officers deviated by
much more than 50%. For example, in "Region F," in which the mean grant
rate for Chinese applicants is 57%, four of the officers granted asylum in fewer
than 5% of their 364 Chinese cases, while twelve other officers granted asylum
in more than 90% of their 1145 Chinese cases.
Judges of the immigration courts with large numbers of cases also appear
to adjudicate asylum cases inconsistently. In the three largest immigration
courts, more than 25% of the judges have asylum grant rates in cases from
APCs that deviate from their own court's mean rate for such cases by more
than 50%. The degree of deviation is dramatic even when the analysis is
confined to nationals of one country. For example, half the judges (eleven of
twenty-two) in the Miami Immigration Court who adjudicated at least fifty
cases over a period of nearly five years have grant rates for Colombian asylum
seekers that deviate from that court's Colombian mean grant rate by more than
50%. A Colombian asylum seeker might be assigned to a judge who granted
asylum in 5% of his 426 cases during the period of our study or to another who
granted asylum in 88% of his 334 cases.
We would have liked to have been able to analyze the internal consistency
of decision making within the Board of Immigration Appeals, and we were
very surprised to learn that although the Board keeps voluminous statistics on
its work, it does not keep statistical records from which it could discern the
pattern of individual members' votes. This gap in the statistical record is
especially troubling in view of the decisions of Attorney General Ashcroft and
Board Chair Lori Scialabba to direct individual members of the Board, rather
than panels, to make most of the Board's decisions in asylum cases. A single
individual now makes the life-altering decision to affirm, remand, or grant
asylum in these cases, but the Board keeps no statistical records of what the
138. In each of these regions, the officers whose grant rates are reported here
adjudicated at least twenty-five cases from FY 1999 through FY 2005.
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members are doing in these cases, making its own quality control very
challenging, and rendering public accountability virtually impossible. One
member could be remanding only 1% of appellate cases to correct immigration
judges' errors, while a member in the next office is remanding 10% of similar
cases. Yet the Board would never know that the assignment of a case to a
particular member had such a great impact on the applicant's odds of obtaining
a remand or an eventual grant of asylum.
We also analyzed asylum decisions of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, though
our investigation of asylum cases in the federal courts is necessarily
incomplete. Because the court system does not keep separate statistics on its
asylum cases, we had to examine individually thousands of unpublished
decisions to determine which ones were in fact appeals from the BIA of denials
of asylum, withholding of removal, or protection under the Convention Against
Torture. In the period we examined, calendar years 2004 and 2005, most
circuits had too few cases to enable us to compare the rates at which individual
judges voted to remand cases. (The Ninth Circuit, by contrast, had too many
cases for us to undertake this analysis!) We did perform this study on the
decisions of the Third and Sixth Circuits, however, and we found that the
results were quite different in those two circuits. The Third Circuit showed a
remarkable degree of consistency from judge to judge, while in the Sixth
Circuit, seven of the thirteen judges who cast twenty-three or more votes in
asylum cases deviated from the circuit's mean rate of votes to remand by more
than 50%. In addition, we could find no significant pattern in the Third Circuit
relating remand votes to the political party of the President who appointed the
judge, while in the Sixth Circuit, judges appointed by Democratic Presidents
voted to remand cases at about twice the rate of judges appointed by
Republican Presidents.
B. Disparities from Region to Region
Although we focused principally on deviations within local adjudicative
bodies (asylum offices, regions, cities, or circuits), our data also showed some
dramatic differences across geographic territory. Among regional asylum
offices, overall grant rates for applications from nationals of eleven APCs
varied between 26% in one region and 62% in another region. 139 This disparity
could be simply the result of differences in nationalities (and therefore
appreciable differences in degrees of threatened persecution) in the mix of
cases in the different regional offices. We have reason to be skeptical of this
explanation, however. First, there is a very large disparity in grant rates among
regional offices even when we examine decisions involving a single small
country, such as Armenia. 14 0 The officers in one regional asylum office
139. See supra Table 1.
140. It is possible that different groups of Chinese refugees, from different regions of
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(Region C) granted asylum to Armenian applicants at a rate 148% higher than
those in another office (Region G). 14 1 Also, even if the asylum office with the
lowest rate had a case load entirely composed of cases from the APC country
with the lowest grant rate and the asylum office with the highest rate had a case
load composed entirely of cases from the country with the highest grant rate,
the difference between the offices would be only 84%, not the observed
138%. 142
Among immigration courts, there is some consistency from city to city. In
cases from the APCs, nearly all of the immigration courts grant asylum at a rate
of between 37% and 54%. No courts grant asylum in these cases at a rate
higher than 54%. However, four immigration courts-in Atlanta, Miami,
Detroit, and San Diego-grant asylum at rates significantly lower than 37%.
We also compared the remand rates of the circuits in cases involving
nationals of fifteen APCs (once again excluding all countries whose nationals
are not in large measure successful at the lower levels of the asylum process).
Five of the eleven circuits that hear asylum appeals have remand rates of
between 8% and 11%, and two other circuits had remand rates between 12%
and 22%. But the Seventh Circuit's remand rate was significantly higher
(31%), and the Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits all had remand rates under
5%. It may not be surprising that all three of those circuits are in the American
South, which is often considered more conservative than other parts of the
country. Nevertheless, all of these circuits are applying the same national
asylum law, 143 and it seems odd to us that the rights of refugees seeking asylum
China and with differing degrees of meritorious claims, might arrive at different U.S. coasts
and therefore have their claims adjudicated by different regions of the asylum office.
However, there are no empirical studies to support this speculation. Furthermore, it seems
less likely that asylum seekers from smaller countries such as Armenia are composed of
groups with particular characteristics that flee to different U.S. cities.
141. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
142. This conclusion is based on an examination of the disparity between the highest
and lowest grant rates nationally among the five APCs (Armenia, China, Colombia, Ethiopia
and Haiti) that accounted for 78% of all cases from the eleven APC countries. Of these five
APCs, the grant rate for the country (Ethiopia) with the highest grant rate (59% in FY 2003
and 2004 combined) is only 84% higher than the grant rate for the country (China) with the
lowest grant rate (32% in FY 2003 and 2004). The percentages in this note are derived from
U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2004 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICs 55 tbl. 18 and
U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2003 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 60 tbl.18.
Unfortunately, DHS is no longer including in its annual statistical yearbooks detailed
statistical information on the number of cases that it grants, denies, refers and rejects.
Compare id., with U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2005 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION
STATISTICs 44 tbl.17. Both books are available at http://www.dhs.gov/ximgtn/statistics/
publications/yearbook.shtm. The discontinuance of detailed statistical reporting makes it
much more difficult for researchers to analyze trends in asylum adjudication by DHS unless
they make informal arrangements, as we did, to receive data sets directly. Fortunately, the
Department has been willing to share those data sets with scholars without requiring them to
go through the often lengthy processes triggered by formal requests under the Freedom of
Information Act.
143. There are, of course, minor differences in statutory interpretation from circuit to
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in the United States should turn significantly on the region of the United States
in which they happen to file their applications.
C. Possible Causes of Disparities Among Immigration Judges
Thanks to sophisticated statistical software and to the fact that the
Executive Office for Immigration Review publishes biographical information
on immigration judges, we were able to present a descriptive analysis
correlating judges' grant rates with personal and biographical information, as
well as with certain other information about the immigration court cases. We
confirmed the findings of prior studies showing that represented clients win
their cases at a rate that is about three times higher than the rate for
unrepresented clients. This difference could reflect the reluctance of lawyers to
accept weak cases, but to a significant extent it probably also reflects the
difficulty of winning an asylum case without the assistance of a professional
advocate. Such advocates are able to collect affidavits from lay and expert
witnesses and other corroborating documents; are familiar with the
Immigration and Nationality Act, the voluminous regulations promulgated
under that law, and the volumes of case law interpreting it; understand the
court's exacting standards for the corroboration of testimony and authentication
of documents; know the court's timetables and formal requirements for filing
papers; are aware of the procedures for pleading and motions; and know how to
conduct direct and cross examination of witnesses and make closing statements
that tie together the facts and law.
Our other discoveries resulting from our study of immigration court
decisions were even more fascinating. We found that applicants had a
significantly greater chance of winning if their applications included a request
for protection of a spouse or minor child in the United States. Perhaps family
applications are more persuasive, because judges don't believe that married
applicants would flee from danger and leave a spouse or child behind, or
because the judges feel additional sympathy for spouses and children, or
because they suspect that unmarried applicants are more likely to commit fraud
or be terrorists. The reasons for the increased odds of prevailing if one has
dependents in the United States merit further study.
Perhaps the most interesting result of our study is that the chance of
winning an asylum case varies significantly according to the gender of the
circuit. But very few asylum appeals turn on statutory interpretation. Most focus on whether
the immigration court and the Board drew proper inferences and conclusions from the
testimony and documentary evidence in the case. The leading treatises, such as DEBORAH
ANKER, THE LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES: ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS AND
ANALYSIS (3d ed. 1994), cite circuits interchangeably to support their descriptions of the law
because statutory interpretation is in fact so uniform nationally (although by dint of its larger




immigration judge. Female judges grant asylum at a rate that is 44% higher
than that of their male colleagues. The work experience of the judge before
joining the bench also matters: The grant rate of judges who once worked for
the Department of Homeland Security (or its predecessor, the Immigration and
Naturalization Service) drops largely in proportion to the length of such prior
service. By contrast, an asylum applicant is considerably advantaged, on a
statistical basis, if his or her judge once practiced immigration law in a private
frim, served on the staff of a nonprofit organization, or had experience as a full-
time law teacher.
D. The Erosion of Appellate Review by the Board of Immigration Appeals
If adjudication by the asylum office and the immigration courts has
become something of a random process, one might expect reform to have been
initiated by appellate review. Unfortunately, in recent years the Board focused
primarily on reducing its own backlog (which it accomplished by affirming the
vast majority of removal orders rapidly) rather than providing effective
appellate oversight.
Even though we were unable to evaluate the consistency of decision
making from one Board member to another, the statistical information that the
Board provided enabled us to confirm and expand upon a previously reported
change in the Board's work over time. As the law firm of Dorsey & Whitney
discovered in 2003, the "reforms" mandated by Attorney General Ashcroft-
firing five Clinton appointees and encouraging others to leave, requiring most
decisions to be decided by summary affirmances or very short opinions, and
replacing three-member panel decision making with single-member
affirmances for most asylum cases-resulted in a sudden and drastic reduction
in the rate at which the Board rendered decisions favorable to asylum
applicants. 44 The statistical information available to Dorsey & Whitney
included all Board cases, not only asylum cases, but our study shows that its
conclusions are equally valid when the cases under study are limited to those
involving asylum. Although the BIA was rendering decisions favorable to
asylum applicants in 37% of asylum appeals in FY 2001, before the firing of
the Clinton appointees and before most asylum cases were assigned to a single
judge who could affirm summarily, that rate dropped precipitously to 13% the
following year, and by FY 2005 it was only 11%. Some might argue that from
FY 1998 through FY 2001, the Board was being too generous to asylum
applicants and that a rate such as 11% is more appropriate, or that fewer
meritorious appeals were filed after FY 2001. We have no way of knowing
which rate is a more accurate reflection of justice. But we are troubled by the
facts that the rate drop was sudden and persistent, that it was associated
temporally with a purge of certain members appointed by a prior administration
144. See DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP, supra note 17, at 39-40.
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and with increased fear of foreign nationals after the 9/11 attacks, and that it
also coincided with the institution of new procedures that provided less scrutiny
of immigration judges' decisions. These factors cause us to suspect that in
many asylum cases, the BIA has ceased to function as an effective appellate
body.
VII. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Different observers may draw different conclusions from the data that we
have presented here. Some may conclude that the asylum adjudication system
is operating as it should, and that no reforms are needed. In particular, at least
two groups of people may be very comfortable with the status quo. Some may
believe that (except when the Attorney General exercises a prerogative right to
change the result of a case or to fire Board members or judges with whom he
disagrees), asylum adjudicators should be "independent" in the sense of
receiving little or no direction to act in a uniform way, even if disparities result.
In addition, some refugee advocates may support greater consistency as a
desirable goal but believe that no attempt to reduce disparities should be made
because politicians who oppose more immigration and those who agree with
them within the executive branch may convert a project seeking more
consistency into one that imposes uniformly lower grant rates on the
adjudicators.
We are very troubled, however, by the central finding of our study.
Whether an asylum applicant is able to live safely in the United States or is
deported to a country in which he claims to fear persecution is very seriously
influenced by a spin of the wheel of chance; that is, by a clerk's random
assignment of an applicant's case to one asylum officer rather than another, or
one immigration judge rather than another. We think that an adjudicator's
deviation by more than 50% from the mean rate for similar cases in that
adjudicator's own office raises serious questions about whether the adjudicator
is imposing his or her own philosophical attitude (or personal level of
skepticism about applicants' testimony) to the cases under consideration.
Similarly, at the appellate levels, we are troubled by the fact that factors
unrelated to the merits of cases so significantly affect an appellant's chance of
obtaining a remand. These extraneous factors include, at the Board of
Immigration Appeals, a Republican Attorney General's 2002 decision to purge
the Board of many members selected by his Democratic predecessor, and to
require cursory opinions, at best, rather than careful analyses of appellants'
contentions. At the U.S. Court of Appeals level, the most obvious extraneous
factor affecting the outcomes of cases is the region of the country in which the
asylum applicant happened to settle before filing his or her application. 1
45
145. The vast majority of asylum applicants are not permitted to work while their
applications are pending. The authors know from personal experience that clients of the
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Despite our misgivings about the random factors affecting the current
system, we do not think that the process would be improved by more stringent
controls on asylum officers, immigration judges, or other participants in the
system. The most obvious control would be a rigid quota system; for example,
a directive requiring every asylum officer to approve between 35% and 40% of
the applications that the officer adjudicates, or requiring every immigration
judge to grant asylum to between 40% and 45% of all applicants.
For several reasons, the cure of a quota system could be worse than the
disease of random adjudication. First, there is no way to know what the right
percentage would be for any quota. The mean rate for a particular nationality in
a particular adjudicating office could be too low or too high. Just because it is
the mean does not make it self-evidently the correct rate. Second, nothing in
this study dictates what the correct range or tolerance should be for a quota
system. We somewhat arbitrarily selected a 50% test as our measure of
deviation, but this range actually seems to us extremely tolerant of variation by
individual adjudicators. On the other hand, a range of plus-or-minus 10% or
even 20% from the mean seems to us to allow too little tolerance for individual
variation based on the normal scatter of valid or doubtful asylum cases. Third,
we fear that any quota system imposed by political authorities would become
ossified, reflecting historical national or regional grant rates but not changing
quickly enough to reflect alterations in human rights conditions that may occur
within persecuting countries. Also, while approximately fifteen countries
produce enough cases to generate reliable mean grant rates, most countries-
even many with bad human rights records-have fewer nationals who flee to
the United States, so the statistical record of grant rates from those countries
would not be a good basis for a quota system.
We also do not recommend a more detailed codification of the substantive
rules governing asylum. It is true that some of those rules are not spelled out in
the Code of Federal Regulations or in precedent cases. For example, there has
never been a succinct, definitive definition of "persecution," because the nature
of persecution and our understanding of it keep changing. Also, while a more
detailed codification could theoretically reduce disparity in decision making,
neither this study nor any other study that we know of offers evidence that
disagreements about substantive law account for the disparities in grant rates.
Those disparities could as easily result from officers' or judges' different
degrees of skepticism about the veracity of applicants, or the adjudicators'
different political philosophies or personal backgrounds. Indeed, our study
suggests that the gender and prior work experience of the adjudicators correlate
strongly with grant rates.
asylum clinic at Georgetown University have settled in the Baltimore/Washington area
primarily because that is where they have friends or family members who can support them
for several months until their cases have been decided. The applicants know nothing about
regional differences in immigration court grant rates, much less the statistical likelihood of
winning appeals in various circuits.
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We do believe, however, that worthwhile steps can be taken to improve
decision making. First, we suggest that EOIR implement more rigorous hiring
standards. 14 6 To be selected as an immigration judge, a candidate should have
to demonstrate that he or she is sensitive to cultural differences and likely to
treat all parties respectfully; capable of managing a large docket without
becoming impatient; predisposed to be very careful in judging the credibility of
people who claim to be victims of trauma or torture; and able to produce well-
reasoned decisions that take into account all of the evidence and arguments
presented by the parties. In addition, it would be desirable for the judges to
have some degree of knowledge of or experience with immigration law.
Immigration judges are not ALJs, and while we do not suggest regulating them
under the APA, we believe that their selection process should be at least as
rigorous as that provided for judges who, arguably, make less consequential
decisions. 
147
146. For a description of the EOIR's current hiring process, see Jason McLure,
Borderline Calls, LEGAL TIMEs, June 19, 2006, at 1:
.. [T]he process by which the judges are hired is a murky one, often little understood by
either immigration lawyers or the judges themselves.... Applicants are vetted by [EOIR's]
chief immigration judge, who conducts interviews and makes formal hiring
recommendations.
But according to an immigration-judge hiring policy released by the Justice Department,
the attorney general also has the option to pre-empt the formal vetting process and directly
hire a judge of his choosing.
Indeed, from October 2004 until early 2007, the Justice Department filled "the
overwhelming majority" of immigration judge positions through direct selection by the
Attorney General, bypassing the public competition process. Emma Schwartz & Jason
McLure, DOJ Made Immigration Judgeships Political, LEGAL TIMES, May 28, 2007, at 12.
EOIR acknowledges that the Attorney General can bypass the entire public competition
process, but it has provided this description of standards and procedures for hiring
immigration judges:
Unless the Attorney General elects to make a direct appointment, .. . [a vacancy
announcement is sent] to various sources (DOJ postings, Internet sites, bar associations, law
journals, etc.). Applicants must have an LL.B. or a J.D. degree and be duly licensed and
authorized to practice law as an attorney under the laws of a state, territory, or the District of
Columbia. Applicants must be U.S. citizens and have a minimum of 7 years of relevant post-
bar admission legal experience at the time the application is submitted, with 1 year
experience equivalent to the GS-I 5 level in the Federal Service....
[The Office of the Chief Immigration Judge looks for] experience in at least three of the
following areas: knowledge of immigration laws and procedures; substantial litigation
experience, preferably in a high-volume context; experience handling complex legal issues;
experience conducting administrative heanngs; or knowledge of judicial practices and
procedures. After reviewing the written applications, OCIJ selects applicants for an interview
when appropriate.
Executive Office for Immigration Review, AILA-EOIR Liaison Agenda Questions: For Oct.
17, 2005, http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/statspub/eoirailal01705.pdf. Note that immigration law
experience is not required, and even knowledge of immigration law is only one of several
alternative qualifications for this job.
147. In Canada, a person desiring to become an adjudicator for the Immigration and
Refugee Board must fill out a lengthy application that is used as an initial screening
mechanism and pass a written entrance test. The applicant must also qualify under a
competency profile which evaluates such qualities as the applicant's self-control and cultural
competence. See the standards described in Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, The
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Second, we suspect that more training is in order, with particular attention
to exercises and lessons that will properly promote greater consistency. The
asylum officers currently receive much more initial and ongoing training than
the immigration judges. The tenure of every asylum officer begins with a five-
week basic training course (including testing). In addition, on a continuing
basis, four hours a week are set aside for training officers on new legal issues
and country conditions. The trainers themselves participate in monthly
conference calls with the national headquarters to address new issues, emerging
patterns of claims, and ideas for training techniques. 148 During some periods, in
at least some of the regional asylum offices, the weekly training has on
occasion included work on interviewing techniques and intercultural
communication. Regular periodic training of this type should be standardized
not only in every asylum office but also for immigration judges, who have only
sporadically received ongoing training. In 2006, for example, Immigration
Judge Denise Slavin, President of the National Association of Immigration
Judges, complained, "We have had no training conferences in person for the
last three years .... We used to have [a] training conference every year but
because of funding cuts we have not.'" 149 We applaud EOIR's January 2007
statement that it would expand and improve training for all immigration
judges. 150
Training for immigration judges should include units on judicial
temperament.151 For example, immigration lawyers have sometimes
Selection Process for Governor in Council Appointments to the Immigration and Refugee
Board of Canada, http://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/about/employment/members/process_e.htm,
and in Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Backgrounder - Immigration and
Refugee Board of Canada Governor in Council Competency Profile, http://www.irb-
cisr.gc.ca/en/media/background/back-compe.htm.
148. Ruppel, supra note 21.
149. Jennifer Ludden, Complaints Prompt Government Review of Immigration Courts,
MORNING EDITION (National Public Radio broadcast Feb. 9, 2006), available at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=5198044.
150. The statement was made to a federal commission that has been very critical of
EOIR's protection of asylum seekers. U.S. COMM'N ON INT'L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM,
EXPEDITED REMOVAL STUDY REPORT CARD: Two YEARS LATER 10 (2007), available at
http://www.uscirf.gov/reports/scorecardFINAL.pdf The Department of Justice held a
training conference for immigration judges in August 2006, and it held another conference in
2007, at which Andrew Schoenholtz presented the research published in this law review
article. Id.
151. In 2006, Attorney General Alberto Gonzales took note of "reports of immigration
judges who fail to treat aliens appearing before them with appropriate respect and
consideration and who fail to produce the quality of work that I expect from employees of
the Department of Justice." Memorandum from Alberto Gonzales, Att'y Gen., to
Immigration Judges (Jan. 9, 2006), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/06202-
asy-ag-memo-ijs.pdf. In view of these reports, he commissioned a study of the work of the
immigration judges. After receiving the study, he announced that he would "establish regular
procedures [for the Board of Immigration Appeals] . . .to report adjudications that reflect
immigration judge temperament problems." U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MEASURES TO IMPROVE
THE IMMIGRATION COURTS AND THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS 3 (2006), available at
November 2007]
STANFORD LA W REVIEW
complained that after an immigration judge is lied to several times by nationals
of a particular country, the judge tends to suspect that all nationals of that
country are liars. The training could include counseling on impartiality,
avoiding stereotyping, and not taking personally the misconduct that the judges
sometimes encounter from people who are desperate to remain in the United
States.
Moreover, within each regional asylum office and within each immigration
court, adjudicators with particularly high and particularly low grant rates
should confer with each other and try to ascertain the cause of this
phenomenon. 152 If simple conversation does not reveal why such great
disparities exist, the adjudicators might sit on several cases jointly, or in panels
of three, which would require them to debate and discover the causes of their
differences. If the differences are based on ideologies or preconceptions of the
adjudicators, these should be discussed with the regional or national director (in
the case of an asylum office) or chief immigration judge (in the case of
immigration court). Merely discovering the origins of statistical disparities
could help to remedy them.
153
http://trac.syr.edu/tracatwork/detail/P104.pdf. In April 2007, the outgoing director of the
Executive Office for Immigration Review announced that "Board members now report
instances where an immigration judge failed to display the appropriate level of
professionalism so that the Office of the Chief Immigration Judge can take appropriate
action." Memorandum from Kevin D. Rooney, Dir., Executive Office for Immigration
Review, to EOIR Employees, in 12 BENDER'S IMMIGR. BULL. 597, 601 (2007).
152. In January 2007, the Department of Justice advised the U.S. Commission on
International Religious Freedom that it would explore mechanisms (for example, peer
review) to reduce "the significant variations in approval and denial rates among immigration
judges." U.S. COMM'N ON INT'L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 150, at 10. Three months
later, the outgoing director of the Executive Office for Immigration Review announced that
its objective had been to "[r]eview a study [apparently the TRAC report, cited supra note 56]
which highlights disparities in asylum grant rates among immigration judges and make
recommendations with respect to this issue" and that this objective had been
"[i]mplemented." Rooney, supra note 151, at 601. However, the director's explanation of
what he meant by his statement that the objective had been "implemented" suggests that
little had yet been done. He reported that "the Office of the Chief Immigration Judge is
improving training for judges, is developing a peer observation and mentoring program to
encourage immigration judges to share best practices, and is closely supervising those
immigration judges who have unusually high or low asylum grant rates." Id The Department
of Justice did hold a national training conference for immigration judges in August 2006 and
another in August 2007, but it has not committed itself to serious initial and regular training
through conferences and other educational events.
153. Canada's Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) was concerned about substantial
disparities in grant rates from one regional office to another and took steps to address the
problem in the late 1990s. It set as a standard a thirty percentage point spread in the grant
rates between two regions for awards of asylum to applicants from any particular country
that produced a substantial number of cases. Note that this measure, a spread of thirty
percentage points, rather than 30%, was in many cases considerably more tolerant of
disparity than the 50% standard used in our study. When the standard was exceeded, the
Board would focus its attention on reducing the disparity through such means as reviewing
whether the country of origin information was current and promoting discussion among the
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Our fourth recommendation is that Congress and the Department of Justice
should provide immigration courts with the resources that are necessary to
enable the judges to work at the standards expected of bodies that adjudicate
important cases. At present, the immigration courts are severely understaffed.
As Second Circuit Chief Judge John M. Walker told Congress in 2006:
The 215 Immigration Judges are required to cope with filings of over 300,000
cases a year. With only 215 Judges, a single Judge has to dispose of 1,400
cases a year or nearly twenty-seven cases a week, or more than five each
business day, simply to stay abreast of his docket. I fail to see how
Immigration Judges can be expected to make thorough and competent findings
of fact and conclusions of law under these circumstances. This is especially
true given the unique nature of immigration hearings. Aliens frequently do not
speak English, so the Immigration Judge must work with a translator, and the
Immigration Judge normally must go over particular testimony several times
before he can be confident that he is getting an accurate answer from the alien.
Hearings, particularly in asylum cases, are highly fact intensive and depend
upon the presentation and consideration of numerous details and documents to
determine issues of credibility and to reach factual conclusions. This can take
no small amount of time depending on the nature of the alien's testimony.
1 54
An increase in the number of judges is only a start on improving resources.
Few if any immigration judges have law clerks; in many courts, four or more
judges share a single clerk. There are no court stenographers; judges record
their hearings on tape recorders and are personally responsible for changing the
cassettes whenever they run out. Court interpreters are of mixed ability. Every
immigration judge should be assigned at least one law clerk, and the quality of
recording and interpretation should be improved. 1
55
decision makers. Over time the number of countries with a significant variance in decision-
making was reduced from over ten to only one or two. More recently, the Canadian
headquarters office began to code cases by type of claim as well as by country (for example,
claims by Iranian monarchists are classified separately from those by Iranian converts to
Christianity). It began to focus on disparities within as well as among regional offices. In
addition, the Board has at times designated decisions as jurisprudential guides or as
persuasive authorities, with a view to promoting consistency in adjudication with respect to
particular types of claims. Telephone Interview with Paul D. Aterman, Dir. Gen. of
Operations, Immigration and Refugee Bd. of Canada (June 14, 2007); see also Immigration
and Refugee Board of Canada, Legal and Policy References, http://www.irb-
cisr.gc.ca/en/references/policy/ index e.htm. Of course, expressing a preferred position on
legal issues or on the state of human rights protection in a country of origin cannot resolve
differences among adjudicators in their judgments of the credibility of applicants.
154. Immigration Litigation Reduction Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
109th Cong. 5-7 (2006) (statement of Hon. John M. Walker, Jr., C.J., U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit), available at http://www.aila.org/content/default.aspx?docid = 18996.
155. The Attorney General has announced plans to upgrade the recording equipment in
immigration courts, but how long this process will take remains to be seen. See U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, supra note 151. Section 701(b)(3) of Senate Bill 1348 and section 701(b)(3) of
House Bill 1645 would have created at least twenty new immigration judges and "not less
than 80" new positions to support the immigration judges. S. 1348, 110th Cong. § 701(b)(3)
(2007); H.R. 1645, 110th Cong. § 701(b)(3) (2007).
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Fifth, we suggest that the government provide appointed counsel for any
indigent asylum applicant who must defend himself in a removal proceeding in
immigration court. People who are trying to prove that they are refugees within
the meaning of federal law should not be required to compile supporting
affidavits and make highly technical legal arguments without professional
advocates, when the consequence of losing may be deportation to countries in
which they face imprisonment, torture, and death. Some of the gap between the
unrepresented affirmative asylum applicants in immigration court who win at a
rate of 16% and the represented applicants who win at a rate of 46% may be
explained by lawyers' refusals to accept cases that appear very weak, but we
suspect that if the currently unrepresented applicants had counsel, the gap
would close appreciably. 156 This suggestion is consistent with the more general
movement toward a regime of "civil Gideon." The American Bar Association,
for example, has urged that the government should provide counsel for
indigents in proceedings in which "basic human needs are at stake, such as
those involving shelter, sustenance, safety, health, or child custody." The ABA
specifically supports the provision of counsel at government expense to all
those in removal proceedings. 157 Of course providing counsel to indigent
asylum applicants has fiscal implications, but to some extent, the cost of
providing counsel will be offset by saving the time of the judges and other
court personnel. Lawyers make proceedings more efficient by screening out
irrelevant testimony and focusing the issues for the judge.
We also have suggestions to improve the Board of Immigration Appeals.
To begin with, the Board should catch up to the Asylum Office and the
immigration courts by keeping and publishing statistics on the decisions of
individual members, at least in asylum cases. If one member is granting asylum
or remanding asylum cases at ten times the rate of another member, the Board
itself, and the public, should at least be aware of this fact.
Second, the Department of Justice should amend the BIA's operating
regulations to prohibit the Board from assigning asylum cases to a single
member for decision. Given the apparently huge differences of opinion among
adjudicators about who deserves asylum, more than one member should review
each case, and the reviewers should discuss the reasons for any differences of
opinion. Also, Board decisions in asylum cases that are briefed by the appellant
should no longer be decided by summary affirmances or even by two or three
sentence conclusory opinions. At least in asylum cases, every Board affirmance
should respond in writing to the contentions of the appellant or his
representative, just as federal district court opinions systematically address the
156. For a well-reasoned argument describing several affordable options for publicly-
funded legal support for indigent respondents in immigration court, see Kerwin, supra note
73.
157. ABA House of Delegates, Resolution 112A (2006), http://www.abanet.org/
media/docs/1 12Arevised.pdf (emphasis added); ABA House of Delegates, Resolution 107A
(2006), http://www.abanet.org/publicserv/immigration/107a right to counsel.pdf.
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contentions of the losing party. 158 This process is an essential element if losing
parties, and their counsel, are to believe that they were at least heard and
understood. 159 If the Board addressed the contentions of counsel, the rate of
appeals to federal court might come down, and even if it did not, the Courts of
Appeals would have a clear and complete statement of views from the Board,
which would place them in a better position to decide whether to affirm or
remand the Board's decision. These two suggestions-requiring multi-member
decisions in asylum cases, and addressing the contentions of counsel-would
require an increase in resources for the Board, but in our view, such an increase
is well-justified by the important role that the Board could once again play as a
reviewing body in life-or-death cases. 1
60
In 2006, the Attorney General seemed to agree that the streamlining
"reforms" of 2002 went too far in the direction of allowing single members to
make so many decisions, although the Department of Justice concluded that "it
is neither necessary nor feasible to return to three-member review of all cases."
The Attorney General determined that "[s]ome adjustments to streamlining,
however, are appropriate" and stated that new rules will "allow the limited use
of three-member written opinions-as opposed to one-member written
opinions-to provide greater legal analysis in a small class of particularly
complex cases." 16 1 This vague and apparently very limited reform does not go
nearly far enough, unless the Department of Justice ultimately adopts our view
that all asylum cases in which an appealing respondent contends that an
158. In January 2007, EOIR advised a federal commission that it was drafting a new
rule to allow the Board to "increase" the number of written decisions and to refer more cases
to three judge panels, but the commission noted "that this does not respond directly to the
[commission's previous] recommendation that all asylum appeals receive written decisions."
U.S. COMM'N ON INT'L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 152, at 11.
159. Social psychology studies have found that the perception that the decision maker
has given "due consideration" to the "respondent's views and arguments" is crucial to
individuals' acceptance of both the decision and the authority of the institution that imposes
the decision. See E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 80-81, 104-06 (1988).
160. We would not necessarily require the restoration of three-member panels in every
asylum case. It might be sufficient to assign two members to review each case and to discuss
their views on it. If, after discussion, the two members continued to disagree, they could
either remand the case to the immigration judge (thereby giving the benefit of the doubt-
but not granting asylum-to the alien) or request the assignment of a third member to break
the tie. This system would presumably be more expensive than one-member decision-
making but less expensive than assigning three members to each appeal.
161. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 151, at 4. Apparently the key word in this
pronouncement is "allow," as opposed to "require." The Executive Office for Immigration
Review has stated that it will issue a rule that "will provide a Board member with the ability
to refer a case to a three-member panel if the case presents complex or unusual issues of law
or fact." Rooney, supra note 151, at 603. If this is how the final rule reads, the individual
member will have discretion to decide a complex or novel case individually rather than
referring the case for a more extensive opinion by a panel.
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immigration judge has erred are, in view of the many factual and legal issues
present in each such proceeding, "particularly complex."
The structure of the immigration courts and the Board should be improved
along with their decisional processes. 162 Congress should establish the Board as
a statutory Article I court and should remove it from the Department of Justice,
where it has become overly politicized by the Attorney General through his
authority to hire and fire its members at will and to erode its review procedures
and powers. 163 The Board should become an independent federal agency (not
part of any federal department), and its members should be appointed by the
President and confirmed by the Senate for terms of ten to fifteen years. No
political official should have the power to fire members of the Board who
disagree with a current administration on policy issues. Instead, changes in
policy should occur incrementally through Board adjudication and through
notice and comment rulemaking, rather than through purges of judges. This
structural change would imbue the Board with a culture of professionalism and
with the independence necessary to perform its duties impartially. It would also
enable the Board to play a more effective appellate role in restoring consistency
in the decisions of the immigration courts.
A combination of events in 2002 and 2006 reveals just how much a
presidential administration is willing and able to manipulate Board membership
to serve partisan political ends and to control the Board's decision making. As
noted above, 164 in 2002, Attorney General John Ashcroft decided that a Board
of only eleven members was appropriate, "based on judgments made about the
historic capacity of appellate courts and administrative appellate bodies to
adjudicate the law in a cohesive manner, the ability of individuals to reach
consensus on legal issues, and the requirements of the existing and projected
caseload." 16 5 To achieve the desired efficiency, he removed five members
appointed by the previous Democratic Administration. Fewer than five years
later, however, when the Board had only nine members (as a result of the
downsizing and two retirements), the Bush Administration decided that the
correct size of the Board was fifteen rather than eleven. 16 6 The Administration
did not suggest that the members who had been appointed under a Democratic
Administration and removed to other jobs in the Department of Justice would
162. For a thoughtful exploration of the question of decisional independence in the
immigration courts and the BIA, see Steven H. Legomsky, Deportation and the War on
Independence, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 369 (2006).
163. In response to concerns about politicization of the asylum process, there have
been "repeated calls for the transfer of decision-making to an independent agency immune
from political pressure" in the United Kingdom. Robert Thomas, Risk Legitimacy and
Asylum Adjudication, 58 N. IR. LEGAL Q. 49, 72 (2007).
164. See supra note 105.
165. Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case
Management, 67 Fed. Reg. 54,878, 54,893 (Aug. 26, 2002).
166. Board of Immigration Appeals: Composition of Board and Temporary Board
Members, 71 Fed. Reg. 70,855 (Dec. 7, 2006).
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be restored to the Board. The net effect of the downsizing and upsizing actions,
therefore, was to provide the Bush Administration with the opportunity to
replace five Democratic appointees with five Republican appointees.
The immigration courts should also be made more professional and should
be insulated from politics by giving them statutory independence from the
Department of Justice.167 The press has called attention to the Department's
use of partisan considerations to select immigration judges, which may or may
not have been legal. 168 But the Department's apparent ability to remove
immigration judges for no reason, invoking the same lack of statutory structure
that it relied on when a Republican Administration removed five Board
members appointed under a Democratic Administration, is even more
troubling, because the lack of any tenure in office could cause some
immigration judges to decide cases based on their desire to please an
administration rather than on the law. Immigration judges are at present
components of the same Executive Office for Immigration Review as the
Board, and they should become part of the same new independent agency as the
Board. New judges should be hired as appointees of a Senate-confirmed
executive director of the new independent agency. We believe that the
important issues of asylum and immigration deserve such a professionalization
of the review function.
Our suggestion to remove the immigration court and the Board of
Immigration Appeals from the Department of Justice and to place these bodies
in an independent agency is neither new nor radical. The United States
Commission on Immigration Reform recommended in 1997 that
"administrative review of all immigration-related decisions" should be vested
in a "newly-created independent agency ... within the Executive Branch. 169
The Commission added presciently that EOIR's location within the Department
of Justice "injects into a quasi-judicial appellate process the possibility of
intervention by the highest ranking law enforcement official in the land, and,
generally, can undermine the BIA's autonomy and stature." 
1 70
Finally, the U.S. Courts of Appeals should set an example for the lower
bodies in the asylum adjudication process by reducing the disparities in their
own remand rates. We do not know why the Seventh Circuit consistently
remands cases at rate 700% or 800% higher than any of the three southern
circuits, but if the answer is simply that the South is more conservative than the
Upper Midwest, that is cold comfort to asylum seekers who arrive in the United
167. Scholars and immigration judges themselves have previously proposed an
independent immigration court. See Legomsky, supra note 162, at 373, 404-05.
168. E.g., Schwartz & McLure, supra note 146.
169. U.S. COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, BECOMING AN AMERICAN: IMMIGRATION
AND IMMIGRANT POLICY 174 (1997), available at http://www.utexas.edu/lbj/uscir/
becoming/full-report.pdf. In the interests of full disclosure, Andrew Schoenholtz was the
Deputy Director of this Commission.
170. Id. at 178.
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States unaware that regional cultural differences in our country may determine
the course of their lives if they need to appeal orders of removal. We suggest
that the Federal Judicial Center convene a national conference of appellate
judges to discuss immigration in general and asylum in particular. The
conference agenda should include panels of experts on the work of the
immigration courts and the BIA, and on persecution around the world. More
importantly, the conference should offer ample opportunity for informal
discussion among judges from different circuits. The conference format should
include small group discussions among judges who rarely vote to remand and
those who often vote to remand, in an effort to reach a better national
consensus on the standard for review of the Board's decisions and on the
application of that standard. These recommendations are far more modest than
the proposal, made by former Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist, to confine all
judicial review of the Board of Immigration Appeals to the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit.' 71 That consolidation proposal would, by definition,
have ended geographical disparities in the adjudication of asylum cases at the
Court of Appeals level. But it had many drawbacks, including creating
incentives for Presidents to appoint judges based on their expected votes in
immigration cases; depriving the judges in question of the perspective of
generalists who decide many different kinds of cases; risking "capture" of the
court by the Department of Justice, which would appear before it in virtually
every case; and overwhelming a court that now decides intellectual property
and a few other types of cases. 172 The courts, too, should refrain from affirming
removal orders without any opinion when an asylum applicant has made
substantial contentions challenging a decision of the Board. Applicants for
asylum are neither citizens nor permanent residents of the United States.
Nevertheless, their claims are extremely serious, as errors of adjudication can
deliver them into the hands of their persecutors. Rejections of their claims on
appeal therefore warrant explanations from the court as well as from the Board.
In view of the results of this study, Congress should also amend the judicial
review provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act to restore a more
normal role for the federal courts in their review of asylum decisions.
Currently, the federal courts defer excessively, especially in the Southern
circuits, to decisions of immigration courts and the Board of Immigration
Appeals, even though those decisions appear to depend to a large extent on the
identity, personal characteristics, and prior work experience of the adjudicator,
as well as on whether or not the asylum applicant had representation or
dependents in the United States. As amended in 1996, the law directs that on
review, "the administrative findings of fact [of the BIA or of an immigration
judge whose findings are not rejected by the BIA] are conclusive unless any
171. S. 2454, 109th Cong. § 501 (2006).
172. We are grateful to Jonathan Le, a student at Georgetown University Law Center,
for sharing with us his unpublished paper that identifies these defects with the Frist proposal.
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reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary."'173
This extreme standard should be replaced with the more usual rule requiring
deference to findings that are supported by substantial evidence. Meanwhile,
the courts should interpret the review statute narrowly, deferring strongly only
to formal findings of fact, and not to applications of law to fact (such as
whether a certain number of beatings constitute "persecution," or whether an
asylum applicant's reason to fear persecution was so great as to be "well-
founded"). Perhaps some courts are already following this guidance;
differences in the circuits' willingness to defer to these applications of law to
fact may account for the immense differences in their remand rates that we
discovered in this study.
Accuracy, consistency, and public acceptance are among the most
important goals of any adjudicative system. 174 This study shows that disparities
are deeply ingrained in the U.S. asylum system, and that the government must
now take significant steps to achieve greater consistency in decision making.
We believe that the recommendations discussed above are crucial to the
government's efforts to achieve such a result.
173. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (2000).
174. See Legomsky, supra note 18, at 622.
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METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX
I. Benchmarks for Counting and Comparing the Number of Outlying
Adjudicators
In order to evaluate consistency within an adjudication body, we needed to
select a benchmark for counting the number of adjudicators (asylum officers,
immigration judges, or appellate judges) who deviated significantly from the
mean. To begin, we had to decide whether to measure deviation in terms of the
difference from the national mean or the mean for the office in which the
adjudicator worked. We decided on the latter standard; therefore, unless
otherwise indicated, we measured deviation from a mean for asylum officers
only in terms of the mean of the regional office in which the asylum officer
works, and deviation from a mean by immigration judges only by measuring
their grant rates against the mean grant rate for the judges in the city in which
they sit. (In a small number of instances, we compared regions or cities, but
these are clearly indicated in the text.) We believe that making local
comparisons is appropriate because the national origin of the population of
asylum seekers varies considerably from region to region. For example,
Haitians and Colombians apply for asylum in much larger proportions in
Miami than in other cities. Even when we considered only asylum-seekers from
one country, those who migrate to one U.S. city may be significantly different
from those who migrate to another city (for example, asylum seekers from one
province may tend to flee to the East Coast of the United States while those
from another province may flee via a different route and end up on the West
Coast.)
To compute mean regional or city grant rates, we included all cases from
the time period of the study. For regional asylum office grant rates, we
multiplied each adjudicator's grant rate by the number of cases decided by that
adjudicator; the product represented the total of that adjudicator's grants. For
immigration court grant rates by city, the data provided by the government
included numbers of cases granted. In both cases, we added total adjudicator
grants, and then divided that sum by the total number of cases decided on their
merits by all adjudicators in the region or city. We reported and evaluated the
grant rates of only those adjudicators who decided at least the threshold number
of cases reported in the text (one hundred cases in most instances, fifty in
others, and twenty-five in two instances: studies of decisions of asylum officers
deciding cases from China and remands by federal courts of appeals). We were
concerned that grant rates of adjudicators who decided fewer than twenty-five
cases might not accurately represent the grant rates of those adjudicators if they
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had decided more cases. 175 That is, an adjudicator who decided only five cases
might have been assigned five weak or five strong cases by chance.
We also had to decide how to count the number of adjudicators who are
"outliers" in a particular region or court. Any benchmark is necessarily
arbitrary, but we selected one that we thought was relatively conservative and
that many people would agree represented a measure of significant deviation
from the norm. By our measure, an adjudicator is an outlier if that adjudicator's
grant rate was more than 50% higher or lower than the regional or city mean.
Thus for a region or city with a 30% mean grant rate for the type of case under
consideration, an adjudicator is not an outlier for our purposes unless his or her
grant rate is lower than 15% or higher than 45%. Many people might think that
a deviation of 50% above and below the mean is too large a range and that our
study therefore understates the degree of disparity in asylum grant rates. Others
might think that we were too intolerant of differences in perspective among
adjudicators. Since we are publishing our raw data on a website176 in Microsoft
Access and Excel formats, others may easily count the number of outliers using
benchmarks of their own choosing, such as deviations of 30% or 70% rather
than 50%.
In most of the studies reported in this Article, the mean grant rate falls in a
relatively narrow range, between 25% and 50%. However, there are a few
studies (relating to particular asylum applicant populations) in which the mean
grant rate is particularly low (e.g., 15%) or high (e.g., 73%). When the mean
grant rate falls significantly, the range of percentages in which an adjudicator is
not deviant becomes smaller. For example, when the mean is only 15%, the
non-deviant range runs from 7.5% to 22.5%, a difference of only fifteen
percentage points rather than forty percentage points, and when the mean is
70%, the non-deviant range is 35% to 100%, a range of sixty-five percentage
points.
For this reason, we also considered defining outliers as those who deviated
from the local mean by more than a fixed number of percentage points. We
seriously considered an alternative definition of outliers as those adjudicators
whose grant rates were more than fifteen percentage points higher or lower than
the regional mean. However, this computation also had its problems. For a
study in which the regional grant rate was 15% or less, by definition there
could be no outliers on the low side. In our view, the fact that a region's mean
grant rate is as low as 15% does not exclude the possibility of outlying
adjudicators; for example, an adjudicator with a 3% grant rate in such a region
seems out of step with the norm. Therefore, we believed that our chosen
method is a more accurate representation of deviance. By contrast, a fixed-
175. In one instance (our study of the votes of judges in the Sixth Circuit during 2004
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percentage-point method tends to understate low-side deviations and overstate
high-side deviations in a study with low regional means, and it tends to
understate high-side deviations and overstate low-side deviations in studies
with high regional means. Of course any reader who wants to examine the
adjudicators' deviations by using a measure based on a fixed percentage point
spread rather than by measuring the percentage of deviation from the mean may
do so by working with the raw data on the website.
II. The Asylum Office
The Asylum Office of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security provided
us with data on all asylum applications decided by its asylum officers from FY
1999 through FY 2005. For each of the 928 officers who served during this
period, the Office provided us with the number of cases decided by that officer,
the officer's approximate grant rate, and the region in which the officer worked.
In addition, for the 884 officers who decided cases from the fifteen APCs, the
Asylum Office provided us with the number of cases the officer decided from
each country, the identity of the country in question, the officer's approximate
grant rate for nationals from that country, the region in which the officer
worked, and the officer's gender. 177 Our analysis of adjudications by asylum
officers included only asylum applications because those officers do not have
authority to grant withholding of removal, 178 and Convention Against Torture
cases are rare.
All the data exclude Mexican asylum applicants. According to the Asylum
Office, Mexican nationals voluntarily entered the affirmative asylum system in
large numbers during this period principally in order to be placed into
immigration court proceedings where they could seek relief other than asylum.
Since they were generally not seeking asylum, they are not included in the
analysis articulated in this Article. 1
79
For privacy and security reasons, the Asylum Office data did not reveal the
identity of either the individual officer or the regional office. Numbers were
assigned randomly to each of the asylum officers on a nationwide basis. Letters
A through H were assigned randomly to each of the eight Asylum Offices.
The grant rates for each officer were provided to us in ranges of 5%: that
is, 1-5%, 6-10%, 11-15%, etc. We took the middle of the range in computing
and graphing our analysis. For example, an 11-15% range is calculated as 13%.
We assume that because our APC data cover more than 875 officers and more
177. See Letter from Andrew Schoenholtz to Joseph Langlois (Jan. 5, 2006) (on file
with authors). For further explanation of the term Asylee Producing Country, see supra text
accompanying note 37.
178. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(a) (2007).
179. For a full explanation, see Schoenholtz, supra note 33, at 338 n.62.
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than 133,000 cases, this rounding off of some rates higher than the midpoint
and some rates lower than the midpoint averages out in the analysis.
This study focuses on merits decisions only. Grants and denials are clearly
merits decisions, as are referrals to immigration courts based on interviews
where the asylum officers did not regard the merits as strong enough for grants.
We also treat rejections based on failure to meet the one-year filing deadline or
an exception to it as merits decisions, as filing on time is a criterion for
eligibility.'
80
Accordingly, our grant rate calculation divides the number of grants by the
number of cases decided on the merits. Cases decided on the merits include
grants; denials of applications filed by aliens in valid immigration statuses;
referrals of out-of-status aliens to immigration court because the applicants
failed, after interviews, to prove eligibility for asylum; and referrals of out-of-
status aliens to immigration court because the applicants did not prove either
that they had met the one-year application deadline or had a suitable
explanation for late filing.
To compare each office to office, and officer to officer, and account for
nationality differences in caseloads, we based comparisons on grant rates
regarding nationals from countries that, as noted above, we call Asylee
Producing Countries (APCs). To make this list, a country had to have had at
least 500 cases before the Asylum Office or immigration court in FY 2004, and
a national grant rate of at least 30% either before the Asylum Office or
immigration courts. These criteria ensure, first, that the database includes a
statistically significant number of applicants and grantees. Second, the minimal
grant rate requirement provides for a set of decisions where asylum officers or
immigration judges as a group have reached a reasonable degree of consensus
in concluding that many applicants from these countries are bona fide. Fifteen
countries met these criteria: Albania, Armenia, Cameroon, China, Colombia,
Ethiopia, Guinea, Haiti, India, Liberia, Mauritania, Pakistan, Russia, Togo, and
Venezuela. Countries that generated low grant rates, such as El Salvador and
Guatemala, are not on this list.
With regard to the Asylum Office data, we refined the set of APC countries
to ensure that there were enough data on individual asylum officers at enough
offices to compare certain nationalities fairly. For four nationalities, that was
not the case. From the list of fifteen APC countries used for the national and
regional data analysis, we could not use data concerning Guinea, Mauritania,
Togo, and Venezuela. For example, only one office decided the vast majority
of Venezuelan cases. So the analysis of individual decision making at the
Asylum Office consists of decisions regarding asylum seekers from the eleven
remaining APC countries. In our APC analyses, we included all officers who
had adjudicated at least fifty cases.
180. For more information about the one-year filing deadline, see supra notes 23-24
and accompanying text.
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In a second approach, we looked for a way to correct for differences in the
particular mix of APC countries in a region's pool of cases adjudicated in a
particular region which might affect that region's grant rate and explain at least
some of the APC grant rate disparity between offices. To accomplish this, we
looked at whether regional office grant rates continued to vary when we
narrowed our focus to applicants from a single country. To obtain enough data
on cases from particular countries that were adjudicated by an individual
officer, however, we had to reduce to twenty-five the minimum number of
cases decided by an asylum officer.
We computed mean grant rates for the group of applicants in question by
including all decisions for each office by all asylum officers in that office
during the period of analysis, even though we report the grant and deviation
rates only for officers who decided at least a certain threshold number of cases.
III. The Immigration Courts
The immigration court data were analyzed in two separate ways. First, we
examined grant rate data on their own. Second, we conducted a cross-tabulation
analysis of grant rate data in conjunction with biographical data and certain
data about the cases. Each section of analysis merits its own Subpart in this
methodology, as different methods were used for each.
A. Grant Rate Data Analysis
There are ample data on the asylum grant rates of particular immigration
courts and immigration judges; for this we are indebted to asylumlaw.org, 18 1
which filed a Freedom of Information Act request with the Executive Office of
Immigration Review to obtain this information. 182 This Article focuses on
asylum cases decided in immigration court between January 1, 2000, and
August 31, 2004, the period covered by that request. 183
181. These data can be found on the asylumlaw.org website. US Immigration Judge
Decisions in Asylum Cases, Jan. 2000 to Aug. 2004, http://www.asylumlaw.org/legal-tools/
index.cfm?fuseaction=showJudges2004.
182. The FOIA request sought the following information on decisions by immigration
judges on requests for asylum, withholding of removal, and claims for relief under the
Convention Against Torture: "the country of origin or asserted citizenship of each applicant;
the number of subsidiary applicants, if any; the immigration judge's name; the location (city)
in which the immigration court is located; the date of the hearing; the date of the decision;
and the decision, with respect to each form of relief requested." It also sought information on
whether the asylum seeker was represented, and whether her case was referred from the
Asylum Office. Letter from David Berten, President, asylumlaw.org, to Charles Adkins-
Blanch, Gen. Counsel, Executive Office for Immigration Review, U.S. Dep't of Justice
(Aug. 3, 2004) (on file with authors).
183. This database includes only asylum decisions, and does not include decisions on
claims of withholding of removal or protection under the Convention Against Torture.
Telephone Conversation with David Berten, asylumlaw.org, (Nov. 16, 2007). Denials
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The available data are vast, including 140,428 decisions on the merits. We
focused on significant comparisons between immigration courts and between
immigration judges on the same court. First, we looked only at immigration
courts that decided at least 1500 asylum cases during the relevant time frame.
We use the term "high-volume immigration courts," or "HVCs," to refer to
these seventeen courts. The seventeen high-volume courts are located in
Arlington, Atlanta, Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Dallas, Detroit, Houston, Los
Angeles, Memphis, Miami, Newark, New York City, Orlando, Philadelphia,
San Diego, and San Francisco. Then, to keep the countries of origin constant,
we limited our analysis to applications for asylum by nationals of the fifteen
APCs. 184 The term "national averages" includes only the cases from APC
countries decided by high volume courts.
We excluded detained cases from the data as best we could. This allowed
us to better compare decision making regarding the affirmative asylum cases at
the Asylum Offices with decision making at immigration courts. The Elizabeth
Immigration Court would have been among the top eighteen courts by volume
of cases (having heard over 1500 cases during this time period), but we
excluded Elizabeth from the study because this court hears almost exclusively
the cases of detained asylum seekers. We also excluded the cases heard by the
judges assigned to Miami's Krome Detention Center and those heard by the
judges assigned to New York's Varick Street Detention Center; again, the
judges in question were not assigned cases randomly. They were, instead,
assigned almost exclusively the cases of detained respondents. Such
respondents request asylum as a defense to removal and face much greater
obstacles to obtaining representation and corroborating evidence; both of these
factors could contribute to significantly lower grant rates. The cases of some
detained asylum seekers who are seeking asylum defensively remain in the
data, but we have removed from the study the judges who hear claims from
detained persons almost exclusively. 
185
We also applied minimum case decision requirements in the following
ways. When analyzing grant rates in individual courts on asylum claims from
individual APCs, we examined only HVCs that had decided at least one
hundred applications by nationals of that country during the period in question.
Similarly, in comparing decisions by immigration judges in the same court on
asylum claims from all APCs, we looked only at judges who had decided at
least one hundred asylum claims from APCs. In comparing decisions by
immigration judges in the same court on asylum claims from a particular APC,
we looked only at judges who had decided at least fifty cases involving the
resulting from legal bars-such as for missing the one-year filing deadline-are included in
these statistics as denials.
184. See supra Methodological Appendix Part I (listing the criteria by which we
selected these fifteen countries).
185. Due to resource constraints, we were not able to use the more reliable method of
removing defensive cases from the data, which would eliminate 95% of the detained cases.
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country in question and excluded decisions by immigration judges detailed to
the court in question. 186 For judges who switched courts during the time frame
studied, we placed them on the court in which the judge practiced the longest;
if there was a tie, we placed the judge on the court in which she sat between
2000 and 2002.
B. Cross-Tabulation Analysis
In addition to the simple grant rate analysis, we conducted a cross-
tabulation analysis to describe the effects of independent variables drawn from
biographical data and other asylum seeker data on asylum grant rates. While we
used the same grant rate data on which we relied on for the simple grant rate
analysis, we approached the data differently, thus requiring a separate
methodology Subpart for the cross-tabulation analysis.
We used immigration judges' biographical data, provided by the Executive
Office of Immigration Review, in conjunction with the grant rate data described
above to run this cross-tabulation analysis, as well as the regression analyses to
confirm the initial results. Again, we worked only with asylum cases, and did
not examine withholding of removal and Convention Against Torture claims.
The database includes 269,756 decisions. For the cross-tabulation and
regression analysis, we examined only grants and denials, and eliminated cases
that were abandoned, withdrawn, or disposed of in some other way. 187 This
step excluded 129,328 cases, leaving 140,428 cases in the database.
We also looked only at primary cases, excluding the cases of dependents.
Primary cases were identified in the following way: where the database
contained identical entries for more than one decision in all of the column
variables (date, court, nationality, decision, representation, type of claim), we
determined that these decisions came from the same "family." This method
may be overinclusive in some instances but is the most effective method
available using the data provided to us.188 From this "family," we selected a
186. In order to address caseload imbalances, EOIR solicits volunteers from among the
immigration judges to work on a different immigration court for a short period of time. This
process is known as "detailing." For further explanation of the process of and reasons for
detailing immigration judges to different courts, see U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
supra note 52, at 18.
187. Grants included conditional grants of asylum, which were awarded to individuals
granted asylum statutorily under the coercive population control provision of the
Immigration and Nationality Act. 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(42)(B) (2000). This provision awards
asylum to individuals persecuted through or on account of coercive population control
measures, but because there was a cap of 1000 grants of asylum each year under this
measure during the timeframe of the study, asylum was granted conditionally until a final
approval could be awarded. See Executive Office for Immigration Review, U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Fact Sheet: Conditional Grants of Asylum Based on Coercive Population Control
Policies (Dec. 16, 2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/press/04/
CPCAsylumFactSheetDec04.htm.
188. For example, we identified one such "family" with twenty-five members, which
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"primary case" and eliminated all the others as "dependent cases." This step
excluded 26,572 cases, leaving 113,856 cases in the database.
Additionally, we removed defensive cases from the data. We did this
because defensive cases are a good proxy for detained cases; we know that
94.5% of detained cases in the full database (excluding Mexican cases) were
defensive. 189 The defensive or affirmative nature of the case was determined by
the "CASYTYPE" column in the data; an entry of "E" represented a
defensive case and an entry of "I" represented an affirmative case.1 90 This
method excluded 46,042 cases (including 191 missing observations), leaving
67,814 cases in the database.
Finally, we removed Mexican cases from the data, for reasons explained at
Part II of the Methodological Appendix. This was easily accomplished as the
database included the country of origin for each asylum seeker. This step
excluded 1371 cases (including fourteen missing observations), leaving 66,443
cases in the database.'
9 1
We used cross-tabulations to examine the impact of nine independent
variables on the dependent variable, grant rate. These variables, further
explained below, include how many dependents the asylum seeker had in the
United States; whether the asylum seeker was represented by an attorney or
other accredited representative; gender of the judge; and previous work
experience: for the Immigration and Naturalization Service or Department of
Homeland Security, for the government, in the military, in a non-governmental
organization, in private practice, or in academia.
We determined the independent variables concerning asylum seekers from
the data provided in response to asylumlaw.org's FOIA request. Specifically,
dependents could be discerned through the method described above.
1 92
Representation was determined by EOIR's "ALIEN ATTY CODE" column;
cells in this column including a code were interpreted to mean that the asylum
seeker was represented and blank cells to mean that the asylum seeker was
unrepresented.
We determined the independent variables concerning immigration judges
largely through biographical data from the Executive Office of Immigration
Review. Some biographies were available on the EOIR website, and others
could be found at the very helpful Transactional Records Access Center
may imply that at least this categorization was overbroad. However, such large "families"
were not common in the database.
189. See E-mail from Executive Office of Immigration Review to Jaya Ramji-Nogales
(Jan. 25, 2007) (on file with authors).
190. E-mail from Executive Office of Immigration Review to Jaya Ramji-Nogales
(Jan. 22, 2007) (on file with authors).
191. For some independent variables, there were additional missing observations that
decreased the number of cases included in the analysis.
192. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
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(TRAC) website. 193 For four judges, we obtained biographical information
from news articles. Of 249 immigration judges whose decisions were analyzed,
we were unable to obtain biographical data for two: Richard Knuck and Terry
Christian. Moreover, there were some time gaps as to employment before
appointment in some of the biographical information provided by EOIR. The
gaps are as follows: twenty-three biographies with imprecise employment
information; ten biographies with one to two years of employment information
missing; twenty-two biographies with three to five years of employment
information missing; ten biographies with six to nine years of employment
information missing; and fifteen biographies with ten or more years of
employment information missing. We requested assistance in filling in these
holes from the Office of the Chief Immigration Judge, who sought but was
unable to provide us with further information. We mailed individual
questionnaires to each of the eighty immigration judges whose biographies
were missing information; we received responses from eight of these judges.
We made educated guesses concerning the bios with imprecise information, but
could not do so for the other holes in the biographies.
We pulled seven variables from the immigration judges' biographies. The
simplest to determine was gender. The most complicated biographical
information concerned employment history. We analyzed only post-law school
experience prior to appointment as an immigration judge. We broke this out
into six categories: government, INS or DHS, military, non-governmental
organization, private practice, and academia. Government included all non-
military employment in federal, state, or local government, but excluded prior
INS or DHS experience. INS or DHS comprised all employment in a role
adversarial to immigrants (including trial attorney, Office of Immigration
Litigation, special Assistant United States Attorney, border patrol, etc.).
Military experience included all post-law-school service; work in the reserves
did not count but work as a military judge did count. We categorized as non-
governmental organization experience all work for non-profit organizations that
involved the provision of legal assistance to indigent or marginalized
populations, including legal services and public defender organizations. Private
practice included all for-profit legal or non-legal work, including the World
Bank, Wells Fargo, and independent contract work for different law firms.
Finally, we included in the academia category only full-time law school
teaching jobs, whether they were clinical or classroom positions. Adjunct
positions were not counted. For periods in which the judge had two jobs, we
looked only at the judge's primary job-for example, we excluded time spent
in the Reserves, in the National Guard, or as an adjunct professor.
We ran a simple cross-tabulation analysis of grant rates by each of the nine
variables. We checked the statistical significance of these results using chi-




square tests and found that all variables were statistically significant. 194 This
analysis produced the results that are discussed in Part III of this Article. 19 5 The
theories underlying the inclusion of each variable follow.
Number of dependents. We were interested in examining the number of
dependents that each asylum seeker had with them in the United States to
determine the impact that the welfare of additional family members might have
on the immigration judge's decision. The Immigration and Nationality Act
limits the definition of dependents to the asylum seeker's spouse and unmarried
children under the age of twenty-one. Our hypothesis was that an asylum
seeker who brings his family with him to the United States might be more
credible than either a single asylum seeker or one who leaves his family behind
in his home country.
Representation. We were interested in knowing whether asylum seekers
were represented in immigration court by an attorney or other accredited
representative. As discussed above, several studies have found that
representation is a very important factor in winning asylum.'
96
Gender of the judge. We had no reason to think that male and female
judges might grant asylum at different rates. We included this variable in our
analysis, however, because we were able to determine the gender of the judge
easily from the pronouns used in the biographical data. When the cross-
tabulation revealed significant differences, we retained the variable in our
study.
Government experience. We wondered whether judges who had previously
worked for the government would be more or less supportive of the
government trial attorney's position in asylum cases.
INS/DHS experience. We wanted to know whether the data supported our
hypothesis that many years of work enforcing immigration laws against non-
citizens influenced the judge's approach to asylum cases.
Military experience. We wanted to know what kind of impact military
experience had on grant rates. On the one hand, patriotism and affinity with the
government might make these judges less likely to grant asylum claims. On the
other hand, the military justice system includes thorough training for its judges
and attorneys, and those judges who worked in the military after law school
may have had experience in this system and thus be more likely to decide cases
based on the merits rather than based on pre-existing biases.
NGO experience. We suspected that judges who had worked for non-
governmental organizations or in a defense capacity would both be more
194. The chi-square test examines the relationship between two variables, assessing
the difference between a situation in which no relationship exists between two variables and
the actual relationship between the variables being analyzed. Where the chi-square outcome
is statistically significant, a causal relationship between the variables may exist.
195. The full cross-tabulation results are reported at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/
humanrightsinstitute/refugeeroulette.htm.
196. See supra note 73.
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sympathetic to asylum seekers and have a greater understanding of how
difficult it is to present a successful asylum claims. As a result, we thought
these judges would be more likely to grant asylum claims.
Private practice experience. We were interested to learn whether
employment in the private sector had any impact on judges' decision making
process. Judges who represented immigrants in their private practice might be
more inclined to grant asylum claims. Judges who represented plaintiffs in
private practice would understand the difficulties posed in presenting any type
of case and might be more sympathetic to asylum seekers.
Academic experience. We wondered whether immigration judges who had
taught full time would be more open to seeing all sides of every issue and
therefore less likely to dismiss novel claims or those that alleged types of
persecution as to which State Department human rights reports were silent.
We ran three regression analyses to test for the general robustness of the
bivariate findings. These analyses select one variable at a time and equalize all
of the other variables in the database. They report the likelihood of a grant of
asylum if the selected variable is altered. We added seven variables to the
regression analyses to increase accuracy of our models: age of the judge,
President whose Attorney General appointed the judge, caseload of the judge,
caseload of the judge's court, national freedom ranking for the asylum seeker's
country of origin, weekly earnings in the state in which the judge's court sits,
and years on the bench.
To determine age, we used the year of graduation from college and
assumed each judge was age twenty-two when she graduated from college. For
judges who obtained their first law degree in a foreign country and did not have
a college graduation date, we used the date of the first law degree and added
twenty-two because in many countries, a law degree is a college degree. Age
was calculated to the date of each case. The country of origin of the asylum
seeker was determined by the "NATNAME" column in the data. We used
national freedom rankings from Freedom House to categorize these countries as
free, partially free, or not free.' 97 We determined weekly earnings in the state in
which the judge's court was located by tabulating Current Population Survey
microdata. 198 We used the date of the first appointment to determine the
political party of the appointing President. Cases decided by each immigration
judge and by each court on which those judges sat were determined using the
data provided in response to asylumlaw.org's FOIA request. Finally, we
calculated years on the bench by looking at date of initial appointment, and,
197. The freedom rating scores created by Freedom House and Freedom House's
description of its methodology are available through Freedom House, Freedom in the World,
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfin?page= 5.




where relevant, dates of termination of employment and reappointment. The
theories underlying the inclusion of these variables follow.
Age of the judge. We were interested in learning whether a judge's age
impacted grant rate. There could be many reasons for this: older judges might
be more jaded and cynical about asylum cases, having presumably seen more
fraudulent cases than the younger judges. Older judges might see only certain
kinds of claims (e.g., political cases) from certain regions (e.g., Communist
countries) as worthy of asylum, and may not have adapted to changes in asylum
law. On the other hand, as grandparents and parents, older judges might be
more sympathetic and protective towards asylum seekers.
Appointing President. We wondered whether the political leanings of the
President in office when the Attorney General appointed the judge would
impact the judge's rulings in asylum cases. This question goes back to the
Edwards-Revesz debate described in the Introduction to this Article--do judges
vote their political convictions or do they decide cases based on the law? We
were interested in the answer to this question.
Caseload and cases per court. These two variables, the first being the
number of cases that the judge in question decided during the period studied
and the second being the number of cases that the immigration court in which
the judge in question sat during the period studied, could impact decision
making in several ways ways. A judge who hears many cases might be likely to
hear and decide cases quickly, which might lead to a lower grant rate.
Particularly if the immigration court on which she sits hears a high volume of
cases, the judges might be under pressure to move their docket by denying
many cases. On the other hand, such a judge and her colleagues might become
more familiar with country conditions in certain countries after seeing
particularly well-prepared asylum cases from that country, and might be more
likely to grant these cases.
Local weekly earnings. We wondered whether local affluence would
impact judges' grant rates.
National freedom ranking. We investigated whether an asylum seeker's
country of origin impacts the possibility of being granted asylum. In a system
based on the merits of the cases, one might expect that asylum seekers from
countries with poor human rights records (i.e., partially free or not free
countries) would be regarded by judges as more likely to win asylum than
asylum seekers from countries viewed as free in this index. It is possible that
the stronger cases from the not free or partially free countries are granted in the
asylum office (especially given that our database includes only affirmative
cases); either way, this variable is of interest.
Years on the bench. We wondered whether the number of years a judge had
served on the immigration bench might impact their grant rate, independent of
their age. A judge with more years on the bench might understand the law more
thoroughly and decide cases more impartially, or may become jaded by the
process and skeptical of all asylum claims before her.
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The first regression, using the logistic model, confirmed the results of the
cross-tabulation. 199 We next ran a logistic regression with fixed effects for
court. Five variables were less than 95% likely to be statistically significant:
caseload of the judge, years the judge had sat on the immigration bench,
appointment under President Reagan, prior military experience, and prior
private practice experience. Prior military experience was found to be slightly
positively correlated with grant rate. Otherwise, the regression confirmed the
results of the cross-tabulation analysis. We also ran a hierarchical linear
regression, which confirmed the results of our cross-tabulations. The results of
these regression analyses are reported at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/
humanrightsinstitute/refugeeroulette.htm.
IV. The Board of Immigration Appeals
We requested data from the Board regarding asylum determinations for
fiscal years 1998-2005. We specifically asked for statistics that would enable us
to examine individual member decision making on the merits of claims for
asylum. We also requested data regarding the mode of decision making (i.e.,
panel, single member short opinions, or affirmances without opinion). Finally,
we asked for information on nationality and representation. 20 0
The Board provided us with data on nationality and representation, as well
as on mode of decision making. Two important problems surfaced, however,
with regard to the data that the Board collects and how it does so. First, the
Board knows the period of service of every Board member, and it knows the
outcome of each Board decision, but it does not keep records from which it can
ascertain which members made or participated in which decisions, or from
which it could calculate the rate at which individual members rendered
decisions (asylum grants or remands) that benefited asylum applicants.
Therefore, we were not able to perform an analysis of disparities in the
decisions from one member to the next, as we were able to do for asylum
officers and immigration judges. Nor could we explore the possible effect of
the genders or prior experiences of the adjudicators. Second, for fiscal years
2001 and 2002, the Board did not have reliable data on the mode of decision
making-whether particular decisions were rendered by a single member or by
a three-member panel. The coding of the decision modes changed during that
period. Unfortunately, the very helpful EOIR staff responsible for statistical
reports did not have the information needed to decipher the meaning of the
codes used in those years.
199. The appointment under President Reagan variable, which was not part of the
cross-tabulation analysis, was less than 95% likely to be statistically significant.
200. See Letter from Andrew Schoenholtz to Lori Scialabba, Chairman, Bd. of
Immigration Appeals (Jan. 30, 2006) (on file with authors).
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The BIA provided us with a set of decision and disposition codes that it
uses to describe the full range of its procedural and substantive
determinations. 201 As discussed above, our study focused on asylum merits
decisions only. Accordingly, we analyzed only those asylum decisions in which
a merits decision was either favorable to the non-citizen or to the government.
Our analysis excluded immigration appeals that did not involve asylum, as well
as asylum cases which the Board coded as outcomes which it could not
determine to be either favorable or unfavorable to the applicant.
Most of the BIA analyses included all nationalities. In certain instances, we
examined only APC merits decisions. In those analyses, we include decisions
on all fifteen APC countries. In one analysis, we report the individual APC
grant rates for individual countries. Where we were not examining the mode of
decision making, we included the data for all the fiscal years provided. Any of
our analyses that specifically examine three-member panel decisions, single
member short opinions, or single member affirmances without opinion only
included fiscal years 1998-2000 and 2003-2005, for the reason discussed
above.
Despite the limits on the data set, we were able to measure the degree of
change that occurred once the BIA implemented the major streamlining
reforms proposed in February 2002. We compared changes in the rates of
decisions favorable to asylum applicants for the three decision modes
individually, comparatively, and combined.
V. The United States Courts of Appeals
The U.S. Courts of Appeals do not keep separate statistics showing their
dispositions of cases involving asylum, withholding, or the Convention Against
Torture. We therefore had to construct a database containing all of these
decisions over a representative period of time. We chose the calendar years
2004 and 2005 as the period for our consideration.
202
201. Board of Immigration Appeals, Board of Immigration Appeals Decision and
Disposition Codes (June 2005) (unpublished code sheet, on file with the authors).
202. In retrospect, it might have been better to have used FY 2004 and 2005 (October
1, 2003, through September 30, 2005) as the database, for purposes of better comparison
with federal statistics which are usually kept by fiscal year. However, by the time we
realized this, we had already compiled the calendar year 2004 database. We do not know of
any reason why our use of a time frame that starts and ends three months later than the fiscal
year would appreciably change any of the statistical information. The database of cases in
most courts of appeals is relatively small, so in our study of decisions of these courts, we
searched for remands after denials by the Board of Convention Against Torture cases as well
as remands after denials of asylum. Asylum cases are, however, the vast majority of the
cases in our database. We did not specifically search for appeals involving denials of
withholding of removal because foreign nationals who appeal from denials of withholding
also appeal from denials of their applications for asylum.
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Most asylum decisions are unpublished, non-precedential decisions, so we
could not obtain the necessary data from printed reports. However, six circuits
(the First Circuit through the Sixth Circuit) have searchable websites on which
they have posted the full texts of all of their calendar year 2004 and 2005
precedential and non-precedential decisions. For these circuits, we began by
searching for all cases in which one of the parties was identified as "Ashcroft"
(for 2004), "Gonzales" (for 2005) or "Attorney General. 20 3 We inspected
these cases individually, rejecting from the database those that were not appeals
from the Board of Immigration Appeals. 20 4 From this preliminary database, we
excluded all cases that did not involve appeals from denials of asylum,
withholding of removal, or claims under the Convention Against Torture. 20 5
We also excluded cases that involved only procedural issues rather than any
consideration of the merits. Specifically, we excluded those in which the court
decided that a motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider had not been timely
filed, or other procedural prerequisites (such as filing a promised brief) had not
been met, and those in which the foreign national claimed only that the process
of adjudication itself (e.g., the summary affirmance procedure of the Board)
violated due process.20 6 Cases in which the court characterized its decision as
either an "affirmance" of the Board's decision or a "denial" or "dismissal" of
the appeal (or "petition for review") were regarded as losses for the foreign
203. All appeals from Board decisions to the U.S. Courts of Appeals are taken by
foreign nationals; the United States does not appeal decisions rendered by its own
Department of Justice. See supra note 30. All asylum appeals considered by the courts in
2004 appeared to have been filed against John Ashcroft in his capacity as Attorney General.
Appeals from decisions of his predecessor Janet Reno, who left office in January 2001, had
been resolved or had been renamed to reflect the appointment of Attorney General Ashcroft.
Alberto R. Gonzales became Attorney General on January 3, 2005. Nine First Circuit cases
from early 2004 were denominated as cases against the Immigration and Naturalization
Service, or INS, an agency within the Department of Justice whose functions were
transferred to the Department of Homeland Security in 2003, but these nine cases were
located and included in the database. The Department of Homeland Security is not the
named respondent in these cases because the appeals are technically Petitions for Review of
a decision of the Attorney General.
204. In some cases, aliens in detention sought writs of habeas corpus from the district
courts and appealed denials to the Court of Appeals. These cases were excluded from the
database.
205. The texts of a small number of non-precedential Fifth Circuit decisions were so
summary that we could not even tell whether these cases involved asylum. We excluded
these cases from the database.
206. However, we included such a case if the foreign national also challenged the
merits of the Board's individualized decision and the court considered those merits. In a few
cases, a foreign national appealed both the denial of an asylum claim and the denial of a
motion to reopen. These cases were included in the database if the Court of Appeals
evaluated the merits of the asylum claim or the fairness of the immigration judge hearing in




national; any remand of the case to the Board, in whole or in part, was
considered a success for the foreign national.20 7
The courts' official websites for the Seventh through the Eleventh Circuits
were not as complete in that they did not include all of the unpublished
decisions for the two years in question. For the Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth
Circuits, we relied on a Westlaw search to collect the preliminary database and
to exclude decisions that were merely procedural. 0 8 We restricted the database
by applying the same criteria that we used in the first six circuits, again
examining each decision individually to characterize it as a denial or a remand.
The Ninth and Eleventh Circuits presented special challenges. Until April
2005, the Eleventh Circuit neither posted its unpublished decisions on its
website nor supplied them to Westlaw. However, Westlaw did post the briefs
for the Eleventh Circuit cases during this period in its CTAl 1 database.
Because the dates on the briefs predated the dates of the corresponding
207. The statistics for the Second Circuit understate both the number of asylum
appeals disposed of by that circuit and the number of cases remanded. In most circuits, the
Office of Immigration Litigation (OIL) of the Department of Justice represents the
government in immigration appeals, including asylum cases. Except in very rare instances,
OIL lawyers have not negotiated with lawyers representing foreign nationals or agreed to
stipulate for remands. For historical reasons, however, the U.S. Attorney's Office for the
Southern District of New York (USAO-SDNY), rather than OIL, has represented the
government in Second Circuit immigration cases. USAO-SDNY has been willing to discuss
cases with foreign nationals' lawyers and to stipulate to remands when it appears that the
Board of Immigration Appeals has affirmed an erroneous or doubtful immigration court
decision. These negotiated remands do not show up in any searchable database of court
opinions. Along with stipulated withdrawals of appeals, they do show up in the PACER
records of Second Circuit cases, but unfortunately, although the docket sheets show that the
case was resolved without a decision by the court, those docket sheets do not usually reveal
whether the disposition was a voluntary withdrawal, a negotiated withdrawal, or a negotiated
remand. USAO-SDNY does not keep statistics on the disposition of asylum cases in which it
engaged in discussion or negotiation before the case removed from the docket of the circuit.
It may seem surprising that the Second Circuit decided only about thirty-six asylum cases
during 2004, although it disposed of 421 such cases during 2005. During 2004, the Second
Circuit received more than 2000 appeals from BIA decisions. See Palmer et al., supra note
15, at 54 tbl. I (showing 945 appeals from the BIA to the Second Circuit from June through
September 2004). However, the USAO-SDNY and the court were so unprepared for the
sudden increase in caseload that most cases were simply put into a backlog, which built up to
about 5000 cases before the Second Circuit decided, in August 2005, to adopt a "non-
argument calendar" to dispose of most BIA appeals without oral argument. Press Release,
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Non-Argument Calendar in the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals (Aug. 4, 2005), http://www.nywd.uscourts.gov/document/Non-
Argument%20Calendar.pdf.
208. For 2004 cases, we used the following search string for each circuit: (asylum
torture & ashcroft "attorney general") & da(aft 12/31/2003 & bef 1/1/2005) % bg(habeas
"motion to reopen" "motion to reconsider" "cancellation of removal" "adjustment of status"
"suspension of deportation"). For 2005 cases the search string sought cases in which
Gonzales rather than Ashcroft was a party and substituted dates in 2005. The searches
excluded appeals from the BIA that may have mentioned asylum in passing but were
actually claims of erroneous denial of other forms of relief from removal. It also excluded
habeas corpus appeals and appeals from motions to reopen.
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opinions, we expanded the search dates for 2004 to begin with March 1, 2003,
and to end with October 31, 2004.209 This search produced 253 hits. We
examined both the briefs and the docket sheets 2 1 in these cases and found that
89 cases were appeals from the Board involving the merits of asylum,
withholding of removal, or the torture convention.
2 11
The Westlaw search of Ninth Circuit cases revealed 1229 cases in calendar
year 2004 that qualified for our preliminary database, a much larger volume of
decided cases than in any of the other circuits. The volume in 2005 was only
slightly smaller (877 cases). We could not examine so many cases individually
to determine whether the outcome was an affirmance or a remand. Instead,
beginning with the 1229 and 877 cases, we searched for the term "remand."
That search yielded 291 cases for 2004 and 235 cases for 2005, which we
examined individually. We found that 225 of the 291 cases in 2004 were
actually remands; the rest mentioned the word "remand" somewhere in the
opinion but affirmed the Board's denial of relief. For 2005, the comparable
number was 183 actual remands. Therefore, we computed the remand rate for
the Ninth Circuit in 2004 as 18.3% (225 actual remands out of 1229 asylum
cases). For 2005, the remand rate was 20.9% (183 remands out of 877 cases).
For our analysis of remand rates from the fifteen APC countries, we had to
determine the nationality of each appellant. For cases in circuits other than the
Ninth Circuit, we obtained the nationality of the applicant by examining the
decisions (or for the Eleventh Circuit, the briefs). To find the approximate
number of APC cases in the Ninth Circuit, we did a string search in the
Westlaw database for that circuit, using the same criteria as those described
above but limiting the search further by requiring the name of one of the fifteen
countries. This search yielded 552 cases, too many to examine individually, so
there are undoubtedly a few "false positives," such as decisions that mentioned
flight through one of the listed countries rather than specifying the country in
question as that of the applicant's nationality. We then added the term
"remand" to the string and then examined all of the resulting cases individually
to eliminate those that were not true remands. This process showed 243
remands, again a slight overstatement because some of those cases named
countries that were not the country of the applicant's nationality. We encourage
other researchers to do a more careful study of the Ninth Circuit's remand rate
209. We assume that all Eleventh Circuit appeals that were briefed before March 2003
were decided in 2003, not 2004, and that no case in which the foreign national's brief was
filed in November or December 2004 would have resulted in an opinion during the calendar
year 2004. In the CTAI I database for 2004 decisions, we used the following search string to
expand the search: (asylum torture) & (Ashcroft "attorney general") & da(aft 3/1/2003 & bef
10/31/2004) % bg (habeas "motion to reopen").
210. The docket sheets may be inspected for a fee on the government's PACER
system, PACER Service Center, http://pacer.psc.uscourts.gov.
211. Seven other cases may have qualified by our criteria, but the court had not posted




by examining each published and unpublished case individually rather than
relying on the searching method that we had to use because our resources were
limited.
For our analysis of remand rates from China, we used the same search
string we used for APC decisions, but limited the search to decisions that used
the word "China." We then manually eliminated cases that were not actually
asylum appeals by nationals of China (e.g., cases in which asylum seekers from
other nations had traveled in China).
We analyzed only the Third and Sixth Circuits for internal consistency. As
noted in the text, the judges of the Fourth, Fifth and Eleventh Circuits did not
vote to remand very often, so although consistency was quite high in these
circuits, there were not enough votes to study the effect of appointments by
different presidential administrations. The total number of cases in the First and
Tenth Circuits was not large enough for analysis. Evaluation of the Second
Circuit was complicated by the fact that because of the docket explosion
described in the text, many of its more difficult cases were held for 2006. We
chose not to evaluate consistency in the Seventh Circuit because it was not
typical, in that it had an unusually high remand rate. The Ninth Circuit had too
many cases for us to count individual votes of judges. That left only the Third,
Sixth, and Eighth Circuits, and of those circuits, we evaluated consistency in




Professor David Law studied the votes in asylum cases in the Ninth Circuit
between 1992 and 2001. His primary focus was a study of whether judges made
strategic use of publication rules to shape the development of case law. 2 12 He
concluded, among other things, that "to some extent, judges vote strategically
and bargain amongst themselves so as to maximize the amount of 'good law'
and minimize the amount of 'bad law' that will appear in the pages of the
Federal Reporter and bind their colleagues in subsequent cases."
Professor Law was kind enough to share with us his data on how each
judge voted in the nearly 2000 cases in his study.2 14 The method by which he
selected cases was similar to ours, with these exceptions: (a) he included
affirmances of habeas corpus denials in his study, whereas we excluded them,
and he reports that there were not many such decisions; (b) he included both
grants of asylum and remands to the Board as decisions favorable to asylum
applicant; in our study, there were virtually no grants, because the Supreme
Court in Ventura had directed the appellate courts to affirm or remand in nearly
all cases.
2 15
From his data set, we excluded all judges who cast fewer than 25 votes
during the period in question.
Figure 55 shows the grant rates of the Ninth Circuit judges.
212. His study appears as David S. Law, Strategic Judicial Lawmaking: Ideology,
Publication, and Asylum Law in the Ninth Circuit, 73 U. CIN. L. REv. 817, 819 (2005).
213. Id. at 864.
214. Like us, Professor Law had to create the data set by examining each published
and unpublished decision that mentioned asylum; the U.S. courts do not code asylum
decisions of the Courts of Appeals as such. He did so with the financial support of the
National Science Foundation. We also received help from Professor Joshua Fischman, who
has written an article based on Prof. Law's data. See Joshua B. Fischman, Decision-Making
Under a Norm of Consensus: A Structural Analysis of Three-Judge Panels (Amer. Law &
Econ. Ass'n Working Paper Series, Paper No. 58, 2007), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=912299.
215. See INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12 (2002). Professor Law separately coded










30O/o .. . . . ..
10%
0%
Figure 56 shows that twenty of the forty-four judges (45%) voted for the
applicant at a rate that was more than 50% higher or lower than the 17.9%
mean rate at which judges in the Ninth Circuit voted in favor of the asylum
applicant on the merits.











Figure 57 shows that as in the Sixth Circuit, judges appointed by
Democrats voted for asylum applicants at a rate much higher than those
appointed by Republicans.








Democratic Appointees (Gray); Republican Appointees (Black)
This visual representation may actually understate the degree of the
differences among the parties' appointees. In fact Democrats voted, in the
aggregate, to support the applicant 24.0% of the time, while Republicans voted
to support the applicant 10.9% of the time, less than half as often. Looking at
the effect of voting on panels, Professor Law concluded that:
With an all-Republican panel, the likelihood that an unpublished decision will
favor the asylum seeker is just 4%. The addition of one Democrat to the panel
triples that probability to 12%. With two Democrats on the panel, the
probability increases again to just over 20%, and with an all-Democrat panel,
the asylum seeker's chances top 30%.216
A final way to look at the data by party is to examine the extent to which
disparities from the mean were on the low side or the high side by party:













Democratic Appointees (Gray); Republican Appointees (Black)
This graph shows that of the nine Republican judges who voted lower or
higher than the mean by more than 50%, seven were on the low side, whereas
of the eleven Democrats who so voted, eight were on the high side. This is yet
another way of saying that political party seems to matter, even when judges
are applying a federal refugee statute.
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